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Prescriptive building codes have been used for many years and created a common sense regarding 
what an adequate fire safety design and an acceptable level of risk is. Introducing performance based 
building codes brought architectural flexibility, more bespoke design, and cost-benefit analysis into 
fire safety design previously not possible in a number of different building types. Alternative 
Solutions are now common place in almost every residential apartment building in Australia and often 
includes a number of typical non-compliances such as extended travel distances between apartments 
and exits. However, it is not that easy to accurately evaluate the level of safety provided by a fire 
safety design in a residential building. The reasons for that are many such as the complexity of the 
system (both active and passive systems), the different aspects affected during a fire (all sub-systems 
in the IFEG) but also the harsh commercial conditions during a residential building project. The 
objective of this thesis was therefore to investigate if (or to what degree) the inclusions of passive and 
active systems compensate for the increased risk due to the extended travel distance for any given 
(non-compliant) building solution. This was done through the development of a comparative risk 
model for residential buildings with a focus on the impact of extended travel distance on occupant 
life safety. The developed risk model indicates that the main contribution to the risk to occupants 
when travel distances are increased in residential buildings can be derived from the increased number 
of apartments. By adding more apartments connected to a corridor, the probability of a fire to occur 
on that level, as well as the consequence for all scenarios when smoke leaks into the corridor are 
increased. Therefore the relative risk nearly increases as the square of the number of apartments 
increase. The difference in travel time due to the extended travel distance was shown to not have any 
measurable impact on the risk level for corridor lengths between 7 m and 25 m in length. 
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Summary 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate if (or to what degree) the inclusion of 
passive and active systems compensates for the increased risk due to the extended 
travel distance for any given (non-compliant) building solution. This was done 
through the development of a comparative risk model for residential buildings with a 
focus on the impact of extended travel distance on occupant life safety. 
The model was developed using an event tree approach together with an ASET/RSET 
analysis (comparing Available Safe Egress Time with Required Safe Egress Time) 
and included 240 scenarios. Probabilities were determined from data, fault tree 
analyses and engineering judgement. Consequences were determined through 
modified ASET/RSET analyses using fire modelling in Fire Dynamics Simulator 
(FDS), previous studies and engineering judgement. The model was configured in an 
Excel spread sheet by using the add-in software PrecisionTree and @Risk from 
Palisade Tools. For each evaluated building solution the model generates an average 
risk value estimating the expected number of fatalities per year at one typical level of 
the apartment building and a curve in an F/N diagram. The values generated by the 
risk model should not be interpreted as accurate estimations of the absolute risk, but 
as comparative values of the risk to occupants based on detailed analyses for several 
scenarios including both fires in the corridor and the apartments with safety systems 
both working and failing. 
The result generated by the model was shown to be sensitive to a number of variables, 
and these fixed values variables were therefore replaced by probability distributions. 
By iterating the result of the model using a Monte Carlo simulation with values from 
the applied distributions it was shown that the generated risk can be characterised as a 
triangular probability distribution for less complex buildings, and as natural-like 
distributions for more complex buildings.  
The model can be used for comparing building solutions and for quantifying the 
change in risk level when different fire safety measures are provided or removed. This 
is done by dividing one generated risk value with the other and calculating a risk ratio.  
The model cannot verify whether the risk level in the evaluated building solution is 
acceptable or not. The model can only tell how large the risk level is compared to the 
risk level for another building solution. If the model is used to compare an alternative 
building solution with a prescriptive compliant building solution it appears that a 
safety factor should be applied. Alternatively the probability distributions from the 
uncertainty analysis can be used from which the risk ratio at different percentiles can 
be obtained. 
The main contribution to the risk to occupants when travel distances are increased in 
residential buildings is due to the increased number of apartments. By adding 
apartments in the corridor, the probability of a fire to occur on that level, as well as 
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the consequence for all scenarios when smoke leaks into the corridor are increased. 
That means the relative risk nearly increases as the square of the factor of apartment 
increase.  
The difference in travel time due to the extended travel distance was shown to not 
have any measurable impact on the risk level for corridor lengths between 7 m and 
25 m. If corridors would be increased significantly longer than that, the travel time 
could have an impact on the risk level. But even then it is likely other factors such as 
number of apartments, provisions for fire brigade intervention and risk for queue in 
the stair would have a larger impact on the risk level than the actual travel time. 
The model can show how the risk is changed when different fire safety measures are 
provided or removed from a building solution. The impact of adding or removing fire 
safety measures is different depending on the building solution. For example the 
effect on the relative risk when providing a sprinkler system is not the same if it is 
provided in a building that has a smoke detection system installed as in a building that 
does not have smoke detection system installed. 
The impact of changing building features in a building with a corridor length of 9 m, a 
maximum travel distance of 6 m and smoke alarms installed in each apartment is 
shown in the table below. 
Change of fire safety measure Impact on the risk level 
18 m additional travel distance for all 
apartments 
no impact 
Doubling the number of apartments in the 
corridor 
+ 328 % 
Providing a heat detection system - 77 % 
Providing a smoke detection system - 77 % 
Providing a sprinkler system - 89 % 
Removing fire ratings between the 
apartments and the corridor 
+ 29 % (presuming smoke seals are 
provided to the apartment doors) 
Removing self-closers from apartment 
doors 
+ 7 % (presuming smoke seals are 
provided to the apartment doors) 
Providing smoke seals to apartment doors - 22 % 
Removing smoke alarms from apartments + 14 % 
Providing a mechanical corridor 
ventilation system (including smoke 
detection to activate system) 
- 88 % 
 
The analysis showed that deterministic evaluations are very depending on what 
scenario is evaluated, and even if the consequences have been lowered in the 
Alternative Solution, the increased probability for a fire to occur could generate a 
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higher average risk. If the analysis is limited to the consequences of fires the result of 
it could show that the safety level has been improved while in reality the risk to 
occupants within the building actually has been increased due to the higher 
probability of fire. 
One way of decreasing the level of uncertainty is to conduct comparative assessments.  
Using comparative assessments means that assumptions and limitations, even if they 
are wrong, applies to both compared solutions and therefore don’t affect the results in 
any direction. However a comparative assessment does not assure its validity. The 
developed model showed that the scenario chosen for evaluation is unquestionably 
essential to the result. But even more importantly, the development of the model also 
revealed that deterministic ASET/RSET analyses may sometimes not be appropriate 
for evaluating fire safety in extended corridors. 
The conclusion from this work is that evaluating fire safety in residential buildings 
should always be a probabilistic risk process considering both the likelihood and 
consequences of several credible scenarios when safety systems are both working and 
failing. To conduct a quantitative risk analysis for every residential apartment 
building project which includes deviations from the prescriptive requirements of the 
building code is not feasible in the economic environment they are developed in. The 
model in this thesis was therefore developed to show how the process can be 
standardised and made more efficient. However, the model can still be improved to 
achieve more accurate results. The model was also shown to be largely depending on 
choices of tenability criteria, evaluated fire scenarios etc. which means the results 
generated by the model must always be interpreted by the user and cannot be relied on 
solely without engineering judgement evaluating the reasonableness of the findings. 
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Terminology and Definitions 
Definitions 
Alternative Solution - A building solution that satisfies the Performance 
Requirements by other means than complying with prescriptive requirements. 
Available Safe Egress Time – The time from fire ignition until escape no longer is 
possible for a specific scenario. 
Deemed-to-Satisfy – Prescriptive provisions in the BCA. 
Detection scenario – A given set of circumstances which generates a specific 
detection time. 
Deterministic – An approach where the input parameters for the scenario are pre-
determined, which will result in a single outcome. 
Effective height – The height to the floor of the topmost storey from the floor of the 
lowest storey providing direct egress to a road or open space. 
Event tree - A logic diagram which presents the probabilities for different outcomes 
of an initial event depending on the following sequence of events. 
Fire Resistance Level – The grading period in minutes determined for structural 
adequacy, integrity and insulation. 
Fire scenario – A fire scenario is, in this thesis, a specific design fire with all 
parameters affecting the fire determined. 
Flashover - The rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement in a fire of 
combustible material within an enclosure. 
F/N Curve (Frequency – Number curve) – A statistical measure to present societal 
risk. The curve shows the frequency of accidents causing x or more fatalities per year. 
Fractional Effective Dose – The cumulative effect of exposure to multiple narcotic 
gases. 
Individual risk – the risk to which any particular occupant is subjected at on the 
location defined by the scenario. If an occupant is inside a building, he or she will be 
subjected to a risk in terms of the hazard frequency (Frantzich, 1998). 
Monte Carlo analysis – A method to perform random sampling to compute 
predictions of mathematical models. 
0 Terminology and Definitions 
x 
 
Occupant Warning System – Any system that provide occupants with a warning 
signal of fire hazard. 
Probabilistic – An approach where both the probabilities and the consequences of 
different scenarios are evaluated. 
Response scenario – A given set of circumstances which determines how quickly the 
occupants in the building decide to evacuate. Is depending on how the occupants 
become aware of a fire. 
Required Safe Egress Time – The time required from when the fire is initiated until 
the occupant has evacuated. The sum of the detection time, response time and 
movement time. 
Societal risk – The risk to the society for example characterised as expected number 
of fatalities per year. 
Sole Occupancy Unit – Apartment. 
Abbreviations 
AOF Apartment Of Fire origin 
AFAC Australian Fire Authority Council 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ASET Available Safe Egress Time 
BCA Building Code of Australia 
CO Carbon Monoxide 
DtS Deemed-to-Satisfy (prescriptive provision) 
ERL Expected Risk to Life 
FED Fractional Effective Dose 
FRL Fire Resistance Level 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IFEG International Fire Engineering Guidelines 
IR Individual Risk 
PDF Probability Density Function 
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PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 
RSET Required Safe Egress Time 
SOU Sole Occupancy Unit 
List of Symbols 
α Growth factor [kW/s2] 
𝜌∞ Ambient density of air [kg/m
3] 
𝐴0 Area of opening [m
2] 
AL Leakage area [m
2] 
ci Consequence for scenario i 
n Number of scenarios 
∆𝑝 Pressure difference between the areas [Pa] 
pi Probability for scenario i 
Q̇ Energy release rate [kW] 
𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡 Total risk to life in the building 
si Description of scenario i 
?̇?𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘  Air leakage flow [m
3/s] 
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1 Introduction 
When the travel distance from apartments to an exit in a residential building is 
increased the most obvious fire safety issue is that in case of a fire on that floor, 
occupants in those apartments would have to walk a longer distance to reach an exit 
and thus might be exposed to smoke and heat during a longer time period. On that 
basis it is reasonable to argue that the safety level of the occupants located furthest 
away from the exit has been decreased by the increased travel distance. But increasing 
the travel distance also affects the risk to occupants in other ways.  For example, the 
more apartments on a floor, the higher the likelihood of a fire occurring on that floor. 
So is the longer walking distance the most influent factor on the risk level, or are there 
other factors that have a larger impact on the risk? 
This thesis constitutes the finalisation of a Master of Science in Risk Management and 
Safety Engineering and Bachelor of Science in Fire Safety Engineering at Lund 
University, Sweden. The thesis aims at quantifying how the risk level is changed 
when the length of the corridor is extended by developing a comparative risk model 
for residential buildings.  
This first chapter explains the background to the study, the objectives and scope of it, 
and also specifies the limitations and boundaries of the work conducted. 
1.1 Background 
Matters regarding the safety, health and amenity of people in buildings have 
traditionally rested with the State and Territory Governments of Australia. There have 
been eight separate Acts of Parliament and eight distinct building regulatory systems 
which caused a legislative maze for building practitioners to work through. The work 
to create a more uniform building code started after World War II by establishing an 
interstate committee to pool resources for the benefit of all states. The committee 
drafted a technical code for building regulatory purposes referred to as the ”Australian 
Model Uniform Building Code” (AMUBC), and was released in the early 1970’s 
(ABCB, 2013). The building code was still modified in each state to suit their specific 
needs and perceptions. During the 1980’s the Local Government Ministerial Council 
decided to form the Australian Building Regulations Coordinating Council 
(AUBRCC) to replace the committee and develop the Building Code of Australia 
(BCA). The first version of the BCA was released 1988 (ABCB, 2013). The code was 
fully prescriptive and developed by combining various parts of the eight different 
state and territory codes. In 1994 the Australian Building Code Board requested that 
the BCA to be converted to a performance-based document. To set requirements for 
performance, the code was written in a bottom-up manner – being constructed from 
what the prescriptive provisions already demanded. The new performance based BCA 
was first released 1996. In 2003 a decision was made to move to an annual 
amendment cycle (ABCB, 2013). Simultaneously guidelines referred to as the Fire 
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Engineering Guidelines (FEG, 1996) were developed to provide a link between the 
regulatory system and fire engineering, provide guidance for the process of fire 
engineering  and provide guidance on available methodologies and data (IFEG, 2005). 
The third edition of the guidelines was released in 2005 and incorporates the 
regulatory system in regards to fire engineering in Canada, USA and New Zealand as 
well, and is referred to as the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG, 2005). 
The new performance based building code brought architectural flexibility and cost-
benefit analysis into fire safety engineering through so called Alternative Solutions 
(Johansson, 2010); 
 Permitting the use of alternative materials, forms of construction or designs 
to the prescriptive requirements. 
 Permitting designs to be tailored to a particular building. 
 Giving clear information on what the building code is trying to achieve. 
 Allowing architectural flexibility previously not possible in a number of 
different building types. 
Alternative Solutions are now common place in almost every residential apartment 
building in Australia and often include “standard” non-compliances such as extended 
travel distances to an exit, reduced fire resistance levels, unprotected openings within 
a prescribed distance of the property boundary, and internal discharge of fire isolated 
stairs. When the building solution includes deviations from the DtS Provisions it must 
be assessed to assure that it still achieves the prescribed Performance Requirements 
and therefore complies with the BCA. 
1.1.1 Safety in residential buildings 
To evaluate the level of safety provided by a fire safety design in a residential 
building accurately is particularly difficult compared to other building types. The 
reasons for that are many; 
i. A residential apartment building is a complex system comprising both passive 
and active fire safety precautions and the consequences of a fire evolves all 
sub-systems in the IFEG (2005). In other words, the different parameters and 
options when designing a residential floor plate can affect the outcome in 
regards to a number of fire safety aspects such as the fire initiation and 
development, the risk for smoke spread, the risk for fire spread, the detection 
and notification time, the means of occupant evacuation and also the means 
for fire service operations. The number of credible fire scenarios is also 
significant. 
ii. The buildings are developed in a prescriptive building code environment with 
historical requirements where the acceptable level of risk has not been 
determined scientifically, but more likely as a reaction to specific fire events 
and by expert judgement in building code authorities carried forward through 
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history. This does not mean that the current level is safe or unsafe, but it does 
mean that the current safety margin afforded is not well understood. 
iii. A residential building is most often a relatively small building design type 
developed under harsh commercial conditions. The budget and profit margins 
are often small and the design team, builders and developers may not have 
expertise knowledge about fire safety. Overall there is not any residential 
building project with a budget large enough to properly investigate the risks 
due to fires. 
iv. A study based on a number of random report reviews indicates that 
engineering analysis in Australia for these buildings are frequently done with 
simple qualitative analysis with no or not adequate level of assessments 
(Johansson & Olsson, 2010a). Moreover and possibly even more importantly 
the level of design in a random sample of buildings varies greatly, and on face 
value has a completely different risk level. Is it possible that the level of safety 
achieved currently is not well understood due to the tools applied and the 
depth of analysis varies too much and the risk is not properly addressed? 
The author theorises that especially the typical deviation from the DtS Provisions 
when the travel distance from an apartment door to an exit (most often a fire isolated 
stair) could due to its complexity be a solution that seldom is assessed properly and 
instead based on a number of assumptions introducing large uncertainties to whether 
the Performance Requirements are achieved or not. 
1.1.2 New verification methods 
Internationally, there seems to be concerns about the alternative building solutions 
developed from since the performance based code was introduced. There is a risk of 
fire engineers conducting manipulated analyses to suit their business interests rather 
than providing an adequate level of safety in the building (Parliament of NSW, 2002). 
As previously noted, the performance based building codes brought more freedom to 
the industry, but that also meant that any qualified person could come up with an 
Alternative Solution which in that person’s view satisfied the Performance 
Requirements. There is now therefore a trend for introducing verification methods as 
attempts believed to address issues such as lack of competency of fire safety 
engineers or as public instruments to try and achieve consistent level of safety in 
buildings. These verification methods are further explained in Section 2.2. 
1.1.3 Previous risk studies 
There have been previous attempts to quantify the risk level in apartment buildings. 
One of the larger initiatives was the CESARE-Risk model that was developed at 
Victoria University in Melbourne (Thomas & Verghese, 2001). The model used a 
combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches for large number of 
scenarios in order to estimate the two performance parameters Expected Risk to Life 
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(ERL) and Fire Cost Expectation (FCE) (Zhao &Beck, 1997). The project was never 
finalised and the model is not currently available to use.  
Nystedt (2003) developed a quantitative risk model for Swedish apartment buildings 
and Johansson (2010) quantified the risk level for Deemed-to-Satisfy apartment 
buildings in Australia. Neither of those models included the impact of extended travel 
distances in the common corridors.  
Based on this, one can conclude that there is a need for a comparative tool that 
quantitatively and probabilistically can compare two residential fire safety designs; 
one prescriptive compliant and one Alternative Solution, and appropriately consider 
the change in risk level due to an increased corridor length. 
1.2 Scope and Objectives 
The objective with this thesis has therefore been to determine if (or to what degree) 
the inclusion of passive and active systems compensates for the increased risk due to 
the extended travel distance for any given (non-compliant) building solution. 
This has been done through the development of a tool which was aimed to be applied 
for properly developing and quantifying fire safety engineering design for residential 
buildings, but at the same time is simple enough so that it can be utilised in this high 
volume and low profit margin end of the property development spectrum. This should 
ensure a more even risk level in these fire engineered buildings in Australia, whilst 
still keeping the goals and objectives of performance based building codes to maintain 
design flexibility and to bespoke the design as cost effective as possible, but without 
compromising the safety level in these buildings – to occupants and the emergency 
personnel which are providing rescue attempts if a fire occurs. 
The model was developed for residential buildings in Australia (BCA Class 2) and 
can be used for assessing whether a proposed building solution complies or not with 
the building code. 
1.2.1 Limitations 
 The thesis analysed the risk due to fires in residential buildings (BCA 
Class 2) in Australia. 
 The thesis considered the risk to life to all occupants (residents, visitors, 
and fire brigade). Property protection and economic aspects of fire safety 
has not been considered.  
 The thesis only considered the risk from internal fires at one level, and fire 
spreading from an adjacent storey or building was therefore not considered. 
 The thesis considered the risk at a typical floor plate with apartments but 
did not involve the egress provisions on the Ground Floor (which is not a 
typical floor plate in a multi-storey building) or the complete building. 
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 Assumptions made in the developed risk model are summarised in section 
5.4. 
1.3 Methodology 
The thesis has been conducted through the following methodology.  
1.3.1 Project initiation 
The thesis started with a brief background study to assimilate knowledge from 
previous studies and identify key factors in the topic. The history and development of 
the Australian building code (BCA) as well as international trends for verifying safety 
designs were gathered and compared. Real case scenarios including fatalities due to 
fires in residential apartment buildings were also investigated to identify what the 
main reasons for the negative outcomes in those cases were. More information than 
what was given in statistics was obtained from published studies and through 
discussions with experts in the field. 
1.3.2 Risk model setup  
Risk principles were studied to provide the background for model development. 
Decisions were made with regards to how the risk should be measured and 
characterised, what acceptable risk is, what variables are most important, how 
consequences should be quantified and how the result should be presented. 
It was determined that the risk model should be based on the three activities in a risk 
analysis as defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, 1995): 
 System definition 
 Hazard identification 
 Risk estimation 
The system was defined as the apartments and the corridor at a typical level in a 
residential apartment building and the fire safety systems provided in the building. 
The hazard identification investigated what the main fire hazards in apartment 
buildings are and how these are changed when the length of the corridor is changed 
when the corridor is extended. The risk estimation model was then developed as an 
event tree analysis based on the hazard identification. The model was developed using 
an event tree approach together with ASET/RSET analysis for 240 scenarios. 
Probabilities were determined from data, fault tree analyses and engineering 
judgements. Consequences were determined through modified ASET/RSET analyses 
using fire modelling in FDS (McGrattan et al., 2010), previous studies and 
engineering judgements. The model was configured in an Excel spread sheet by using 
the add-in software PrecisionTree (Palisade Corporation, 2013a) and @Risk (Palisade 
Corporation, 2013b). For each evaluated building solution the model generates an 
average risk value estimating the individual risk, the expected number of fatalities per 
year at one typical level of the apartment building and a curve in an F/N diagram. The 
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values generated by the risk model should not be interpreted as accurate estimations 
of the absolute risk, but as comparative values of the risk to occupants based on 
detailed analyses for several scenarios including both fires in the corridor and the 
apartments with safety systems both working and failing. The result generated by the 
model was shown to be sensitive to a number of variables, and these fixed values 
variables were therefore replaced by probability distributions. By iterating the result 
of the model using Monte Carlo simulation with values from the risk estimation and 
risk ratios between the compared building solutions could be characterised as 
probability distributions.  
1.3.3 Model testing 
To test the model three building solutions were evaluated; two prescriptive compliant 
solutions and one Alternative Solution deviating from the provisions in the BCA. 
1.4 Thesis overview  
Chapter 2 presents how fire safety currently can be verified in Australia and what 
factors that determines what approach that should be taken. The benefits and 
disadvantages with verification methods are explored and a discussion on how 
building regulations and fire authorities can assure that safety is achieved concludes 
the chapter. 
Chapter 3 explains further the concept of risk within fire safety engineering. The 
chapter presents the risk management process, how risk can be defined, measured and 
characterised and what acceptable risk is. 
Chapter 4 is a background study about fires in apartment buildings. Previous fire 
incidents and statistics about residential fires are presented as well as previous studies 
about fire development and human behaviour in fires. Finally common fire safety 
measures in apartment buildings in Australia are presented. 
The development of the risk model is presented in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8. The 
prerequisites are explained, the system definition of the model and the assumptions 
made are shown. Chapter 6 is the hazard identification which forms the base for what 
risks and fire scenarios the risk model should consider. The event tree structure is 
presented in Chapter 7 including the fire scenarios, fire safety systems and occupant 
reactions. The probabilities for the different events are quantified. The results of the 
model are presented in Chapter 9 which also includes a sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis.  
Chapter 10 includes a discussion about the developed risk model, the result it 
generated, the uncertainty in the results and how the model affects evaluating fire 
safety in residential buildings. 
The conclusions that can be made from this thesis are summarised in Chapter 11. 
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2 Verifying fire safety 
2.1 Current building regulation in Australia 
One of the goals with the BCA is the achievement and maintenance of acceptable 
standards of safety from fire for the benefit of the community. This goal extends no 
further than is necessary in the public interest, is considered to be cost effective and 
not needlessly onerous in its application (IFEG, 2005). The hierarchy of the BCA is 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 The hierarchy of the BCA – reproduced from IFEG (2005) 
The Objectives are statements which reflect community expectations. An example of 
an Objective in the BCA (2013) is; 
“The Objective of this section is to – 
(a) Provide, as far as is reasonable, people with safe, equitable and dignified 
access to –  
i. A building; and 
ii. The services and facilities within a building; and 
(b) Safeguard occupants from illness or injury while evacuating in an 
emergency” 
 
Functional Statements describe how the building achieves the Objectives. An example 
is shown below (BCA, 2013); 
“A building is to provide, as far as is reasonable – 
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(a) safe; and  
(b) equitable and dignified, 
access for people to the services and facilities within.” 
 
These explain the intent of the Performance Requirements which are the requirements 
that a building solution must meet. A typical Performance Requirement is shown 
below (BCA, 2013); 
“Exits must be provided from a building to allow occupants to evacuate safely, 
with their number, location and dimensions being appropriate to – 
(a) the travel distance; and 
(b) the number, mobility and other characteristics of occupants; and 
(c) the function or use of the building; and 
(d) the height of the building; and 
(e) whether the exit is from above or below ground level. 
 
 A Building Solution is therefore by definition a solution which complies with the 
Performance Requirements. Section A0.5 in the BCA (2013) prescribes: 
“Compliance with the Performance Requirements can only be achieved by – 
(f) Complying with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; or 
(g) Formulating an Alternative Solution which –  
i. Complies with the Performance Requirements 
ii. Is shown to be at least equivalent to the Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Provisions; or 
iii. Complying with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; or 
(h) a combination of (a) and (b).” 
 
A residential apartment building that has an extended corridor would most likely still 
include safety provisions that are in accordance with the DtS Provisions. This kind of 
buildings therefore normally satisfies the Performance Requirements through BCA 
Clause A0.5(c) a combination of (a) and (b). 
2.1.1 Assessment Methods 
The introduction of a performance based building code increased the need for proper 
verification that safety is achieved when the building includes deviations from the 
prescriptive requirements. Section A0.9 of the BCA states that: 
“The following Assessment Methods or any combination of them can be used to 
determine that a Building Solution complies with the Performance Requirements: 
 
(a) Evidence to support that the use of a material, form of construction or 
design meets a Performance Requirement or a Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Provision as described in A2.2. 
(b) Verification Methods such as – 
i. the Verification Methods in the BCA; or 
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ii. such other Verification Methods as the appropriate authority 
accepts for determining the compliance with the Performance 
Requirements. 
(c) Comparison with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions. 
(d) Expert Judgement” 
 
BCA Clause A0.9(b)(i) states that a Building Solution can be assessed by using the 
Verification Methods in the BCA. At the time of this research there are only two fire 
safety Verification Methods included in the BCA. Those methods consider the risk for 
fire spread between buildings and are thus not relevant to the scope of this thesis. 
Extended travel distances in apartment buildings are therefore commonly assessed 
through other verification methods, comparisons with the Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Provisions or through expert judgement. 
2.2 Verification methods as part of building codes 
There is currently a general verification method proposed to be implemented in the 
BCA for 2015 or 2016. The verification method in theory covers all relevant 
Performance Requirements and gives the engineer clear directions for what fire 
scenarios the building solution shall be evaluated. If this verification method is 
implemented the other options in BCA A0.9 will still remain to verify a fire safety 
design, but since the use of approved verification methods reduces the risk to building 
certifiers and building surveyors a possible outcome could be that the verification 
method will be the common way of assessing Alternative Solutions in the future. 
The proposed Verification Method has several similarities to a newly implemented 
verification method VM2 (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, 2013) in 
New Zealand. The VM2 includes ten design scenarios that should be considered: 
 BE – Blocked exit 
 UT – Unknown threat in unoccupied room 
 CS – Concealed space 
 SF – Smouldering fire 
 HS – Horizontal spread of fire 
 VS – Vertical spread of fire 
 IS – Surface finishes 
 FO – Firefighting operations 
 CF – Challenging fire 
 RC – Robustness check 
For each design scenario there is a flowchart to follow how the scenario shall be 
evaluated, what input parameters to assume and what acceptance criteria to satisfy. 
Some of the design scenarios are solved by inspection or providing certain fire safety 
measures while other design scenarios such as UT, CF and RC should be assessed 
through conducting quantitative analyses. The verification method is deterministic 
and absolute to its nature and also at some places it prescriptively determines what 
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measures that shall be included when the building design does not satisfy the criteria 
in the method. 
The verification method has been questioned and caused long delays in building 
approvals and in some cases expensive solutions to meet the highly prescriptive 
verification method requirements. The author recognises that considering a large 
number of fire scenarios should ensure a robust fire safety design and prevent the 
previous observed spread of safety levels provided in buildings. However it is also 
logical that when a new methodology like this is implemented it will cause additional 
work for all actors involved from the fire safety consultant to the authority having 
jurisdiction. 
2.2.1 The Swedish guideline (BBRAD) 
The Swedish guideline for verifying fire safety BBRAD (BFS, 2013) contains 
recommendations on appropriate verification methods and implies that performance 
based building designs should be verified from a holistic perspective by conducting a 
hazard analysis considering both the probability and consequence of credible 
scenarios. The design process should comprise the following four stages: 
 Identify the need for verification 
 Verify that the fire safety level is adequate 
 Control the verification 
 Document the fire safety strategy 
Depending on how large the impact of the fire safety is different methods can then be 
used to verify the safety level. For example qualitative assessments are appropriate for 
small changes in the building when the uncertainties associated with the fire safety 
strategy are small. 
If the changes in the building have a larger impact on the fire safety, the design should 
be verified with either scenario analysis or a quantitative risk analysis. The 
verification method suggests fire scenarios that should be considered, methods of 
analyses, input data to use and also acceptance criteria to satisfy. However it does 
point out that the engineer should decide what fire scenarios that are appropriate and 
that those may not be the ones suggested in the guideline. Verification through 
scenario analyses shall also include a sensitivity analysis to identify what variables 
that have a large impact on the safety level. 
Quantitative risk analyses shall be based on distributions for the involved variables. 
The distributions should reflect the expected conditions during the economically 
credible life length of the building. Even these kinds of analyses shall include a 
sensitivity analysis to identify which variables that must be considered conservatively. 
Fire scenarios that should be considered are: 
Extended travel distance in residential apartment buildings – A comparative risk model 
11 
 
 Fire scenario 1 – A crucial fire scenario with fast fire growth rate and large 
heat release rate (HRR). All provided fire safety measures are assumed to 
work as intended. 
 Fire scenario 2 – The fire scenario includes a fire in a space where 
occupants normally not are located, but is adjacent to a room including 
many occupants. Automatic suppression system may affect the scenario as 
specified in the verification method. 
 Fire scenario 3 – A fire scenario which may be a smaller stress to the fire 
safety in the building, but occurring while specific safety systems such as 
smoke detection, sprinkler system etc. fail to operate.  
A comparative risk-based study made by Wibelius & Thuns (2012) indicates that 
BBRAD fulfils its purpose by providing a safety level higher than the reference level 
given by the prescriptive compliant solutions which is accepted by society. 
2.3 Verification methods 
When assessing a Building Solution that includes deviations from the DtS Provisions 
the fire safety engineer has to show that the proposed Building Solution complies with 
the Performance Requirements through Assessment Method (b), (c) or (d). Any of 
those methods can then be an assessment which is described as qualitative or 
quantitative, comparative or absolute, and deterministic or probabilistic as shown in 
Figure 2.2 which is reproduced from the IFEG (2005). 
 
Figure 2.2 Verification methods in fire safety engineering 
Paté-Cornell summarises in her article (1996) six levels for which uncertainties in risk 
analysis can be treated. The six levels are: 
 Level 0: “Hazard detection and failure modes’ identification” only includes 
qualitative judgements for what the potential hazards are and in what 
different ways a system can fail without any attempt of quantifying the risks. 
Verification 
methods 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Deterministic Probabilistic 
Comparative Absolute 
Comparative Absolute 
Comparative Absolute 
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 Level 1: “The ‘Worst-case’ approach” is based on the accumulation of 
worst-case assumptions to quantify what is really at risk without 
considering the probability.  
 Level 2: “Quasi-worst cases and plausible upper bounds” analysis 
represents the attempt to evaluate the worst possible conditions that can be 
reasonably expected. This is useful either when there is some uncertainty as 
to what the worst case might be, or when the worst case is so unlikely or 
infrequent that it is meaningless. 
 Level 3: includes risk analyses based on “Best estimates and central values” 
to generate average or median values of the results. 
 Level 4: “Probabilistic risk assessment, single risk curve” takes into 
account different probabilities of the analysed system being in specific 
states. The effects of all uncertainties are aggregated into one risk curve 
which shows how the result varies due to uncertainty. 
 Level 5: “Probabilistic risk analysis, multiple risk curves” is similar to 
Level 4 but separates uncertainty due to knowledge or stochastic 
randomness. 
As long as risk analyses are conducted using single deterministic (such as average or 
mean values) the reliability of the result is unknown (Frantzich, 1998). A good way of 
illuminating the uncertainty in the results is to carry out an uncertainty analysis in 
which the variables are described by distributions instead of single values. The 
variation or uncertainty in each variable should then be described by its probability 
density function (PDF) as shown in Figure 2.3. The result will be expressed as 
distributions of the state function G(X).  
 
Figure 2.3 Uncertainty through a model (used with permission from Frantzich, 1998) 
What approach that should be taken is depending on a number of factors such as how 
large the proposed changes in the building are, the complexity of the building and the 
number of credible fire scenarios. 
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Qualitative analyses are appropriate when there are only few or minor deviations 
proposed that have a relatively small but known impact on the fire safety in the 
building simultaneously as the benefits with the proposed trial design are known and 
clearly improve the safety to an acceptable level. 
For more complex problems qualitative methods are generally not considered to be 
acceptable (IFEG, 2005). In those cases a quantitative analysis can be conducted 
using any common fire engineering method to calculate the expected outcome of fire 
scenarios. The quantitative analysis is often supported by additional qualitative 
arguments. 
A comparative analysis aims at comparing the sub systems that are affected to that of 
a comparable building solution that fully complies with the Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Provisions. When an evaluation is carried out on an absolute basis, the results of the 
analysis of the fire safety design are matched using a pre-defined acceptance criteria. 
2.3.1 Deterministic methods 
Deterministic methods are based on physical relationships derived from scientific 
theories and empirical results. The fire safety design is evaluated by assuming a set of 
circumstances and then calculating a single outcome which determines if the design is 
safe or not. The uncertainty in the result is thus treated through Level 2 in according 
to Paté-Cornell (1996). However, the probability of that fire scenario is not explicitly 
considered and the uncertainty in the result is unknown. Normally those methods 
adopts a timeline approach where the occurrence of various events is calculated and 
compared (IFEG, 2005).  
2.3.2 Probabilistic methods 
Probabilistic approaches generally consider a larger number of fire scenarios, and 
also the probability of the fire scenarios are considered in the analysis. These methods 
generally require statistical data which are not readily available and because of their 
complexity, may involve time-consuming calculations. The benefit of using a 
probabilistic approach is that the fire safety design is more robustly evaluated since 
the probability for failure of safety systems also is reflected in the result. 
Lundin (2001) identified that a common mistake when different building solutions are 
compared is that the difference in reliability is disregarded which can affect the safety 
level. The assessed consequence of a fire scenario may therefore be improved in the 
performance based design compared to a prescriptive compliant design when fire 
safety systems (for example the sprinkler system) are working properly, but the 
consequence could be significantly worse when the safety systems fails as shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 Comparison between two design alternatives – diagram reproduced from 
Lundin (2001) 
An important question to ask is then: should we design for failure scenarios and 
presume that the fire safety precautions we provide fail to operate in the way they are 
intended? From a commercial point of view there is then as an example no point of 
providing a sprinkler system to a building if the building is proved to be safe even 
when it does not operate.  
Ashe et al. presents in their article (2009) that 57 % of the total cost of fires is 
allocated to ‘costs in anticipation’ compared to 15 % of the total cost allocated to 
‘cost as a consequence of fire’. This could be an indication that too much money in 
the society are spent on fire safety precautions and more lives could be saved if the 
money were spent in other areas. 
From a safety point a building provided with a sprinkler system provides obvious 
benefits for the building safety and that provision should therefore be encouraged by 
the building regulations. 
To manage this issue the author can see two main ways of managing failure scenarios 
in fire safety engineering: 
 Analysing the Alternative Solution comparatively 
It is difficult to draw the line in an absolute term for what is safe enough and what is 
not. By setting the benchmark at the performance of a comparable building solution 
which complies with the prescriptive requirements the engineer can be sure that the 
comparable building provides a safety level which is accepted by society. If the 
building solution then is compared to that and considering scenarios when safety 
systems fails in both building solutions the reliabilitity is also considered in the result. 
 Applying a probabilistic approach 
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Fails 
2 fatalities 
0 fatalities 
10? 100? 1000? 
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In comparative probabilistic assessments it is possible to consider a large number of 
scenarios including when one or several safety systems fails simultaneously – without 
over-conservatively designing the building to withstand a fire scenario when all safety 
systems fail to operate as intended. Probabilistic methods are further explained in 
Chapter 3. 
2.4 Discussion 
When evaluating fire safety, the engineer can be tempted to just start calculating the 
outcome of a particular fire scenario without determining what scenario should be 
evaluated. User friendly fire modelling tools make it very easy to determine the input 
and obtain an exact answer to the question asked. The difficulty for authorities 
reviewing and approving a building design is to assure that the right questions have 
been asked by the engineer during the verification process. 
This is especially true for deterministic analyses based on a few fire scenarios without 
considering scenario probability or assessing all different failure scenarios. The result 
is a risk for poor analyses. Poor analyses could cause severe consequences to society. 
One outcome is that the safety level to occupants could be decreased and the number 
of fatalities due to fires could therefore increase. Another outcome could be that the 
authorities having jurisdiction could become more restrictive and therefore hinder the 
construction market from growing which would have economic consequences to the 
society. 
As clearly pointed out earlier the author promotes the use of comparative and 
probabilistic analyses. But a comparative probabilistic analysis does not assure its 
validity. Regardless of what tools that are used there will always be the need for 
engineering judgement. Ideally, the engineer should use tools to back up his 
engineering judgement, not base his engineering judgement solely on the results of 
tools. In other words, a 100 m long corridor may not be acceptable even if an 
appropriate model tells us it is. There is also always a risk that the user has misused 
the tool. Tools cannot distinguish between appropriate input and inappropriate input 
and therefore it is usually not possible to regulate a tool.  
A solution to that is the engineer’s accreditation and liability. If the fire safety 
engineer is accredited it indicates that the engineer probably has the knowledge to 
make appropriate judgements and is not solely relying on a qualification or license 
obtained a long time ago. If the person also has a liability and could get accused if 
flaws are found in the design, that naturally further prevents the engineer from 
providing fire safety designs that have not been proved to be safe.  
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3 Risk analysis in fire safety engineering 
Risk is a complex concept that includes several meanings and therefore does not have 
an agreed definition. It has traditionally been used in a technical objective sense 
where the approach has focused on being scientific and measurable without 
considering any subjective values or perceptions. This view of risk has been criticised 
over the last decades since it omits important social, psychological and cultural 
aspects and because of that a social constructivist risk science has also been 
developed (Nilsson, 2003).  
In fire risk analysis there are obviously benefits with having a measurable approach. 
One example is the measure of expected risk to life (ERL) as described by Equation 
3.1 (Yung, 2008), where p denotes the probability and c the consequence. 
𝑬𝑹𝑳 = 𝒑 ∙ 𝒄 Equation 3.1 
This definition is close to Kaplan and Garrick’s (1981) risk triplet which is defined as 
the answers to the following questions: 
 What can happen? 
 How likely is this to happen? 
 What are the consequences? 
The risk triplet is usually presented in the form: 
𝑹 = {(𝒔𝒊, 𝒑𝒊, 𝒄𝒊)} Equation 3.2 
where, 
si = the scenario description 
pi = the probability of the scenario 
ci = the consequence of the scenario 
The contribution to the total risk can then be expressed as a function of the individual 
scenarios, as shown in Equation 3.3. 
𝑹𝒕𝒐𝒕 = ∑{(𝒔𝒊, 𝒑𝒊, 𝒄𝒊)}
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
 
Equation 3.3 
where, 
n = number of scenarios 
It may seem confusing that the first parameter (si) in the risk triplet is a designation or 
a description rather than a numeric value that can be assigned to the following two 
parameters (pi and ci). However the risk triplet does define an objective and scientific 
way of describing risk for which mathematical principles can be applied to. 
 
Extended travel distance in residential apartment buildings – A comparative risk model 
17 
 
3.1 Risk management 
One of several definitions of the risk management process is developed by the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, 1995) and presented in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1 The activities in the risk management process (reproduced from IEC (1995)). 
The first activity in the risk management process is Risk analysis which defines the 
scope of the analysis, the potential hazards in the chosen system and also evaluates 
qualitatively or quantitatively the risk caused by the identified hazards within the 
system. In Risk evaluation the result from the Risk analysis is judged against 
acceptance criteria. If the risk is unacceptable options for reducing the risk are 
analysed. These two activities are together referred to as the Risk assessment. The 
final stage is the Risk reduction/control which includes a decision for what option or 
options that shall be implemented and monitored (Nilsson, 2003). 
The risk model in this thesis is based on the risk assessment process and developed to 
give the user an indication for if the risk is acceptable or not and how the risk is 
affected when different options are implemented. 
3.2 Risk analysis methods 
Depending on how detailed the risk analysis is there are a number of different 
methods to conduct the analysis. As mentioned in section 2.3 the decision for what 
method in fire safety engineering to use should be based on how large the proposed 
Risk analysis 
- System definition 
- Hazard identification 
- Risk estimation 
Risk evaluation 
- Risk tolerability decisions 
- Analysis of options 
Risk reduction/control 
- Decision making 
- Implementation 
- Monitoring 
Risk assessment 
Risk management 
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changes are, the complexity of the building etc. Other factors to consider are (Nystedt, 
2000): 
 Usability – The result of the chosen method must be expressed in terms that 
can be understood and interpreted in the context 
 Cost-effectiveness – The value of the risk analysis must be larger than the 
cost of conducting 
 Credibility – Uncertainties related to the results of the risk analysis must be 
quantified and within acceptable limits. 
Also risk analysis methods can be classified as qualitative or quantitative. Some 
methods involve both qualitative and quantitative elements and these methods can 
therefore be called semi-quantitative. 
3.2.1 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods are useful in the initial stage for identify the most hazardous 
events. The methods are developed for different kind of operations and their purpose 
is mainly to describe events during different conditions (Nilsson, 2003). Typical 
methods are checklists, HazOp, What if-analyses and PHA (Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis) with ordinal scale. 
HazOp means Hazard and Operability studies and is a structured and systematic 
examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and 
evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent 
efficient operation (Nilsson, 2003). What if-analyses identify hazards through 
evaluating the consequences of unplanned events that could occur in a system. The 
goal is to analyse deviations from the planned operation by what if-questions. The 
results are qualitative and are presented as tables with credible scenarios together with 
suggestions for risk reduction measures (Nilsson, 2003). Checklists are based on 
experience and are used for identifying known hazards and as a controlling measure 
to ensure that accepted standard prerequisites are applied. 
PHA is a kind of risk identification method that normally is conducted through 
identifying the potential hazards in the projected facility. By letting people with 
experience of the prerequisites intuitively grade the probabilities and consequences 
for the hazards they are then ranked relatively to each other in a risk matrix (Nilsson, 
2003). 
3.2.2 Semi-quantitative methods 
Semi-quantitative methods are more detailed than the qualitative methods and include 
numeric measures for the probabilities and the consequences to some extent. The 
measures do not have to be exact but can be intervals or order to differentiate the 
magnitude of different risks. A common way of presenting results is through a risk 
matrix with cardinal scales (Nilsson, 2003). 
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3.2.3 Quantitative methods 
Nystedt (2011) notes that there are only a small number of models that can express 
the total risk of fire in a building, and these models are too complicated to be used in 
practice. The main reason for the complexity of the models are that risk is measured 
differently depending on which barrier group that is studied. The scenarios (si) in the 
risk triplet may concern for example fire spreading or occupants evacuating, and 
depending on what risk is regarded, the consequence is measured differently. That 
makes it very difficult to measure all risk and summarise the result to one numeric 
value, and could only be done by the use of techniques as multi attribute utility 
analysis (Nystedt, 2011). 
Quantitative probabilistic methods are often required to examine a large number of 
scenarios with different chains of events. A common method of assessing possible 
outcomes is by structuring the events in an event tree. An event tree is a logical 
diagram which presents the probabilities for different outcomes of an initial event 
depending on the following sequence of events. An example of an event tree is 
presented in Figure 3.2 with the symbols from Equation 3.3 included. 
 
Figure 3.2 An event tree for a simple fire risk analysis. Note that the values in the tree are 
only chosen for illustrating the principle. 
Risk analyses with event trees are based on a high number of deterministic scenario 
outcome estimates, and by considering the probability and consequence for each 
scenario, this will lead to a probabilistic measure of risk (Frantzich, 1998). In the 
event tree, the probability for each sub-scenario is calculated by multiplying all 
probabilities that led to that scenario from the initial event. The risk contribution from 
that event is obtained by multiplying the probability with its consequence, and the 
total risk is calculated by summarising the risk of all events in the tree. 
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A difficulty with event trees is the estimation of probabilities or frequencies. A 
probability can only have values between 0 and 1, while frequencies do not have an 
upper limit. The traditional definition for probability is easy to understand for 
theoretical examples such as the chance of picking up a ball with a certain colour 
from a bucket when the number of balls and their colours are known. The reality is 
more complex and the step difference between estimating a probability of picking up 
a certain colour to for example how to estimate the probability for fire spread through 
a fire rated construction is significant (Johansson & Lundin, 1999).  
Instead of the traditional probability definition the frequency interpretation is 
normally applied. The frequency interpretation is as follows. If the probability of a 
certain event (A) during an experiment is 0.25, the relative frequency during a large 
number of similar experiments will be approximately 1/4. This is an easier way of 
understanding probabilities in risk analyses. However the number of fires in a 
building would normally be very few, which means that the frequency of failure of a 
system in one building cannot be expected to be near the average frequency for a 
large number of experiments (Johansson & Lundin, 1999). 
Another kind of probability is called subjective probability and is simply an 
estimation of the likelihood as made by a person. The probability can thus vary 
depending on who the estimator is. To decrease the variation the estimators can be 
calibrated through guidelines for estimating probabilities. Another way is to start with 
an average value for a certain kind of buildings and from there determine how much 
the subject building deviates from the average and by that estimating the probabilities 
(Johansson & Lundin, 1999). 
Fault tree analysis is another way of estimating frequencies or probabilities of certain 
events. The fault tree is characterised with a top event for which the probability or 
frequency is estimated by investigating what events that need to occur, either 
individually or in combination to cause the top event to occur. Depending on what 
kind of gate (AND/OR) different formulas are applied to calculate the probability or 
frequency of the top event from the probabilities and frequencies of the sub-events. 
3.2.4 Risk measures 
There are many ways of measuring risks and depending on whose risk is measured 
there are also several ways of presenting the result. The two most common risk 
measures are individual risk (IR) and societal risk (Lundin, 2004). 
3.2.4.1 Individual risk 
Individual risk normally describes the risk of death per year from one or several risk 
sources (Johansson, 2010). Davidsson et al. (1997) explains a few ways of expressing 
individual risk, for example average individual risk: 
𝑰𝑹𝒂 =
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒑𝒆𝒐𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌
 
Equation 3.4 
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Another way of describing individual risk is location specific individual risk - the 
likelihood of a person dying if that person always is located at a certain location. The 
risk is then often expressed as risk per year and presented as curves on a map to show 
how the risk depends on the source of the risk.  
3.2.5 Societal risk 
To characterise the severity of a risk to group of individuals or a population societal 
risk is often used as the measure. The result can be presented as the average of 
number of fatalities per year or as a risk profile in an F/N curve (Frequency of 
accidents vs. Number of fatalities). An F/N curve shows the cumulative probability 
for events causing a number N or more fatalities per year. An example of an F/N 
curve is shown in Figure 3.3 
 
Figure 3.3 Example of an F/N curve (used with permission from Frantzich, 1998) 
3.3 Evaluating risks 
Davidsson et al. (1997) formulated four general principles as a base for evaluating 
risks which often are referred to when discussing how risks should be evaluated. The 
four principles are: 
 The principle of reasonableness – An activity should not cause risks that 
with reasonable means could be avoided. This means that risks which could 
be eliminated or reduced with reasonable technical and economic resources 
should always be adjusted regardless of risk level. 
 The proportionality principle – The total risks caused by an activity should 
not be disproportional to the benefits (earnings, products, favours etc.) that 
the activity provides. 
 The distribution principle – Risks shall be reasonably distributed in the 
society in relation to what benefits the activity provides. It means that 
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individuals not should be exposed to disproportional risks compared to the 
benefits that they obtain from it. 
 The principle of avoiding disasters – Risks should rather be realised in 
accidents with limited consequences that can be handled by available 
resources than in disasters. 
When applying these principles to an apartment building the principle of 
reasonableness tells that it could be argued that all apartments should have smoke 
alarms installed. It is a relatively small cost that could save lives by waking people up 
during a fire. Even if the likelihood (and therefore also the risk) of a fire is low the 
principle says that apartments still should be provided with smoke alarms. The 
proportionality principle could be realised in that it is not reasonable to omit a 
sprinkler system in a building where it is prescribed to be installed. To delete a 
sprinkler system is a large increase in the risk level the cost savings for the 
development would be margin. When extending the travel distance by increasing the 
corridor length the developer can fit more apartments in the building and the project 
could make more profit which is a benefit. However occupants in the building may be 
exposed to a larger risk level due to the extended travel distance without obtaining 
any share in the benefits that the developer obtains. This is against the distribution 
principle and the risk level and should therefore be adjusted for those occupants. The 
principle of avoiding disasters tells that there are good reasons to fire separate each 
storey of the building. If a fire occurs on one level it should not affect occupants 
located on other storeys, nor cause the building to collapse. 
3.3.1 Acceptable level of risk 
A difficulty when conducting risk analyses is to determine what level of risk is 
acceptable. The difficulty can be derived from the complexity of the concepts of risk. 
Firstly there is a lot of subjectivity on what an acceptable risk is which depends on a 
number of factors such as: 
 If the person is exposed to the risk voluntarily 
 What benefits the person gets by being exposed by the risk 
 What the potential consequence could be 
That means that some risks can be acceptable for some people but unacceptable for 
others, and a certain risk level from one circumstance could be acceptable for a person 
who does not accept the same risk level when it is caused by another circumstance.  
Secondly it is not obvious what unit the risk should be measured in, and if societal 
risk and individual risk should be valued equally. That makes it difficult for 
authorities to determine acceptance criteria for risk analyses. 
In a comparative analysis the Alternative Solution is compared to a similar building 
which complies with the DtS Provisions. The risk level provided by the comparative 
building sets the acceptance criteria for what an acceptable risk for that building type 
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is. But the risk levels can vary largely between different DtS compliant buildings. 
Johansson (2010) showed with a simple risk analysis approach that the risk levels in 
the buildings he assessed varied with a factor of up to 26.  
When an absolute risk analysis is conducted the result is compared against an 
absolute criterion. Most acceptable risk criteria have been developed for various types 
of hazardous operations (Davidsson et al., 1997). As an example the Department of 
Planning in NSW has developed risk criteria for strategic planning, potentially 
hazardous developments and development in the vicinity of potentially hazardous 
facilities (NSW Government, 2011). The acceptance criterion can be defined as single 
threshold value, but it is more common to divide it into three zones (Johansson, 
2010): 
 Unacceptable risks. The contribution of the risk source will under no 
circumstances be considered acceptable. Risk mitigation is therefore needed. 
 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Cost benefit analysis is 
introduced, and at this level all risks shall be mitigated as long as it is 
reasonably practicable. 
 Acceptable risks. Risks low and therefore do not need to be mitigated. 
These principles are normally not applied to fire safety engineering for apartment 
buildings and as Johansson (2010) mentions it could be questioned if they should be. 
The BCA does not specify any absolute criteria for risk levels. Lundin (2004) 
mentions four methods for how acceptable level of risk can be determined. The 
methods are: 
 Political decisions – In some areas the risk levels are determined by 
political decisions and it is then indirectly also determined large resources 
that should be engaged to save one statistical life. 
 Incident reporting – If there is empirical data available risk levels can be 
derived through statistical analysis. Some difficulties with this is that the 
available data is too small (based on too few events), the information about 
the circumstances are missing in the data and there is also a risk that the 
data is too old and therefore not valid for the present. 
 Use risk levels from other areas – This may also be inappropriate since 
people tend to accept some risk levels from some activities while not 
accepting the same risk levels from other activities as previously discussed. 
 Current level - through a comparative analysis as explained in Section 2.3. 
Regardless of which method is chosen the four general principles presented in Section 
3.3 should be considered. 
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4 Fires in apartment buildings 
4.1 Previous incidents 
Previous fire incidents were found during an internet search and within the reviewed 
fire statistic reports. No previous incidents could be found where the length of the 
corridor has had a direct effect on the outcome. However during the review some 
observations were made which were beneficial to the development of the risk model. 
The observations are presented below.  
4.1.1 The fire in Rinkeby (Stockholm) 2009 
In 2009 a fire was initiated in an apartment on the ground floor in a six storey 
apartment building. The fire started in a room where occupants were not located. 
When the occupants in the apartment could smell smoke they opened the door to the 
burning room to realise that they immediately should evacuate. The door between the 
apartment door and the stair was fire rated to 60 minutes, but was accidentally left 
open so smoke filled the fire rated staircase. One woman who saw the fire from 
outside entered the building to save her children located on the fifth level. The woman 
and the six children were later found as fatalities at different locations in the stair. 
Other occupants in the building became aware of the fire from the smell of smoke, but 
when trying to evacuate, the smoke and the heat in the stair made them return to their 
apartments. Those occupants were later saved from their balconies when the fire 
brigade arrived (SHK, 2010).  
Observations: 
 Unsprinklered fire led to severe consequences 
 No self-closer to fire door (not required) 
 The fire brigade could not close the apartment door (too warm, and 
probably damaged by the fire). 
 One occupant in the apartment located opposite to the burning apartment 
evacuated by ducking down under the flames emerging from the door. 
 Several occupants entered the stair but realised it was not tenable and 
decided to return to their apartment. 
 Smoke ventilation hatch failure 
 Occupants were safe within their apartments; however one family decided 
to evacuate instead of staying. 
 Similar situation could happen if a door is left open to a corridor instead of 
a staircase. 
4.1.2 The fire in Bankstown (Sydney) 2012 
In 2012 a fire started at a balcony. The balcony door and the apartment door to the 
corridor were open. This helped spread the fire throughout the apartment. Two 
occupants could not exit the apartment because of the stream of heat and instead they 
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went to their bedroom and closed the door. Smoke did leak through the door and 
eventually the conditions in the bedroom became untenable so the occupants decided 
to jump from the window. One of the occupants did not survive the fall (Klein & 
Cuneo, 2012) 
Observations: 
 Occupants in the apartment of fire origin (AOF) were awake – but still not 
able to evacuate in time. 
 No sprinkler and bad wind conditions led to a severe fire development. 
 The apartment door was fire rated door and provided with self-closer, but 
was probably wedged open.  
 Occupants in other levels were unable to evacuate because of the smoke in 
the corridors – however they were safe inside their apartments until rescued 
by the fire brigade. 
4.1.3 Ludington, Michigan 1993 
In 1993 a fire was initiated in the corridor on the second floor of an apartment 
building. One family woke up by observing smoke that had leaked through vents into 
their apartment. The male tried to extinguish the fire with a 10-pound dry chemical 
fire extinguisher, but when realising his attempt was ineffective he had to escape. The 
fire caused a total of nine fatalities (USFA, 1993).  
Observations 
 Non-fire rated corridor without smoke detection in a building without a 
sprinkler system led to disastrous consequences. 
 Some occupants woke up by the smell of smoke but were not able to 
evacuate in time. 
 Smoke alarms were wrongly installed and did not activate 
 Occupants that did not wake up died while asleep. 
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4.2 Fire statistics 
The most recent fire statistics for Australia were requested from AFAC (Australian 
Fire Authority Council) but could not be provided. Instead earlier data were reviewed 
and complemented with data from the USA and Sweden. 
4.2.1 Australia 
Australian data between 1989 and 1993 summarised by Dowling & Ramsay (1997) 
showed that residential fires are the most common type of fire and also cause the 
highest number of fatalities. 
Table 4.1 Injuries and deaths in all structure fires by building type, 1989 – 1993. 
Reproduced from Dowling & Ramsay (1997). 
BCA 
building 
class 
AFIRS fixed 
property 
use 
Fires Injuries Deaths 
 Occupants Firefighters Occupants  Firefighters 
1  
Single 
dwellings; 
not 
categorised 
Dwellings 
(41) 
27,483 1,526 291 174 2 
2 
Apartments 
Apartments 
(42) 
5,606 464 46 38 2 
3  
Hotels & 
boarding 
houses 
Hotels etc. 
(43-48) 
1,789 157 36 28 0 
Other, 
unknown 
residential 
Other, 
unknown 
residential 
(40, 49) 
298 17 2 3 0 
Total 
residential 
Residential 
(4) 
35,176 2,165 375 244 4 
All other 
building 
categories, 
unknown 
All non-
residential, 
unknown 
23,617 551 405 14 0 
Total All 58,793 2,716 780 258 4 
 
During those years in average 1120 fires caused 8 fatalities every year. By looking at 
newer statistics from the fire service in New South Wales it seems as that average 
could have been reduced. During the year 2006/07 1242 apartment fires caused 6 
fatalities which generates a lower yearly average than the statistics from 1989 – 1993. 
Whether that average is applicable to the other states in Australia could not be proved. 
The data from NSWFB (2007) also shows where the fires in apartment building occur 
and the data is summarised in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Area of fire origin in residential apartment buildings (NSWFB, 2007) 
The most common area where fire started was inside the apartments, and the exact 
room of fire origin is shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Room of fire origin in residential apartment buildings (NSWFB, 2007) 
Area of fire origin  Percentage 
Kitchen, cooking area 49 % 
Sleeping room for under five persons 11 % 
Lounge area 9 % 
Garage, car-port, vehicle storage area 3 % 
Laundry room, area 3 % 
4.2.2 USA  
In the USA 75 % of all civilian fatalities occur as a result of fires in residential 
buildings which represent 81 % of all fire fatalities. The main part of those fatalities 
occur in one- and two-family home structures, and as shown in Figure 4.2, apartment 
fires represent 14 % of all civilian fire deaths. 
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Figure 4.2 Civilian fire deaths by major property class 2011 (Levesque, 2013) 
The number of fatalities per 1000 fire is summarised in Table 4.3 and has slightly 
decreased during the measured ten year period. 
Table 4.3 Number of fires and fatalities in apartment structures between year 2000 and 
2011 (NFPA, 2013) 
Year Fires Fatalities Fatalities per 1000 fire 
2000 84500 500 5.9 
2001 88000 460 5.2 
2002 88500 390 4.4 
2003 91500 410 4.5 
2004 94000 510 5.4 
2005 94000 460 4.9 
2006 91500 425 4.6 
2007 98500 515 5.2 
2008 95500 390 4.1 
2009 90000 465 5.2 
2010 90500 440 4.9 
2011 95500 415 4.4 
 
The statistics from the USA also showed that fatalities in residential buildings 
generally occur when an individual is escaping, sleeping or is unable to act during a 
fire as shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Civilian activity prior to death in residential building fires, 2007 – 2009 
(USFA, 2011) 
Locations where fatalities in apartment fires were found are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Locations of fatalities in apartment buildings (NFPA, 2013) 
Location Percentage 
Bedroom 55 % 
Common rooms (dens, family rooms, living rooms or lounges) 9 % 
Kitchens and cooking areas 7 % 
Other functional areas 6 % 
Bathrooms and lavatories 5 % 
Not specific rooms, egress areas 10 % 
Unknown 8 % 
4.2.3 Sweden 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency provides a database online where the user 
can search data from the incident reports of the fire brigade. The number fires and 
fatalities during the last decade are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Number of fires and fatalities in Sweden (MSB, 2013) 
Year Number of fire 
incidents 
Number of deaths Fatalities per 1000 fire 
1999 3230 39 12 
2000 3355 41 12 
2001 2900 45 16 
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Year Number of fire 
incidents 
Number of deaths Fatalities per 1000 fire 
2002 2775 61 22 
2003 2652 31 12 
2004 2451 22 9 
2005 2669 36 13 
2006 2706 31 12 
2007 2946 38 13 
2008 2844 39 14 
2009 2919 55 19 
2010 2934 54 18 
2011 2815 37 13 
2012 2997 40 13 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 most fires started in the kitchen due to cooking 
appliances left on. 
 
Figure 4.4 Location of residential fires in Sweden 1998 - 2012 (MSB, 2013) 
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Figure 4.5 Cause of residential fires in Sweden 1998 - 2012 (MSB, 2013) 
However, as shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, fatal residential fires do more often 
start in the living room or the bedroom due to smoking. 
 
Figure 4.6 Location of lethal residential fires in Sweden 1998 - 2012 (MSB, 2013) 
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Figure 4.7 Cause of lethal residential fires in Sweden 1998 - 2012 (MSB, 2013) 
In Nystedt’s study (2003) data was gathered from the Swedish Rescue Service 
Agency regarding lethal fires. As shown in Figure 4.8, this data also recorded what 
item first ignited in residential fires.  
 
Figure 4.8 Item first ignited in lethal residential fires (Nystedt, 2003) 
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4.2.4 Summary 
When reviewing the statistics in regards to apartment fires from different part of the 
world some consistencies were found: 
 Fires in dwellings constitutes the most common fire and also cause the 
largest number of fatalities 
 Fires in apartment buildings are most likely to occur within the apartments 
 Apartment fires occur most often in the kitchen and cooking areas, however 
bedroom fires cause the largest number of fatalities. 
4.3 Fire development in apartment buildings 
A fire in an enclosure such as an apartment can develop in a multitude of different 
ways, mostly depending on the enclosure geometry and ventilation and the fuel type, 
amount, and surface area (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). A typical fire development is 
shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
Figure 4.9 A typical development for a fire in an enclosure (reproduced from Karlsson & 
Quintiere, 2000) 
The ignition is the process that leads to an exothermic process, which produces 
temperatures greatly above the ambient. The accompanying process can be either 
flaming combustion or smouldering combustion (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). 
After ignition the fire will grow at a rate depending on a number of factors such as 
(Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000): 
 The type of combustion 
 The type of fuel 
 Interaction with the surroundings 
 Access to oxygen 
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Flashover is defined as the rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement in a 
fire of combustible material within an enclosure. At that moment the fire changes 
from being fuel controlled to being ventilation controlled and is limited by the oxygen 
available for maintaining the combustion. As long as there is fuel available to 
combust, the fire will continue burning at its highest heat release rate. When the fuel 
is decreasing the fire will eventually return to being fuel controlled and decay until all 
fuel is combusted. 
Because apartments include a heavy fuel load and mixture of different fuels is the fire 
development generally rapid. The four most common items first ignited resulting in 
fire deaths are upholstered furniture, mattresses, internal wall coverings and clothing 
(Nystedt, 2003). A simple way to describe this accelerating fire growth is to assume 
that the energy release rate increases as the square of the time. By multiplying time 
squared by a factor α, various growth velocities can be simulated, and the energy 
release rate as a function of time could be expressed as Equation 4.1 (Karlsson & 
Quintiere, 2000). 
?̇? = 𝜶 ∙ 𝒕𝟐 Equation 4.1 
where, 
Q̇ = Energy release rate (kW) 
α = growth factor (kW/s2) 
t = time from established ignition (s) 
Values of α for different growth rates according to NFPA 204M are shown in Table 
4.6. 
Table 4.6 Growth rates (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). 
Growth rate α (kW/s2) Time (s) to reach 1055 kW 
Ultra fast 0.19 75 
Fast 0.047 150 
Medium 0.012 300 
Slow 0.003 600 
 
Some typical growth rates recommended for various types for various types of 
occupancies are shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Typical growth rates (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). 
Type of occupancy Growth rate α  
Dwellings etc Medium 
Hotels, nursing homes etc. Fast 
Shopping centers, entertainment centers Ultra fast 
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Type of occupancy Growth rate α  
Schools, offices Fast 
Hazardous industries Not specified 
 
The approximation of a fire development by using the t-squared fire (as shown in 
Equation 4.1) has been shown to be a good estimation for the growth phase of a fire 
(Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000). However does the equation not represent the steady 
phase of a fire or the decay phase. When using the approximation as a design fire the 
engineer must, depending on what the purpose of the analysis is, consider what time 
scale of the fire is relevant and thereafter apply reasonable assumptions for the 
maximum heat release rate and the decay phase presuming these stages are relevant. 
4.4 Human behaviour in apartment building fires 
In the report ‘Deaths in residential fires’ Nystedt (2003) presents some of the findings 
about human behaviour in fires. In Sweden, most people believe that the risk of fire in 
their own home is small and are unprepared as to what action to take when exposed to 
a fire at home (Nystedt, 2003). The frequency of fatalities per fire is lower in 
Australia compared to Sweden which means the perception that the risk of fire is low 
may be applicable also for Australia. The majority of people in the Swedish study 
stated that they; 
 would escape through a window if the ordinary exit was blocked,  
 are aware of that smoke spreads faster than fire and would consider closing 
the door to the room on fire before leaving the building (Nystedt, 2003). 
Kobes et al. (2010) presents three distinct strategies for surviving a fire: 
 Extinguish the fire (or at least try to) 
 Take shelter and wait to be rescued 
 Evacuate 
For 75 % of the domestic fires in Australia, the fire brigade was not called out, which 
means that about three quarters of the fires had either extinguished themselves or 
were extinguished by occupants. Kobes et al. (2010) also notes that there are cases 
when occupants tended to walk through smoke or even jump out of a building. Yet, 
the strategy of instructing the occupants of hotels or apartment buildings to stay in 
their rooms is likely to be an effective way of ensuring their survival during a fire 
(Kobes et al., 2010). This statement is dependent on the passive fire protection in the 
building, and should therefore only be valid in countries where the fire rated 
construction normally achieves the required Fire Resistance Level (FRL) and the 
FRLs provided are adequate in regards to the expected fire development. The 
common strategy in Australia is to evacuate people instead of advising them to stay in 
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place during a fire even though the Australian Standards give options for using partial 
evacuation or shelter in place (no evacuation) (AS3745, 2010). 
For a long time it was assumed that during an evacuation when occupants 
encountered smoke, they would stop, turn back, and find another means of egress. It is 
now acknowledged that many people are prepared to move through smoke during an 
evacuation (Proulx, 2008). It is estimated that over 60 percent of evacuees in small 
residential buildings move through smoke to evacuate and a study for the bomb blast 
at World Trade Center 1993 showed that up to 94 percent of the occupants of Tower 1 
moved through smoke (Averill et al., 2005). However the fraction of people that do so 
largely depends on the temperature and the toxicity of the smoke. 
Nystedt mentions in his report (2003) an Australian investigation by Brennan and 
Thomas (2001). The study showed that most people who become fatalities were alone 
when the fire started and also responsible for the fire. Where multiple fatalities have 
occurred, the person responsible for the fire was usually one of them. Because those 
who die in fires shared the same characteristics as those who frequently start fires and 
occupants who are killed by the fire without causing it shared the same risk behaviour 
as the fire starter, Brennan and Thomas suggested that fire is more a social problem 
than a technical one. 
Even if social factors have a large impact on the risk to occupants, it is still important 
that the constructed building not further increase the risk. As noted the objectives in 
the building code are statements to reflect the expectations of society, and it is 
expected that buildings shall be constructed to provide safety from fire to the 
occupants in it, even if social factors may decrease the efficacy of the fire safety 
measures. 
4.4.1 Modelling human response 
The most common engineering approach for modelling human behaviour is to divide 
the time from ignition to completed evacuation into three phases – detection, response 
and travel time (Nystedt, 2003). By comparing the evacuation time with the time it 
takes for a building to reach untenable conditions during a fire the safety provided by 
the building solution can be evaluated. 
4.4.1.1 Detection time 
The detection time is the time from ignition until the occupant is aware of the fire. 
Occupants can generally be aware of the fire either through the safety systems in the 
building or manually by fire cues. The detection time is affected by a number of 
factors such as the fire characteristics, occupant characteristics and conditions. A 
study made by Bruck and Brennan (2001) showed how occupants react to different 
fire cues. The study confirmed fire statistics saying that suggest most people who are 
unimpaired will be aroused from sleep by low level fire cues. Another study by Bruck 
(1998) showed that most adults wake up within 30 s after the alarm activation.  
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4.4.1.2 Response time 
The response time is the time from the occupant becomes aware of the fire until he 
decides to evacuate. This time varies depending on how the occupant became aware 
of the fire. Some different response times from Nystedt (2003) are shown in Table 
4.8.  
Table 4.8 Response times from different fire cues (Proulx et al., 1995) 
Occupant notified by Response time [s] 
Heat, smoke or flames from the fire 50 
Fire service arrival 50 
Alerted by others 100 
Spoken message 100 
External alarm bell 250 
Local smoke detector 250 
4.4.1.3 Travel time 
The last part of the evacuation time is the phase from when escape is initiated until the 
occupant has reached a safe area such as an exit. This time mainly depends on the 
travel distance the occupant has to walk, the conditions the occupant is exposed to 
during the evacuation and the characteristics of the occupant. For example completely 
disabled occupants will need assistance during an evacuation, which obviously 
increases the travel time. 
The response time is largely depending on the type of building and occupancy. 
Studies by Proulx (2008) showed that the response time can be up to approximately 
three times as long as the travel time, and therefore the travel time is generally less 
important when evaluating the total evacuation time. 
Gwynne and Rosenbaum (2008) state that the maximum exit flow speed for 
unimpeded occupants in corridors is 1.19 m/s. However the walking speed is 
dependent on a number of factors such as familiarity with the building, visibility and 
the physical ability of the occupant. A general correlation between walking speed and 
visibility was developed by Jin (1975). The correlation gives walking speeds from 
1 m/s to 0.3 m/s depending on the visibility at the egress route. 
4.5 Fire safety measures in residential buildings 
During the background study different building codes were reviewed to get a wider 
understanding of what safety measures different parts of the world require for 
residential apartment buildings and what the similarities and differences are to the 
BCA. Because the model was developed for apartment buildings in Australia the 
requirements of the BCA have been presented in more detail. Fire safety requirements 
for the UK, the USA and Sweden are summarised in Appendix A. 
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4.5.1 Passive protection 
In Australia a residential building (BCA Class 2) is defined as a building containing 
two or more sole-occupancy units each being a separate dwelling. The passive 
protection in residential buildings is determined by what the type of construction the 
building is prescribed to be which is depending on the number of stories in the 
building as shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 Type of construction required for residential buildings 
Rise in storeys Type of construction 
4 or more A 
3 A 
2 B 
1 C 
 
For Type A constructions, Fire Resistance Levels (FRLs) are prescribed to generally 
be 90 minutes for loadbearing building elements and 60 minutes for non-loadbearing 
elements. The same FRLs are required for Type B constructions except that the FRL 
for internal loadbearing walls between Sole Occupancy Units (SOUs), which is the 
word for apartments in the BCA, and a bounding corridor are required to be 60 
minutes. Type C constructions only require an FRL for external walls if they are 
located less than 1.5 m from any fire-source feature. Internal walls are required to 
have an FRL of 60 minutes. The BCA generally does not give any concessions in 
regards to FRLs when sprinklers are installed, however there are exceptions. For 
example the State specific appendix for Victoria gives sprinkler concessions for 
residential buildings below 25 m in height. 
4.5.2 Distribution of exits 
The BCA prescribes that residential buildings must have at least one exit from each 
storey if the building is less than 25 m tall and two exits from each storey if the 
building is higher than 25 m. The entrance doorway of any SOU must be not more 
than six meter from an exit or from a point from which travel in different directions to 
two exits is available. 
4.5.3 Active protection 
4.5.3.1 Fire-fighting equipment 
The BCA prescribes that a fire hydrant system must be provided to serve buildings 
that have a total floor area greater than 500 m2. Where one or more internal fire 
hydrants are installed the building shall also be provided with fire hose reels installed 
in accordance with AS2441 (2005). The fire hose reels provide means for building 
occupants to undertake initial attack during a fire. In addition, portable fire 
extinguishers are provided in residential buildings. By the time of this study it was 
proposed that the requirement for fire hose reels in residential buildings could be 
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omitted from the building code since they rarely gets used due to the misperception 
that they are installed for the fire services. Whether that suggestion will be 
implemented is at this point not known, however the omission of fire hose reels in 
residential buildings been often been justified through fire engineered Alternative 
Solutions. 
4.5.3.2 Sprinkler system 
The BCA prescribes that a sprinkler system must be installed throughout a residential 
building if any part of the building has an effective height above 25 m. However 
sprinkler systems are often included in lower residential buildings as well, but then 
usually as a part of an Alternative Solution to justify the proposed deviations from the 
DtS Provisions. 
4.5.3.3 Smoke and fire detection 
Class 2 (residential) parts of the building must be provided with either smoke alarms 
in accordance with AS3786 (1993) or a smoke detection system in accordance with 
AS1670.1 or a combination of a smoke alarm system within SOUs and a smoke 
detection system in areas not within SOUs. 
4.5.3.4 Occupant warning system 
Residential buildings taller than 25 m must also be provided with a sound system and 
intercom system for emergency purposes complying where applicable with AS1670.4 
to enable wardens to readily control the evacuation of the building occupants in an 
emergency. 
4.5.3.5 Air pressurisation systems 
Any required fire-isolated stairway, including any associated fire-isolated passageway 
serving any storey above an effective height of 25 m must be provided with an 
automatic air pressurisation system for fire-isolated exits in accordance with AS/NZS 
1668.1. 
4.5.4 Reliability 
The reliabilities and efficiencies of different fire safety systems were investigated by 
looking at previous studies. 
4.5.4.1 Passive fire protection 
The PD7974 (BSI, 2003) presents probabilities for fire-resisting structures achieving 
at least 75 % of the designated fire resistance standard as shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 Reliabilities in PD7974 (BSI, 2003) 
Passive fire systems 
Probability that fire-
resisting structures will 
achieve at least 75 % of 
Masonry walls 0.75 
Partition walls 0.65 
Glazing 0.4 
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Passive fire systems 
the designated fire 
resistance standard 
Suspended ceilings 0.25 
 
These numbers can be compared to other studies summarised by Bukowski et al. 
(2002) and shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 Published estimates for passive fire protection systems operational reliability 
(Bukowski, 2002) 
Protection system Warrington UK 
Delphi Study  
Fire Engineering Guidelines Australia 
(Expert Survey) 
Masonry construction 81 % 95 % (no opening) 
90 % (opening with automatic closer) 
Gypsum partitions 69 % 95 % (no opening) 
90 % (opening with automatic closer) 
 
As shown in the two tables there are significant differences between estimated 
reliabilities. This could be because construction methods vary to some degree as well 
as the test for proving fire resistance in different parts of the world. 
4.5.4.2 Active fire protection 
Bukowski et al. (2002) also summarised published estimates for active fire safety 
systems. The reliabilities for different systems during flaming fires are presented in 
Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12 Active fire protection systems reliability during flaming fires (Bukowski et al, 
2002) 
Protection system Warrington UK Delphi 
Study  
Fire Engineering 
Guidelines Australia 
(Expert Survey) 
Heat detector 89 % 90 % 
Home smoke alarm 79 % 75 % 
System smoke detector 90 % 90 % 
Beam smoke detector 88 % 80 % 
Aspirated smoke detector NA 95 % 
Sprinklers operate 95 % 95 % 
Sprinklers control but do 
not extinguish 
64 % NA  
Sprinklers extinguish 48 % NA  
NA = Not Addressed 
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These reliabilities are consistent with other studies. William and Koffel summarises 
previous studies about sprinkler reliability in their paper (2005). The scope, breadth, 
and reporting periods of the various studies summarised varied significantly end they 
underline the importance of reviewing the scope of each study. The reliability of 
success for sprinkler systems in the previous studies varied from 87 % to 99.5 %, and 
the authors recognise a sprinkler reliability of 90 % to be appropriate when evaluating 
life safety (William & Koffel, 2005). 
Some probabilities for detector failure are summarised in MARSH’s report (2008). 
The authors also emphasises the importance of estimating the effectiveness when 
QRA is the basis for fire engineering design. The effectiveness of a fire protection 
system depends on its reliability and efficacy, and each of these in turn depends on 
other factors which makes the concept of effectiveness rather complex. However the 
report suggests the use of values from the IFEG (2005) shown in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13 Effectiveness of systems for various fire conditions 
Protection system Smouldering fire Flaming fire Post-flashover fire 
Sprinkler system 0 % 90 % 95 % 
Heat detector 0 % 90 % 95 % 
Smoke detector 70 % 80 % 85 % 
4.5.5 Smoke leakage 
Research by Gross (1989) on the air leakage through standard sized single doors 
indicates that 200 °C smoke leakage (consistent with sprinkler protected scenarios) 
across the door typically is 0.06 m3/s at a 25 Pa pressure differential (or 216 m3/h) 
while smoke sealed doors typically have a leakage rate of about between 50 m3/h to 
less than 2 m3/h at a 25 Pa pressure differential at 200 °C. The smoke spread into the 
public corridor can therefore be reduced at least 77 % with the installation of smoke 
seals.  
4.5.6 Smoke ventilation 
Mechanical ventilation has been proved to dramatically improve the conditions in the 
corridor. A study made by BRE (2005) included approximately seventy practical 
experiments and over five hundred numerical simulations to provide 
recommendations in support of revisions to Approved Document B. The project 
concluded that tenable conditions in the corridor can be maintained with the provision 
of a smoke extraction scheme or a pressurisation scheme. 
Colt is a company in UK that has developed an extended corridor system for 
residential buildings. This system included mechanical ventilation through an extract 
point at one end of the corridor and a source of inlet air at the other end. The corridor 
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system was proved to provide a significantly higher safety level to occupants than a 
prescriptive compliant building solution (Colt, 2007). 
For the purpose of this thesis it was therefore concluded that there are mechanical 
ventilation systems available which can keep the corridor tenable even if smoke from 
a burning apartment is leaking into it. 
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5 Risk estimation model 
5.1 Prerequisites for model 
The model was developed from the following prerequisites: 
 The purpose of the model was to evaluate how the risk level is changed 
when the travel distance is increased. Therefore it was determined that a 
model that compares risk levels relatively was appropriate.  
 By comparing two alternatives the absolute risk level did not have to be 
quantified nor evaluated to an absolute criterion. Furthermore, uncertainties 
in the model were to a degree eliminated since the assumptions made 
always applied to the both compared building solutions. 
 The model was based on a quantitative probabilistic method using event-
tree analysis as described in section 3.2.3. 
 Each scenario in the event tree was evaluated through a modified 
ASET/RSET analysis evaluating if the occupants within each apartment 
would survive an evacuation during the current conditions in the corridor. 
 Uncertainties were analysed explicitly in section 9.4 through applying 
probability distributions to the most impacting variables as shown in Figure 
2.3. 
It was determined that the development of the risk model was to follow the three 
activities in a risk analysis: 
 System definition 
 Hazard identification 
 Risk estimation 
These terms are defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, 
1995) and presented in Figure 3.1. The System definition is presented in section 5.2, 
the Hazard identification in Chapter 6 and the Risk estimation is presented in Chapter 
7 to Chapter 9. 
5.1.1 Risk measure 
As a part of the result it was determined to present the expected number of fatalities 
per fire. That number shows to what degree the consequences of each fire has been 
reduced or increased when different fire safety measures are added or removed. 
However the total risk could be higher in a building where the consequence of each 
fire is reduced. This is due to the increased probability and frequency for fires to 
occur. By using Equation 3.4 the risk model also generates an estimation of the 
average individual risk, which can be used as a comparative value when evaluating 
building solutions.  
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5.1.1.1 Consequence definition 
Because the risk measure was determined to be characterised as the probability for a 
certain number of fatalities, the consequence in the model was defined as the number 
of building occupant fatalities due to the assessed fire scenarios. 
5.2 System definition 
The system for which the model was developed was defined as the apartments and the 
corridor on a typical floor plate in a residential apartment building in Australia. 
Included in the system are also all occupants and fire safety measures located within 
its boundary. The dotted blue line in Figure 5.1 shows the system, the exit stair or any 
other spaces located on the same floor are therefore outside the scope of the model. 
 
Figure 5.1 Typical floor plate and system definition for the comparative risk model  
5.2.1 Risk to the fire brigade 
The risk to the fire brigade was only considered by limiting the validity area of the 
model. It was estimated that the risk to the fire brigade would not change significantly 
as long as their procedures for intervention were not changed. The risk model was 
therefore determined to only be valid for corridor lengths up to twenty-five meters. If 
a corridor is extended beyond that limit the redundancy in the safety level is decreased 
because the attack by the fire brigade is more complex. 
To include a function for fire brigade intervention in the model to save occupants the 
conditions within the apartments would have to be evaluated. The difference due to 
corridor lengths would in that case be less significant in model because even if the 
corridor would be untenable, occupants could still be counted as saved by fire 
brigade. And because the scope of the model is to be used for evaluating building 
solutions it seemed inappropriate to affect the results by adding an effect of the fire 
brigade. The author’s opinion is that a building performance should not be judged or 
relied on for its distance from the nearest fire station. Buildings should be designed to 
satisfy the Performance Requirements regardless of where it is located. Fire service 
intervention is then only adding a level of redundancy for life safety purposes and for 
System boundary 
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property protection. Therefore the model was developed without considering 
scenarios where occupants are saved by the fire brigade. 
5.3 Model structure 
The model was based on an event tree analysis as schematically presented in Figure 
5.2.  
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Figure 5.2 Model flow chart 
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The model compares building solutions through the following methodology. 
1. A typical residential level of each building solution is inserted in the model by 
specifying the number of apartments, their distances to the nearest exit, the 
average number of occupants located within each apartment and the fire safety 
measures provided in the building (both passive and active systems).  
2. The building solution is then evaluated in the event tree which includes up to 
240 scenarios depending on what safety measures the building solution is 
provided with. The more fire safety measures, the more scenarios in the model 
are given a probability to occur. The model then conducts a modified 
ASET/RSET analysis for each apartment location in the corridor for all 
scenarios in the event tree. 
3. The risk is then calculated by multiplying the probability for each scenario 
with its summarised consequences in the corridor and the expected frequency 
of fires at the typical level. The resulting risk is thereafter presented as the 
individual risk, the average risk at the floor (expected number of fatalities per 
year) and a curve in an F/N diagram.  
4. These three risk units can then be compared with a comparative building 
solution which complies with the prescriptive requirements to determine 
whether the evaluated building solution is acceptable. 
5.3.1 Risk estimation 
The risk model event tree is presented in Appendix B and includes in total 240 
different scenarios based on two fire locations. For each scenario in the event tree a 
safety margin was calculated by comparing the ASET to the RSET to determine if the 
scenario would result in consequences or not. This is shown schematically in Figure 
5.3. The ASET was estimated using fire modelling in FDS (McGrattan et al., 2007) or 
engineering judgement and the RSET was calculated by summarising the detection 
time (td), response time (tr), and travel time (tt) for each apartment as presented in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 Consequence modelling principle – The consequence for each apartment is 
calculated by comparing the RSET for each apartment with the ASET for the common 
corridor. 
The risk model quantifies the safety margin for each apartment. A positive safety 
margin is interpreted by the model as all occupants within that apartment being safe 
for that scenario. Accordingly, if the safety margin is calculated to be negative it 
means that all occupants within that apartment are considered as fatalities for that 
scenario. 
All fire scenarios in the event tree were evaluated for each apartment in the corridor 
and the consequence for each scenario was thereafter calculated by summarising the 
consequences from all apartments for each scenario. The risk is thereafter calculated 
by multiplying the probability for the scenario with the number of consequences. A 
schematic picture of the risk estimation process is shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Schematic picture of risk model event tree analysis 
5.4 Assumptions 
The following main assumptions were made during the development of the 
comparative risk model 
 The model was built up by applying standard compartment sizes for 
corridors and apartments (presented in section 8.1.4). 
 The available safe egress time (ASET) in the corridor was assumed to be 
the same for all apartments in the evaluated building solution. 
 The risk of smoke leakage between apartments for example through the 
ventilation system was neglected in the model. 
 Smoke alarms (when working) were assumed to wake up all occupants 
within the apartment of fire origin. 
 Mechanical corridor ventilation was assumed to keep the corridor tenable 
during all scenarios when the system was working as intended. Scenarios 
for when the ventilation system is failing was determined through fire 
modelling. 
 The effect of cross corridor doors was assumed to be that all apartments 
beyond the cross corridor door were assumed to be safe for all scenarios 
when the door is working as intended. 
The influence on the result due to the assumptions made when developing the model 
is discussed in section 10.1. 
5.5 Apartment design alternatives 
The model was developed to be used for any apartment building configuration. To test 
the model the impacts of each fire safety measure was evaluated by introducing each 
measure to an apartment configuration (DtS Solution 1) and assess the change in risk 
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level. Furthermore three different apartment configurations were evaluated and 
compared; two prescriptive compliant (DtS Solution 1 and 2) and one solution 
including deviations from the DtS Provisions (Alternative Solution). 
The characteristics of the three compared building solutions were determined to be as 
described in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Key parameters for the compared building solutions 
Parameter DtS Solution 1  DtS Solution 2 Alternative Solution 
Number of 
apartments 
6 14 14 
Number of 
stairs 
1 2 1 
Longest travel 
distance in the 
corridor 
6 m 13 m 24 m 
Total length of 
corridor 
9 m 25 m 25 m 
Sprinkler 
system 
No No Yes 
Smoke 
Detection & 
Alarm 
Smoke alarms 
inside apartments. 
Smoke alarms inside 
apartments. 
Smoke alarms inside 
apartments 
interconnected to 
smoke detection 
system in the 
corridor. 
Passive 
Construction 
Generally 60 
minutes FRL. 
Self-closer at all 
doors. 
Generally 60 minutes 
FRL. 
Self-closer at all 
doors. 
Generally 60 minutes 
FRL. 
Self-closer at all 
doors. 
Smoke seals at 
apartment doors. 
 
The floor layouts are schematically shown in Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7. 
Please note that the scale and dimensions not are accurate in the figures. 
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Figure 5.5 Floor layout for DtS Solution 1 
 
Figure 5.6 Floor layout for DtS Solution 2 
 
Figure 5.7 Floor layout for Alternative Solution  
6 m 
12 m 13 m 
24 m 
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6 Hazard identification 
6.1 General fire hazards 
As shown in the previously presented statistics, residential fires is the type of fires 
that causes the largest number of fatalities and also one of the most hazardous 
buildings for fire brigade intervention. Apartment building fires are not as common as 
family house fires but they still represent a considerable proportion of fatalities due to 
fires. The statistics also show that there are consistencies between different parts of 
the world in regards to residential building fires. Fires inside apartments constitute the 
major part of all fires, and the largest percentage of those fires occurs in the kitchen 
and cooking areas. However bedroom fires cause the largest number of fatalities, with 
smoking as the most common reason for ignition. The main hazards in a residential 
building are therefore the cooking equipment, heating equipment, electrical devices 
and also the occupants (misusing equipment, smoking etc.). The most common 
activity prior to death is escaping or sleeping and a considerable percentage of 
fatalities were unable to act. Other factors that further increase the risk in residential 
buildings compared to other building types are explained below. 
6.1.1 Occupant condition 
The occupant characteristics have a large impact on the risk for fatalities in residential 
buildings. Just the fact residential buildings include sleeping occupants for a 
considerable proportion of a day means that the risk is largely increased. Statistics 
from the USFA (2011) presented in section 4.2.2 and below shows that nearly 50 
percent of all fatalities occurred while the occupants were asleep, 25 percent where 
physically disabled and another 20 percent were possibly impaired by alcohol. 
Table 6.1 Human Factors Contributing to Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings 
2007 - 2009 (USFA, 2011) 
Human factors contributing to fatality Percent of fire fatalities 
in residential buildings 
Asleep 47.6 
Physically disabled 24.7 
Possibly impaired by alcohol 19.5 
Possibly mentally disabled 8.8 
Unconscious 8.4 
Possibly impaired by other drug or chemical 8.1 
Unattended or supervised person 6.9 
Physically restrained 1.4 
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Other human factors have an impact on lethal fires were concluded in a Japanese 
study by Sekizawa (1988). The study found that:  
 48 % of the fatalities were over 65 years old and 9 % were younger than 6 
years old. 
 Disabled people over 65 years of age are exposed to 40 times the risk of 
dying in fires than the average population. 
 More than 70 % of the fire victims have difficulties in performing the 
evacuation. 
 50 % of the fatalities are drunk or asleep when they die. 
 50 % are alone when the fire breaks out. 
6.1.2 Combustibles 
Apartment buildings generally comprise a lot of combustibles such as furnish made of 
plastic and fabric materials which can cause a fast growing fire (Nystedt, 2003). 
Statistics from Sweden and USA show that the first item igniting is usually bed 
clothing, clothes or flammable liquid. The causes of these fires are outlined in Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2 Cause of fire for different items (Nystedt, 2003) 
Item Cause 
Upholstered furniture Abandoned candles and cigarettes, suspicious causes, 
falling asleep while smoking etc. 
Mattresses and bedding Children playing with fire, abandoned candles and 
cigarettes, falling asleep while smoking etc. 
Internal wall covering Short circuit or ground fault, suspicious causes, 
unattended cooking etc. 
Clothing Lighters, cigarettes, candles, matches etc. 
6.1.3 Compartment geometrics 
The ceiling height on each story in an apartment building is relatively low and the 
ventilation conditions are normally limited compared to other buildings. These factors 
in combination with the high fire load inside the apartments increase the risk in at 
least two ways: 
 The time until the hot layer reaches a critical height where occupants may 
be unable to evacuate is decreased. 
 The time until flashover occurs and the fire becomes ventilation controlled 
is decreased. 
6.1.4 Maintenance 
Fire safety precautions in Australian apartment buildings are limited. Depending on 
the building size an apartment may only include smoke alarms which not are 
connected to any detection system in the building. These fire safety measures may 
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also be poorly maintained or disconnected by occupants. An example is occupants 
removing batteries from smoke alarms due to spurious alarms during cooking. 
6.1.5 Staff 
There are generally no staff present in an apartment building that can assist occupants 
with evacuating the building.  
6.2 Impact on risk by increasing the travel distance 
Since the reviewed fire statistics do not specify the corridor length in those buildings 
where fatalities have occurred it was not possible to quantify how the risk is changed 
when the corridor is extended and the travel distance to an exit is increased on a 
statistical basis. To identify the main factors on the risk when the travel distance to an 
exit is increased has therefore been done through qualitative judgements for each sub 
system of the IFEG (2005). These sub-systems which has been analysed are:  
 A – Fire initiation & development & control 
 B – Smoke development & spread & control 
 C – Fire spread & impact & control 
 D – Fire detection, warning & suppression 
 E – Occupant evacuation & control 
 F – Fire services intervention 
6.2.1 A – Fire initiation & development & control 
Fire occurrence is a random phenomenon affected by several uncertain factors. 
Several studies have been made to estimate the probability of a fire to occur and it is 
clearly a non-linear function of building size (Lin, 2005). It was anyway concluded 
for the purpose of this study that increasing the building size increases the probability 
for a fire to occur in the building. A small change in travel distance would not 
necessarily mean that the building size has increased. But generally the travel distance 
in residential apartment buildings is increased for increasing the building size and 
increasing the number of apartments without sacrificing additional area of the 
building to be non-lettable for tenants (for example additional stairwells). A longer 
common corridor could therefore serve a larger building with more apartments which 
would result in a higher probability for a fire occurring on that level. 
6.2.2 B – Smoke development & spread & control 
The credible fire scenarios in residential apartment buildings are the same regardless 
of the size of the building, the length of the corridor or the travel distance to an exit. 
The combustible materials are expected to be the same and produce the same kind of 
toxic gases. If smoke spreads to a corridor the length of it could affect the smoke layer 
height, the temperature and the toxicity of the smoke layer. The increased 
compartment size could function as a reservoir for the smoke layer and provide 
additional time for occupant egress. How large this effect is was further investigated 
during the development of the model, see section 9.1.1. 
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Obviously the fire safety measures will also have an impact on the smoke spread and 
control. As an example the provision of a sprinkler system definitely has an impact on 
the smoke development, the fire spread, the gas temperature and toxicity. Furthermore 
smoke seals on the apartment doors can have a benefit by preventing smoke from 
entering the corridor or other apartments. 
6.2.3 C – Fire spread & impact & control 
The risk for fire spread is not directly affected by increasing the travel distance to an 
exit. However as explained in section 6.2.2 the provided fire safety measures could 
have a direct impact on the risk of fire spread. 
6.2.4 D – Fire detection, warning & suppression 
The fire detection, warning and suppression normally form the essential part of the 
fire safety design. The performance or reliability of these systems is not expected to 
be affected by the corridor length since the systems still have to be installed in 
accordance with prescribed standards. The risk to occupants in the building is 
obviously affected when these systems are varied. 
6.2.5 E – Occupant evacuation & control 
Occupant evacuation and control is affected when the travel distance is increased. As 
discussed in 6.2.1 could the number of apartment be increased and therefore is also 
the number of occupants increased. Secondly does the extended travel distance result 
in an increased evacuation time which means that egressing occupants could be 
exposed to critical conditions during a longer time period.  
6.2.6 F – Fire services intervention 
The main concern for the fire services when increasing the corridor length is that there 
are more apartments affected and therefore potentially more occupants to save. In an 
ideal situation all occupants on the floor of fire origin have already evacuated the 
building by the time the fire brigade arrive. But if occupants are stuck in their 
apartments and have to be saved, the required effort by the fire brigade increases with 
the number of occupants.  
Secondly, increasing the travel distance and the length of the common corridor means 
that the fire brigade have a longer distance to travel from the stair to the apartment of 
fire origin. Whether the corridor is affected by smoke or not should not cause any 
significant risk to the fire fighters because they are provided with breathing apparatus. 
But the further away the apartment of fire origin is located, the less hose length will 
be available for the attack inside the apartment. The fire brigade connect their hose to 
the hydrant which often is located in the stair. The hose is thirty meters long, and once 
it is pressurised with water it cannot be extended with another hose length. 
Connecting two hose lengths in the stair would mean a fire fighter would have to 
carry too much hose during the attack and is therefore not reasonable. For this reason 
there is a limit where the fire brigade cannot conduct their operations using normal 
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routines. Where this limit is depends on the location of the hydrant and the size of the 
apartments, but any corridor longer than twenty five meters has a reduced redundancy 
level because the fire brigade operations are more complicated. 
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7 Probability mapping 
7.1 Event tree 
The event tree was developed based on the Hazard identification conducted in 
Chapter 6. The hazard identification showed that fire inside apartments are the most 
common fires in residential apartment buildings. Fires in the corridor are not as 
common since only approximately 5 % of fire occurs there. However, it was expected 
that a fire in the corridor cold have a significant impact on the risk level since a fire 
there would most likely affect the ability for to safely evacuate for all occupants 
located on the same floor as the fire. Therefore it was determined that the model 
should evaluate the risk due to apartment fires and corridor fires. 
For the analysis, the starting event was a fire starting and then following the split in 
the event tree for the location of the fire which included the options “apartment” and 
“corridor”. From the location of the fire each branch was then developed from an 
“expected chronological timeline” perspective. In other words, the splits in the event 
tree were included in the expected order they would occur during the relevant fire 
scenario. For example an apartment fire was expected to activate the smoke alarms in 
the apartment at an earlier stage than it activated the smoke detectors in the common 
corridor. The full event tree is presented in detail in Appendix B. 
7.1.1 Corridor fire 
The corridor fire was assumed to affect the following system in chronological order: 
 Smoke detection (if installed) 
 Heat detection (if installed) 
 Sprinkler system (if installed) 
Because of the expected limited size of a corridor fire it was assumed that it could 
only cause untenable conditions in the corridor. Conditions within apartments were 
therefore not analysed for these scenarios. 
7.1.2 Apartment fire 
The apartment fire was assumed to affect the following fire safety systems in 
chronological order: 
 Smoke alarms 
 Heat detection (if installed) 
 Sprinkler system (if installed) 
 Passive construction 
 Smoke detection in corridor (if installed) 
 Smoke ventilation in corridor (if installed) 
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7.2 Fires 
7.2.1 Probability of a fire 
As discussed under hazard identification, the probability for a fire relates to the 
building size even though the correlation not is linear. For the purpose of the risk 
model it was assumed that the probability of a fire occurring is linear to the number of 
apartments on that level. 
Between 1989 and 1993 there were in average 1121 apartment fires every year 
(Dowling & Ramsay, 1997). At approximately same time (1997) the total number of 
apartments in Australia was 795,000 (ABS, 2008). Therefore the probability of a fire 
per dwelling and year is determined as: 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 =
𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟏 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒔/𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓
𝟕𝟗𝟓. 𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒔
= 𝟏. 𝟒𝟏 ∙ 𝟏𝟎−𝟑 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 
From section 4.4 approximately three quarters of all fires are extinguished or 
extinguish themselves without requiring the fire brigade. In the risk model it was 
assumed that if an occupant manages to extinguish the fire or if the fire self-
extinguishes, the fire would not result in any consequences to the building. Those 
scenarios were therefore not considered further, and the probability of a fire that could 
cause consequences was determined accordingly. 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒂𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓
= 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 ∙ (𝟏. 𝟒𝟏 ∙ 𝟏𝟎−𝟑) = 𝟑. 𝟓𝟐𝟓 ∙ 𝟏𝟎−𝟒 
The fire that could cause consequences was also determined to constitute the starting 
event of the event tree upon which the risk model was developed. This event was 
named “severe fire” Further to this it was assumed that the starting fires are flaming 
fires. Flaming fires typically grow faster than smouldering fires and are therefore a 
larger risk to building occupants. Also, fire protection systems generally are more 
effective for flaming fires than smouldering fires as shown in Table 4.13. This 
assumption is further discussed in section 10.1.1. 
7.2.2 Location of fires 
The first branch in the event tree regards the fire location. As shown in Figure 4.1 
fires inside apartments is the most common type of fire representing approximately 
77 % of all fires in apartment buildings. The model therefore considers fires that start 
in an apartment. 
Fires in stairways, lobbies and escape routes constitute 4.3 % of apartment fires. But 
during the development of the model it was estimated that because of the increased 
number of apartments in the corridor, a fire located in the corridor could cause a 
significant difference in risk level and therefore should be considered in the model. 
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These are the two fire locations considered in the model and from here on they are 
referred to as the apartment fire and the corridor fire. The probability for each branch 
was calculated by the relative probability for the fires. 
𝑷(𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) =
𝟒. 𝟑 %
𝟕𝟕 + 𝟒. 𝟑 %
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓𝟑 
𝑷(𝒂𝒑𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟏 − 𝑷(𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒐𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟒𝟕 
How the both fires were modelled is further explained in Appendix D. 
7.3 Passive systems 
The model was designed to consider the contribution of having fire rated construction 
parts and precautions to prevent smoke spread. However passive fire protection also 
has a reliability and a probability of failure which was determined as follows. 
7.3.1 Wall structures 
If the fire-resisting structure fails to achieve 75 % of the designated fire resistance 
standard it will only perform up to 75 % of the time in the fire resistance test. That 
does not mean that the structure would perform during the same time during a real 
fire. In the model it was therefore assumed that if a fire-resisting structure fails to 
achieve at least 75 % of the designated fire resistance standard it has failed to achieve 
any fire resistance level. Because the wall between apartments and the corridor could 
be either masonry or partition walls the probability for a fire-resisting structure to fail 
was determined by applying an average of the values presented in BSI (2003) 
(showed in Table 4.10).  
𝑷(𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆) =
(𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓) + (𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟔𝟓)
𝟐
= 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎 
7.3.2 Doors 
To estimate the reliability of the apartment doors three splits in the event tree were 
introduced: 
 Door closing 
 Achieves required FRL 
 Smoke leakage 
To prevent smoke from entering the common corridor the door had to be successful 
through all stages. The part of the event tree that presents the probabilities for smoke 
spread to the corridor is presented in Figure 7.1 
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Figure 7.1 Event tree – Smoke leakage to corridor 
7.3.2.1 Door closing 
Some of the most common causes of failures for fire rated doors are according to 
Moinuddin & Thomas study (2009): 
 Self-closer fails to close the door 
 Door wedged open 
To determine the probability of the door not being in a closed position a simple fault 
tree analysis was conducted following the methodology shown in section 3.2.3. The 
fault tree is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 Fault tree – Self-closing apartment door open during a fire 
When self-closers are provided the probability of failure was hence determined 
accordingly. 
𝑷(𝒅𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 − 𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟒  
The probability for an apartment door which not is provided with self-closer being 
open during a fire was estimated through another fault tree analysis. The probability 
No leakage
Smoke leakage
90.0% 35.28%
70.0% Smoke seals
0
10.0% 3.92%
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0
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44.0% 44.0%
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Self-closer 
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that the apartment door would be left open was estimated to be in the order of twice as 
likely when self-closers not are provided, and was therefore assumed to be 0.4. The 
fault tree is shown in Figure 7.3 and the probability that the door is open during a fire 
was calculated to be 0.58. 
𝑷(𝒅𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒕 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 − 𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒏 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟖  
 
Figure 7.3 Fault tree – Apartment door without self-closer open during a fire 
7.3.2.2 Achieving fire resistance level 
The probability for a door achieving its designated FRL was assumed to be similar to 
that of a fire rated structure. The probability of failure was therefore: 
𝑷(𝒅𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝑭𝑹𝑳 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆) = 𝑷(𝒘𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎 
7.3.2.3 Smoke leakage 
As shown in section 4.5.5 the smoke leakage depends on if smoke seals are provided 
or not. However if smoke seals are installed there is still a probability that it fails to 
stop the smoke. The reliability of smoke seals could not be determined from the 
literature study and was therefore estimated from the probability of failure for a 
passive construction including openings according to the Australian expert survey 
which is shown in Table 4.11. 
𝑷(𝒔𝒎𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 
If smoke seals are not provided there is obviously no probability that they would be 
effective and it is therefore likely that smoke would enter the common corridor. 
7.3.2.4 Cross corridor doors 
To determine the reliability of cross corridor doors an event tree analysis was 
conducted as shown in Figure 7.4. 
𝑷(𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔 𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆 𝒃𝒆𝒚𝒐𝒏𝒅 𝒂 𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 − 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒅𝒐𝒓 𝒅𝒐𝒐𝒓) = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟏 
SOU door 
not closed
0.58
Blocked open Left open
Ref: PD7974 Ref: PD7974
0.3 0.4
OR
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Figure 7.4 Event tree – cross corridor failure
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7.4 Active systems 
7.4.1 Smoke alarms 
The effectivenesses of smoke alarms where determined as follows based on Bukowski 
(1998) and MARSH (2008). 
𝑷(𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆 − 𝒉𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒔𝒎𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒓𝒎) = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏 
𝑷(𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆 − 𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒔𝒎𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓) = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 
7.4.2 Heat detection 
The effectiveness of heat detection according to Table 4.13 is 90 %. The probability 
of failure is: 
𝑷(𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆 − 𝒉𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓) = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 
7.4.3 Sprinkler system 
The effectiveness of the sprinkler system was based on the literature study in section 
4.5.4.2 and determined as follows. 
𝑷(𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒙𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒉 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟖 
𝑷(𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐 
𝑷(𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒆𝒓 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 
7.4.4 Smoke ventilation 
The effectiveness of the smoke ventilation system was based on the probability 
presented in PD7974 (BSI, 2003). 
𝑷(𝑽𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒂𝒔 𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒆𝒅, 𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅) = 𝟎. 𝟗 
7.5 Occupant awareness 
The last branches for all scenarios where the fire was not extinguished is based on 
whether the occupants are awake or asleep. 
It was assumed that all occupants are within their apartments when the fire is initiated, 
and the default probability for occupants being awake was estimated accordingly. 
Occupants would normally be asleep 7 hours per day which represents 30 % of a day. 
It was assumed that during a fire an average 50 % of the sleeping occupants will not 
wake up or being affected by alcohol or drugs to a degree will not react as quick as if 
they were awake. 
𝑷(𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒔𝒍𝒆𝒆𝒑 𝒐𝒓 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅) = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓 
𝑷(𝒐𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝒂𝒘𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒘𝒂𝒌𝒆 𝒖𝒑 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒐) = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟓 
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The model was the designed so that the user can estimate the probability for 
occupants being awake. It is for example reasonable to assume a higher probability 
that occupants will wake up for a building solution where sounders are installed in all 
bedrooms to provide a higher sound pressure level than were the sounders only are 
located in the hallway. 
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8 Consequence analysis 
To quantify the consequences for all scenarios in the event tree an ASET/RSET 
analysis were conducted for each scenario. The ASET for each scenario was 
determined by the time when evacuation no longer was possible without causing a 
severe hazard to the health of the occupants. The RSETs were individually 
determined for each apartment and were calculated by summarising the detection 
time, response time and travel time for the occupants to reach an exit. 
8.1 Available safe egress time (ASET) 
As explained in section 5.3.1 the ASET was determined by evaluating the conditions 
in the corridor for each scenario and were assumed to be the same for all apartments 
located within the evaluated corridor. 
8.1.1 Tenability criteria 
To determine the ASET in the corridor a tenability criteria had to be chosen. The 
effect of fire environments on humans is an exceptionally difficult subject to quantify 
(Spearpoint, 2008). Harm can be psychological, physiological or physical and 
accurate data on humans is rarely available from real-fire incidents. A common way 
of assessing whether occupants can evacuate is to evaluate the height of the hot layer 
and determine the visibility. If the hot layer is below 2 m and the visibility in the hot 
layer is below 10 m there is a risk that occupants would be exposed to toxic 
conditions and are therefore not able to evacuate. Other common criteria used are 
when occupants are exposed to more than 60 °C or 2.5 kW/m2. 
However during the development of the model it seemed too conservative to assume 
that an occupant becomes a fatality the same second he cannot see more than 10 m, or 
is exposed to a temperature of 60 °C. In a real fire event, an egressing occupant could 
either duck down under the hot layer or return to their own apartment which would 
constitute a safe place for another unknown time. 
The model was therefore determined to apply the “Fractional Effective Dose” (FED) 
approach to determine the ASET. FED is an international standard, maintained by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) and documented in ISO document 13571 
(2012). The approach is described by Purser (2002) and involves accounting for the 
cumulative effect of exposure to multiple narcotic gases. The present version of FDS 
uses only the concentrations of the gases CO, CO2 and O2 to calculate the FED value 
accordingly. 
𝐅𝐄𝐃𝒕𝒐𝒕 = 𝐅𝐄𝐃𝑪𝑶 + 𝐅𝐄𝐃𝑪𝑶𝟐 + 𝐅𝐄𝐃𝑶𝟐  Equation 8.1 
Apartment fires are expected to generate other toxic gases than the ones mentioned 
above. This is therefore a limitation in the model which is further discussed in section 
10.1.5. 
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The model was determined to use an FED in the corridor of 0.3 as tenability criterion. 
In other words occupants in the apartments were deemed to be fatalities at the time 
they would have obtained 30 % of an incapacitating dose of toxic concentrations of 
gases in the corridor if they had been there since the fire started. This is still a 
conservative criterion since occupants normally are located within their apartments 
and therefore would not be exposed to the conditions in the corridor during the same 
amount of time as the FED measure points. However, because the FED criterion 
generally is exceeded significantly later than for example visibility it was expected to 
generate a more accurate result. 
8.1.2 Fire scenarios 
Since several scenarios in the risk model event tree were based on the exact same fire 
development the different scenarios to model were identified by developing a separate 
fire development event tree as shown in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 Fire development event tree 
The event tree presents how different parameters results in thirteen different fire 
scenarios. A simplification in the model was applied by assuming that extinguished 
fires, fires that does not leak smoke into the corridor and fire scenarios where the 
mechanical ventilation is efficient will not cause any risk to the occupants. These fire 
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scenarios (labelled 0, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13) were therefore not modelled and the ASET 
were determined to be indefinite in the corridor. However the fire scenario labelled 13 
could cause consequences within the apartment of fire origin. These consequences 
were estimated qualitatively as explained in section 8.1.5. The modelled fire scenarios 
were given IDs and are presented in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Fire scenarios in the model 
Fire scenario Scenario ID Fire scenario description 
2 CF-SC-VF Corridor Fire – Sprinkler Controlled – Ventilation 
system Failure 
4 CF-SF-VF Corridor Fire – Sprinkler Failure – Ventilation 
system Failure 
6 AF-SC-SS-VF Apartment Fire – Sprinkler Controlled – Smoke Seal 
leakage – Ventilation system Failure 
8 AF-SC-DO-VF Apartment Fire – Sprinkler Controlled – Door Open 
– Ventilation system Failure 
10 AF-SF-SS-VF Apartment Fire – Sprinkler Failure – Smoke Seal 
leakage – Ventilation system Failure 
12 AF-SF-DO-VF Apartment Fire – Sprinkler Failure – Door Open – 
Ventilation system Failure 
 
The ASETs were determined for corridor lengths between 7 and 25 m by fire 
modelling in FDS. Accordingly a register of ASETs for all scenarios for different 
corridor lengths was developed. The fire modelling is further explained in Appendix 
D and the register of ASETs for all corridor lengths in the model are presented in 
Appendix C. 
8.1.3 Fire modelling 
The fire modellings were conducted by assuming standard dimensions of the 
apartment of fire origin, and fixed width and height of the corridor. The length of the 
corridor was then varied in each fire scenario to evaluate how the ASET was changed 
for every increased meter of the corridor length. The fire modellings are presented in 
detail in Appendix D. 
Both fires were assumed to grow with a medium t-square growth rate, however the 
impact on the risk of other fire growths were analysed in the uncertainty analysis 
(section 9.4) by applying other ASETs in the model. 
8.1.3.1 Sprinkler system effects 
The sprinkler system (when working) was assumed to either extinguish or control the 
fire. The scenarios when the sprinkler system extinguished the fire were assumed to 
not cause any consequences and the ASETs for these scenarios were therefore 
determined to be indefinite. Fatalities in sprinklered fires are very rare; hence the 
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assumption that there are no fatalities when the sprinkler system controls the fire is 
reasonable. 
For the sprinkler controlled fires the following method presented by Staffansson 
(2010) was applied. 
If ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 > 5. MW: 
 After the sprinkler activation, the heat release rate is kept constant for the 
duration of one minute, equal to ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡, 
 After one minute, the heat release rate is reduced by a third of the heat 
release rate at the time of sprinkler activation. This reduction occurs over 
the next subsequent minute. 
 The heat release rate can then be assumed to be a third of ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 for the rest 
of the fire progress. 
If ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 < 5. MW: 
 After sprinkler activation, the heat release rate can be assumed constant, 
equal to ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡  for the rest of the fire progress. 
The sprinkler activation time and heat release rate was obtained from the fire 
modellings. 
8.1.3.2 Corridor fire 
A fire in the corridor could be caused by faults in electrical equipment or by arsonists. 
The fuel load in an apartment corridor is normally very limited. The corridor fire was 
therefore assumed to start in temporary placed items in the corridor, causing a 
maximum heat release rate equivalent to three burning wastepaper baskets (one 
wastepaper basket generates approximately 100 kW (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000)). 
The fire curve was assumed to follow a similar shape to the waste bin fire analysed by 
Särdqvist (1993) and the fire growth rate was therefore determined to be as a medium 
t-square fire. 
?̇? = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟕 ∙ 𝒕𝟐 
?̇?𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟑𝟎𝟎 𝐤𝐖 
The fire was assumed to burn for five minutes at its peak heat release rate, 
representing a fuel load of a few kilograms of plastic materials. After that the fire was 
assumed to fade at a linear decreasing rate during 120 s. The time until sprinkler 
activation was calculated using Quasi-Steady-State Modelling and with a similar fuel 
load a sprinkler controlled fire could burn for approximately 1000 s. As shown in 
Appendix E the activation time was calculated to be 183 s and the design fires are 
shown in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 Fire curve – corridor fire 
8.1.3.3 Apartment fire 
As shown in the statistical data the most common fires in apartment buildings start in 
the kitchen, but the fires that cause fatalities in apartment buildings more often start in 
the bedroom. The apartment fire was therefore assumed to be a fire in a bed 
represented as a t-square fire (Equation 4.1). The fire growth rate was assumed to be 
medium which as shown in Table 4.7 is a typical growth rate for dwellings. It was 
assumed that the fuel load in the apartment was large enough to cause a ventilation 
controlled fire. The maximum heat release rate was calculated to be 4.3 MW by using 
Equation F. 1. The calculation is shown in Appendix F 
?̇?𝑺𝑶𝑼 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟏𝟕 ∙ 𝒕
𝟐 
?̇?𝒎𝒂𝒙 = ?̇?𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅 
The apartment fires are shown in Figure 8.3, but it was also anticipated that the 
apartment could be limited at a lower heat release rate because of the ventilation 
conditions in the fire modelling. 
The probability for a fire to occur was expected to be similar in all apartments, 
however the consequences were expected to be worse from an apartment fire near the 
exit stair. And because risk is the probability multiplied with consequence, the 
designing apartment fire was determined to be located in an apartment near the exit 
stair. 
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Figure 8.3 Fire curve – apartment fire 
8.1.4 Compartment dimensions 
The compartment dimensions were chosen after reviewing a number of recent 
residential building projects in Australia and were set as “standard compartments” in 
the model.  
8.1.4.1 Apartment 
The standard compartment dimensions for apartments were determined to be: 
 Width: 4 m 
 Length 8 m 
 Ceiling height: 2.4 m 
8.1.4.2 Corridor 
The available time for egress was modelled for all corridor lengths (1 m increments) 
between 7 m and 25 m. The other dimensions of the corridor were (compliant with the 
BCA): 
 Width: 1.2 m 
 Ceiling height: 2.4 m 
8.1.4.3 Doors 
The dimensions of the doors were: 
 Width: 0.92 m 
 Height: 2.1 m 
8.1.4.4 Windows 
The apartment was determined to have one window with the following dimensions: 
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 Width: 1.9 m 
 Height: 1.3 m 
The window was expected to break during a fire because of the radiating heat and 
flame impingements from the fire. The window was therefore modelled as fully open 
during the entire fire scenario. A typical model compartment setup is shown in Figure 
8.4. 
 
Figure 8.4 Example of compartment setup 
8.1.5 ASET in the apartment of fire origin 
Because the model applies an ASET/RSET analysis in the corridor for all apartments 
without considering the conditions within apartments a function for calculating 
consequences in the apartment of fire origin (AOF) was included. The function was 
configured to add or subtract consequences depending on whether the occupants in 
the AOF were expected to survive or not. Whether occupants in the AOF react in time 
is depending on many factors such as the location of fire, fire growth rate and 
occupant awareness. The function in the model was only considering the awareness of 
the occupant and the efficiency of the sprinkler system and calculated consequences 
by the rules summarised in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Rules for consequences in AOF 
Fire scenario Comment Rule 
Corridor fire No AOF No consequences added 
or subtracted from total 
consequences. 
Apartment fire – 
extinguished by sprinkler 
system 
All occupants are expected 
to be safe 
No consequences added 
or subtracted from total 
result. 
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Fire scenario Comment Rule 
Apartment fire – Sprinkler 
controlled/failure - smoke 
alarm working 
All occupants in the AOF 
expected to wake up and 
evacuate without being 
exposed to critical 
conditions. 
Subtract one apartment 
from total consequence. 
Apartment fire – Sprinkler 
controlled/failure - smoke 
alarm failing 
Occupants in the AOF that 
are awake are expected to 
note the fire and escape. 
Sleeping occupants are 
expected to be 
consequences. 
Add one apartment to 
total consequence (except 
if all apartments in the 
corridor already are 
consequences). 
8.2 Required safe egress time (RSET) 
The required safe egress time was estimated for each apartment by summarising the 
Detection time, Response time and the Travel time. 
8.2.1 Detection time 
The different detection scenarios were identified in the same way as the different fire 
scenarios by developing a separate event tree. The identified detection scenarios and 
their corresponding detection times are presented in Table 8.3. The detection times 
were obtained from the fire modellings. 
Table 8.3 Detection scenarios 
Detection 
scenario 
Scenario ID Detection scenario description Detection time [s] 
1 CF-Sd Corridor Fire – Smoke detection 
system activation 
27 
2 CF-Hd Corridor Fire – Heat detection 
system activation 
143 
3 CF-Sp Corridor Fire – Sprinkler system 
activation 
183 
4 CF-Nd Corridor Fire – No detection 600 
5 AF-NSl-Hd Apartment Fire – No Smoke leakage 
to corridor – Heat detection 
activation 
178 
6 AF-NSl-Sp Apartment Fire – No Smoke leakage 
to corridor – Sprinkler activation 
178 
7 AF-NSl-Sd Apartment Fire – No Smoke leakage 
to corridor – Smoke detection 
activation 
1029 
8 AF-Sl-Sd Apartment Fire – Smoke leakage to 57 
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Detection 
scenario 
Scenario ID Detection scenario description Detection time [s] 
corridor – Smoke detection 
activation 
9 AF-Sl-Hd Apartment Fire – Smoke leakage to 
corridor – Heat detection activation 
188 
10 AF-Sl-Sp Apartment Fire – Smoke leakage to 
corridor – Sprinkler activation 
178 
11 AF-Nd Apartment Fire – No detection 900 
12 AF-SA Apartment Fire – Smoke Alarm 
detection 
32 
 
For scenarios where detection was failing or not provided it was assumed that 
occupants would become aware of the fire after approximately 10 minutes for a 
corridor fire and 15 minutes for an apartment fire.  
8.2.2 Response time 
The response times were then estimated based on the values in Table 4.8 as follows. 
 100 s for all detection scenarios that activates the Building Occupant 
Warning System (referred to as Response scenario 1) 
 200 s for all scenarios where no detection has activated but occupants were 
awake (referred to as Response scenario 2) 
 1000 seconds when occupants are asleep and do not wake up by the alarm 
(referred to as Response scenario 3) 
The estimation for when no detection is provided or when occupants are asleep was 
solely made by engineering judgement. However the impact of the response times 
was investigated in the sensitivity analysis in section 9.3. 
8.2.3 Travel time 
The travel time which is the time it takes for an occupant to reach the exit from the 
evacuation is initiated was calculated individually for each apartment. Because of the 
standard size of the apartments in the model all occupants would have approximately 
between 0 and 9 meters to walk to reach the corridor; an average distance of 5 m was 
used. When the occupants have reached the corridor the additional distance to reach 
the exit was determined by the distance between the apartment and the exit stair. The 
walking speed for each occupant was based on the walking speeds in presented in 
section 4.4.1.3 of 1.19 m/s for all occupants evacuating before the layer height was 
below 2 m and a walking speed of 0.28 m/s for all occupants evacuating when the 
smoke layer height was below 10 m. 
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9   Results 
The ASETs for all corridor lengths, detection and response times are presented in 
Appendix C. A spread sheet was developed in Excel were number of apartments, 
distances to exits, number of occupants could be determined by the user. The spread 
sheet then calculated the consequences for each apartment and scenario. The total 
consequence was multiplied with the frequency of fires and the probability for the 
scenario as the resulting risk value. By summarising the risk values from all scenarios 
the comparative risk value for the building solution was obtained. 
9.1 Effects on the total risk level 
The developed model for comparing the risk to occupants within apartment buildings 
shows that extending the travel distance has barely any impact on the total risk level, 
as long as the number of apartments in the corridor not is increased. The increased 
corridor lengths actually increases the ASET for a number of scenarios because the 
larger volume of the corridor decreases the concentration of toxic gases in the hot 
layer compared to a shorter corridor.  
However, every time the number of apartments is increased by a factor, the total risk 
level generated by the risk model is increased by approximately the same factor 
squared. That means that if the number of apartments is multiplied by 4, the total risk 
level to occupants will be approximately 16 times higher unless other fire safety 
precautions are provided. 
The effect on the total risk from each parameter was investigated by evaluating how 
the average risk level varied in the model adding different safety systems separately to 
the base case solution (DtS Solution 1). The result is shown in Table 9.1 
Table 9.1 Effects of different fire safety measures 
Building solution/ 
fire safety 
measure changed 
Societal risk  
RS [Expected 
number of 
fatalities per year] 
Individual risk RI  Expected number of 
consequences per 
severe fire 
[fatalities] 
DtS Solution 1 
(base case) 
0.0222 0.00185 10.50 
+ 18 m travel 
distance 
0.0222 (no impact) 0.00185 10.50 
+ six more 
apartments 
0.0952 (+ 328 %) 0.00364 22.50 
+ heat detection 
system 
0.00522 ( - 76.5 %) 0.00044 2.47 
+ smoke detection 0.00522 ( - 76.5 %) 0.00044 2.47 
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Building solution/ 
fire safety 
measure changed 
Societal risk  
RS [Expected 
number of 
fatalities per year] 
Individual risk RI  Expected number of 
consequences per 
severe fire 
[fatalities] 
system (in corridor 
only) 
+ sprinkler system 0.00236 (- 89.4 %) 0.0002 1.12 
+ No fire ratings 0.0222 (no impact) 0.00185 10.50 
+ Removed self-
closers from 
apartment doors 
0.0222 (no impact) 0.00185 10.50 
+ Smoke seals to 
apartment doors 
0.0173 (- 22.3 %) 0.00144 8.16 
+ Smoke alarms 
removed 
0.0254 (+ 14.4 %) 0.00212 12.0 
+ Mechanical 
corridor 
ventilation 
(including smoke 
detection to 
activate system) 
0.00262 (- 88.2 %) 0.00022 1.24 
+ Cross corridor 
door dividing the 
corridor (50 % of 
the apartments 
beyond the door) 
0.0147 (- 33.8 %) 0.00174 6.95 
9.1.1 Extended travel distance to reach an exit 
As shown in Table 9.1 an additional 18 m travel distance for all apartments does not 
cause any noticeable difference in risk level to the occupants in the building. The 
additional 18 m travel distance makes the travel time for each apartment 
approximately 20 s longer which is a relatively small change to the total evacuation 
time. The scenarios that cause consequences in the model remain therefore the same 
even if 18 m travel distance is added and the risk model does not show any change in 
risk level due to the extended travel distance. 
9.1.2 Additional apartments 
The effect of additional apartments is significant in the model. As shown in Table 9.1 
the total risk is almost four times higher when the number of apartments is doubled. 
This is because the expected number of consequences per severe fire is doubled at the 
same time as the probability for a fire to occur is doubled in the model. 
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9.1.3 Smoke and heat detection 
Both smoke and heat detection system has a significant impact on the total risk level. 
By including any of these systems a number of scenarios in the event tree with 
improved detection and response times are given a probability and therefore 
considered in the result. Each system reduces the total risk level with approximately 
77 % and the two systems combined reduce the total risk level approximately 84 %. 
9.1.4 Sprinkler system 
With the assumptions made that a sprinkler system extinguish 48 % of the fires, 
controls 42 % of the fires, and fails for 10 % of the fires, the total risk level is reduced 
89 % when a sprinkler system is provided to the building. The number of severe fires 
occurring is unchanged, but the expected consequence per severe fire is reduced from 
10.50 to 1.12. 
9.1.5 Fire ratings 
The model does not show any difference in risk level to occupants when fire ratings 
are removed from the walls and the doors. This result was unexpected but is generated 
because the model assumes there will always be smoke leakage when smoke seals are 
not provided. 
With smoke seals provided to the apartment doors, the estimated risk value was 
increased 29 % when the fire ratings were removed from the construction. 
9.1.6 Self-closers at apartment doors 
Similarly to the fire ratings, the model did not show any difference in risk level when 
removing self-closers from apartment doors because the doors were not provided with 
smoke seals. With smoke seals provided to the doors the estimated risk value was 
increased 7.3 % when self-closers were removed from the apartment doors. 
9.1.7 Smoke seals 
The risk model showed that the total risk to occupants can be reduced by 
approximately 22 % by providing smoke seals to the apartment doors preventing 
smoke from apartment fires to spread to the corridor. 
9.1.8 Smoke alarms 
The model shows that the total risk level is increased by approximately 14 % if the 
smoke alarms in the apartments are removed. This is maybe lower than expected. But 
because the risk model is measuring the societal risk, and the major part of the 
consequences are from scenarios when all apartments in the corridors becomes 
fatalities, and the smoke alarm in those cases only saves one apartment, the effect of 
removing smoke alarms on the total risk is not larger. However, the individual risk to 
occupants within the AOF could be significantly increased by removing the smoke 
alarms, but how large that impact is was not quantified in the model. 
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9.1.9 Mechanical ventilation 
With the assumptions made in the model the effect of providing a smoke ventilation 
system is significant. The total risk is reduced approximately 88 %, but 75 % of that is 
due to the detection system that activates the ventilation also notify the occupants to 
evacuate at an earlier stage. 
9.1.10 Cross corridor doors 
With the assumptions made the model shows a risk reduction of 34 % when the 
corridor is divided into two halves with 50 % of the apartments on each side of the 
door. 
9.2  Compared building solutions 
The risk values for the three compared building solutions are presented in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 Risk values for the compared building solutions 
Building solution Risk value RS 
[Expected number of 
fatalities per year] 
Relative to DtS Solution 1  
(Risk ratio) 
DtS Solution 1 0.0222 1 
DtS Solution 2 0.131 5.89 
Alternative Solution 0.00334 0.151 
 
The risk model showed that the risk level is approximately six times higher in DtS 
Solution 2 and approximately one seventh in the Alternative Solution when compared 
to DtS Solution 1. The F/N-curves for the three compared building solutions are 
presented in Figure 9.1. Due to conservative assumptions when developing the risk 
model the result seem to be overestimated. It must therefore be noted that this F/N 
curve does not show absolute risk levels in the evaluated buildings. The curves do still 
give a good illustration for why the total average risk level is different between the 
compared building solutions. 
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Figure 9.1 F/N curves for the compared building solutions 
9.3 Sensitivity analysis 
The risk model tells the impact on the total risk level by providing different fire safety 
measures to the building solution. The sensitivity of the input could therefore not be 
characterised by simply looking at the resulting risk when applying other assumptions 
and probabilities in the model. Instead the sensitivity analysis was conducted by 
changing different parameters and evaluating how large the impact was on the relative 
difference in risk between two compared building solutions; the Alternative Solution 
and the DtS Solution 1. For every varied parameter a risk ratio was calculated by 
dividing the risk values for the compared building solutions. The result of the 
sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Building solution / changed parameter Risk ratio 
[RAS/RDtS1] 
Impact on the result 
Base case (no change) 0.1505 - 
ASET halved for all limited fire scenarios 
(unlimited ASETs unchanged) 
0.177 + 18 % 
All detection times halved 0.1505 No impact 
All response times halved 0.131 - 13 % 
Travel distance within apartment 0.1505 No impact 
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Building solution / changed parameter Risk ratio 
[RAS/RDtS1] 
Impact on the result 
increased to 20 m (representing large 
apartments) 
Frequency of fires doubled 0.1505 No impact 
Number of apartments doubled 0.132 +12.2 % 
Proportion of extinguished fires halved 0.1505 No impact 
Relative frequency of corridor fires 
doubled 
0.171 + 13.5 % 
Efficiency of smoke detection system 
halved 
0.323 + 114 % 
Probability of sprinkler failure doubled 0.254 + 69 % 
Probability of fire rated construction 
failing doubled 
0.163 + 8.6 % 
Probability of AOF door open halved 0.145 - 3.7 % 
Probability of smoke seal failure doubled 0.152 + 1.05 % 
Probability of smoke alarm failure doubled 0.1693 + 12.5 % 
Probability occupants being asleep 
doubled 
0.235 + 56 % 
 
To investigate the sensitivity of the reliability of mechanical ventilation a smoke 
detection system and mechanical ventilation was included in both DtS Solution 1 and 
the Alternative Solution which generated a risk ratio of 0.659. The result is shown in 
Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 Sensitivity analysis - mechanical ventilation 
Building solution / changed 
parameter 
Risk ratio [RAS/RDtS1] Impact on the result 
Probability for mechanical 
ventilation system failure doubled 
0.655 - 0.5 % 
9.4 Uncertainty analysis 
The uncertainty analysis was conducted by applying probability distributions to those 
variables that affected the affected the result more than 10 % in the sensitivity 
analysis. The effect of including the different safety measures and the difference 
between the compared solutions were then evaluated again the in risk model through 
Monte Carlo-simulation using 1000 iterations with values from the chosen 
distributions. The following variables were therefore given distributions in the 
uncertainty analysis: 
 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
 Occupant response time 
 Relative frequency of corridor fires 
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 Efficiency of smoke detection 
 Reliability of sprinkler system 
 Probability of fire rated construction failing 
 Probability of smoke alarm failure 
 Probability of occupants being asleep 
Even if the number of apartments affected the result more than 10 % it was not 
included as a variation in the uncertainty analysis. The model is developed to be used 
for comparing building solutions where the number of apartments always is known. 
There is hence no uncertainty related to that variable. The impact on changing the 
probability for mechanical ventilation did also impact the result 10 %, but since none 
of the compared building solution include mechanical ventilation it was excluded 
from the uncertainty analysis. 
9.4.1 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) 
The ASETs used in the model were derived from fire modellings using a t-square fire 
with Medium fire growth rate. Because the fire growth rate is largely depending on 
the cause of ignition and burning material the factor is largely associated with 
uncertainty. Staffansson summarised fire growth rates for dwellings found in various 
literatures (2010) and they varied between Medium and Fast. A Fast fire growth rate 
would obviously reduce the ASET in the corridor. In the uncertainty analysis the 
ASET was determined to be distributed evenly between the obtained value from the 
fire modellings and an ASET reduced with 50 % representing a quicker fire growth 
scenario. 
9.4.2 Occupant response time 
The response times in the model were based on studies made by Proulx et al. (1995). 
However it is reasonable to assume that the response time can vary significantly 
between different occupants depending on factors such as age, if they are influenced 
by alcohol or drugs etc. To consider a large variance, the distribution was assumed to 
be normal distributed with a standard deviation of 25 %. 
9.4.3 Relative frequency of corridor fires 
The relative frequency of corridor fires in apartment buildings was based on statistics 
from the NSWFB (2007). The number of incidents was relatively small and therefore 
there is a risk that the distribution between different fires could be different in a larger 
number of incidents and also different in other states in Australia. The distribution 
was assumed to be triangular and the upper and lower limits were determined by 
adding and subtracting 50 % from the expected value. 
9.4.4 Smoke detection efficiency 
The background study showed that the efficiency of smoke detection is widely 
documented and generally showed to be around 90 %. Therefore a triangular 
distribution was applied that generates a higher probability for the expected mean 
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value. The upper and lower limits were determined by adding and subtracting 10 % 
from the expected value. 
9.4.5 Sprinkler system reliability 
The probabilities applied for the sprinkler system efficiency are based on data and 
therefor relatively reliable. The variable was assumed to be normal distributed with 
the expected values applied in the model and a standard deviation of 10 %. 
9.4.6 Probability fire rated construction failing 
The probability for the fire rated construction not achieving its designated FRL was 
obtained from BSI (2003). In the uncertainty analysis it was assumed that the 
probability is uniformly distributed from 0.2 to 0.4. 
9.4.7 Probability of smoke alarm failure 
The probability distribution for smoke alarm failure was chosen similarly to that of 
the smoke detection system. The distribution was therefore assumed to be triangular 
with limits determined by adding or subtracting 10 % of the reliability. 
9.4.8 Probability of occupants being asleep 
The probability of occupants being asleep is depending on the time of the day and 
also the performance of the occupant warning system and smoke alarm in the 
building. The probability was therefore expected to be normal distributed with a 
standard deviation of 30 %. 
9.4.9 Summary 
The probability distributions used in the uncertainty analysis are summarised in Table 
9.5 
Table 9.5 Summary of uncertainty analysis 
Parameter Expected 
probability 
(mean 
value) 
Comment Chosen 
distribution 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
ASET Scenario 
specific 
Uncertain 
variable 
Uniform 0.5 x ASET 
from fire 
modelling 
ASET from 
fire 
modelling 
Occupant 
response time 
Scenario 
specific 
Uncertain 
variable 
Normal 25 % 
Relative 
frequency of 
corridor fires 
5.3 % Uncertain 
variable 
Triangular 2.65 7.95 
Smoke 
detection 
efficiency 
0.90 Stable 
variable 
Triangular 0.81 0.99 
9 Results 
82 
 
Parameter Expected 
probability 
(mean 
value) 
Comment Chosen 
distribution 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Sprinkler 
system 
reliability 
Shown in 
section 7.4.3 
Stable 
variable 
Normal Standard deviation of 
10 % 
Fire rated 
construction 
failure 
0.30 Mean 
value from 
BSI (2003) 
Uniform 0.20 0.40 
Probability of 
smoke alarm 
failure 
0.21 Stable 
variable 
Triangular 0.131 0.289 
Probability 
occupants 
being asleep 
0.15 Uncertain 
variable 
Normal Standard deviation of 
0.05 
9.4.10 Results 
The probability distributions in Table 9.5 were included in the model, and the impact 
on the risk by including different safety systems were calculated. The 95 % 
Confidence Interval of the result is presented in Table 9.6. 
Table 9.6 Effects of different fire safety measures 
Building solution/ fire 
safety measure changed 
Risk value [Expected 
number of fatalities per 
year] (95 % CI) 
Expected number of 
consequences per severe 
fire [fatalities] (95 % CI) 
DtS Solution 1 0.130 – 1.131  26.38 – 26.62 
+ 18 m travel distance 0.130 – 1.131 26.38 – 26.62 
+ six more apartments 0.0947 – 0.0957 22.38 – 22. 62 
+ smoke detection 
system 
0.00248 – 0.00748 1.17 – 3.54 
+ sprinkler system -0.00162 – 0.00622  -0.76 – 2.94  
+ No fire ratings 0.0220 – 0.0225 10.38 – 10.62 
+ Removed self-closers 
from apartment doors 
0.0220 – 0.0225 10.39 – 10.62 
+ Smoke seals to 
apartment doors 
0.0161 – 0.0183 7.60 – 8.67 
+ Smoke alarms 
removed 
0.254 (result did not vary 
with the chosen 
distributions) 
12 (result did not vary 
with the chosen 
distributions) 
+ Mechanical corridor 0.00108 – 0.00417 0.513 – 1.97 
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Building solution/ fire 
safety measure changed 
Risk value [Expected 
number of fatalities per 
year] (95 % CI) 
Expected number of 
consequences per severe 
fire [fatalities] (95 % CI) 
ventilation (including 
smoke detection to 
activate system) 
+ Cross corridor door 
dividing the corridor 
(50 % of the apartments 
beyond the door) 
0.0144 – 0.149 6.80 – 7.05 
 
The 95 % Confidence Intervals of the results and the risk ratio between the compared 
building solutions are shown in Figure 9.2 to Figure 9.7. 
 
Figure 9.2 Risk estimation for DtS Solution 1 
 
Figure 9.3 Risk estimation for DtS Solution 2 
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Figure 9.4 Risk ratio DtS Solution 2 / DtS Solution 1 
 
Figure 9.5 Risk estimation for Alternative Solution 
 
Figure 9.6 Risk ratio Alternative Solution / DtS Solution 1 
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Figure 9.7 Risk ratio Alternative Solution / DtS Solution 1 showing the lower 95 % CI 
The uncertainty analysis showed that the result estimation by the risk model is similar 
to a triangular or natural distribution for all evaluated building solutions. The standard 
deviation is depending on how many systems which are included in the evaluated 
building solution and varies between 0.6 % in DtS Solution 1 and 68 % in the 
Alternative Solution. The distributions of the risk ratios also showed the standard 
variation of the result. As an example the ratio between the Alternative Solution and 
DtS Solution 1 is up to 0.32 in 95 % of the cases.  
It was also surprising that the estimated risk distribution included negative values 
when the sprinkler system was provided. This was a result of the function that adds 
and subtracts consequences in the AOF. Apparently that function did not operate as 
intended in combination with the MonteCarlo-simulation in @Risk. The results of the 
uncertainty analysis are further discussed in Chapter 10. 
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10 Discussion 
10.1 Model development 
10.1.1 Standard compartment fires 
The model uses standard compartments for evaluating the ASET in the corridor. This 
was deemed acceptable because the model was developed to only show the relative 
difference of an increased corridor. If the compartments in an evaluated building do 
not have the same dimensions as in the model the impact on the results is expected to 
be negligible because the model is comparing the relative difference in risk due to 
different corridor lengths. The sensitivity analysis also showed that even if the ASETs 
for both scenarios are reduced 50 %, the total effect of the result would not be more 
than 18 %. Using the actual dimensions of an evaluated building is therefore not 
expected to cause any significant difference in the result. 
10.1.2 Only flaming fires 
The model only evaluates the risk from flaming fires. Flaming fires generally grow 
faster and it could therefore be argued that the results of the model are conservative. 
However there is a small chance that smouldering fires could develop and cause toxic 
conditions in the corridor without activating the sprinkler system. In that regards there 
are risks due to fires which are not considered in the model. This is one of the reasons 
the model never can be claimed to present the absolute risk level. 
10.1.3 Same ASET for all apartments 
The assumption that the ASET would be the same for all apartments within the 
corridor was both conservative and realistic. When the ASET for one of the 
apartments is exceeded there is a high probability that even if the conditions are 
tenable at other locations in the corridor, occupants would still have to pass the 
location where untenable conditions have occurred. The difference in ASET between 
different locations in the corridor also turned out to be marginal compared to the total 
ASET for the majority of all fire scenarios as shown in Appendix D. 
10.1.4 Sleeping occupants in the apartment fatalities 
The developed model is sensitive to whether occupants are asleep or not. For the 
compared building solutions all consequences occurred when the occupants were 
asleep or did not react to the occupant warning system (for example due to being 
drunk or affected by drugs). This was though expected and also reflects that the 
principles in the model are based on the fact that most fatalities in residential 
apartment fires occur in the bedroom as shown in Table 4.4. 
The model also assumes that in all cases where the smoke alarms within the 
apartments are working as intended, the occupants would wake up to evacuate in 
time. Even if the model is sensitive to whether occupants are asleep it does not 
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include overly conservative assumptions in regards to wether occupants would wake 
up or not. 
10.1.5 Tenability criteria 
The decision for what tenability criterion to use in the model was difficult because of 
the large uncertainties related to human response. It was deemed that visibility would 
be too conservative because occupants do not normally die at the moment they cannot 
see longer than 10 m. Especially in a familiar environment with at the most two 
directions to travel in (such as an apartment corridor) it is possible that occupants 
would be able to evacuate even with less than 5 m visibility presuming they are 
holding their breath and that the conditions in the exit stair are tenable. Secondly, 
there is no advantage in being overly conservative in comparative assessments. It only 
means that the risk to occupants will be largely overestimated in both cases, and the 
uncertainty in the results could be increased. It is difficult to tell if the overestimation 
of the risk has affected the compared solutions proportionally. The chosen FED 
criterion resulted in longer ASETs compared to using a visibility criterion, but could 
still be regarded as conservative. It represents the time until an occupant located in the 
corridor has reached 30 % of an incapacitating dose of toxic concentrations of gases 
in the corridor, and occupants within apartments or evacuating the corridor would not 
obtain the same level of exposure; meaning the real ASET would be longer for them. 
However, as previously noted apartment fires are expected to generate other toxic 
gases than the ones used in FDS to calculate the FED value. This means that in a real 
fire scenario there could be other toxic gases present which would decrease the ASET 
in the corridor. This adds to the uncertainty of the model, but is to some degree 
considered by using a tenability criterion of 30 % instead of 100 %.  
The fire modellings were carried out using default values for Polyurethane. The CO 
yield was therefore set to 0 which may not be an accurate approximation considering 
the expected combustion products for an apartment fire. The impact of this mistake 
was investigated through some additional sensitivity studies. The ASET when using a 
CO yield of 0.1 was shown to be 30 % less for a 9 m long corridor and up to 50 % 
less for a 25 m long corridor when compared to the ASETs used in the model. As 
shown in the sensitivity analysis presented in section 9.3, the calculated risk ratio is 
affected up to 18 % when all ASETs are reduced 50 %. Therefore the uncertainty of 
the model is expected to be in the order of 20 % just due to the uncertainty of the 
combustion products in the fire modellings. One way of reducing this uncertainty is to 
change the risk model to be based on another tenability criterion. For example using 
the time until the visibility is below 10 m in the corridor could despite being a 
conservative criterion be a reasonable option that would reduce the uncertainty of the 
results of the model.  
One interesting observation from the fire modelling was that the ASET increases with 
extended corridors. The extended travel distance therefore automatically compensates 
the ASET to cover the additional movement time. This means that evaluating 
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extended travel distances through ASET/RSET analyses will often show that the 
extension is acceptable. Especially when the FED is used as tenability criterion the 
increased movement time is likely to be offset by the increased ASET time. 
10.2 Model results 
Despite best efforts developing the model, the model overestimates the risk level 
regardless of which building solution is evaluated. Statistics for Australia showed that 
in approximately 800 000 apartments, 1100 apartment fires and 8 fatalities occur per 
year. The average risk for apartments in buildings designed in accordance with 
common Australian building practice should therefore be in the order of 10-5 fatalities 
per apartment per year which is significantly lower than the risk values generated by 
the model. 
The model seems to overestimate the risk regardless of what safety measures are 
provided which indicates that the starting input values not are accurate, which could 
be due to one or several of the following causes 
 The probability of a fire to occur is too high 
 The probability of a fire being extinguished is underestimated 
 The effect on the probability when increasing the number of apartments is 
overestimated 
 The probability of occupants being asleep is overestimated 
The probability of fire was derived from statistics and should therefore be accurate. 
However the linear increase of probability with the increased number of dwellings is a 
simplification which makes the model overestimating the risk. 
The results generated from the model can therefore not be interpreted as a 
quantification of the absolute risk level in the building or the evaluated level of it. 
10.2.1 Effects of changing parameters in the model 
The model did not show any difference in risk level when the travel distance was 
extended without changing the number of apartments. This could be an accurate result 
for the compared corridor lengths. It should not be interpreted as if a corridor could be 
extended to any length without it having an impact on the risk. The differences in 
travel time in the compared corridor length were not large enough to cause any 
additional consequences, but at some distance from the exit the distance will be long 
enough to cause a difference. Furthermore other factors which not are considered in 
the model will be affected with longer corridor lengths such as the possibility for the 
fire brigade to perform an attack to the furthest apartment and the risk for congestion 
in the stair. 
The effect of increasing the number of apartments is fundamental in the model. From 
a general risk perspective this was expected because it both affects the probability and 
the consequences, but the author was somewhat surprised that doubling the number of 
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apartments has an effect on the risk comparable to removing a sprinkler system. Even 
though the effect of additional apartments may be overestimated by the model, the 
results indicate that the number of apartments at a level could be one of the most 
important factors to consider when evaluating and comparing risk levels in residential 
buildings. 
The effects on by providing smoke or heat detection systems to the building were also 
significant as expected. The main reason for that is the interconnection that makes all 
apartments on the floor aware of the fire. A fire in an apartment without a detection 
system could grow large before other apartments in the corridor become aware of it 
and thus make the corridor untenable before occupants have started to evacuate. 
The model does assume that smoke always will leak into the corridor if the doors are 
not provided with smoke seals. This makes the benefits of providing smoke seals 
significant in the model. However Gross showed (1989) that the smoke leakage is 
reduced approximately 77 % - 96 %, and the model should therefore consider that the 
conditions in the corridor are expected to be improved when smoke seals are 
provided. 
As previously discussed the impact on societal risk by providing smoke alarms was 
lower than expected. This is because the model does not presume that occupants 
evacuating from the AOF would notify their neighbours on the way out and the 
neighbours are therefore not aware of the fire unless there is a detection system 
installed. In reality the evacuating occupants would probably notify their neighbours, 
but to consider this action in a model which focus is to evaluate the effects of travel 
distance is unreasonably complex and related to huge uncertainties. 
The effect on the risk level by providing mechanical ventilation was significant in the 
risk model. This is because the corridor was assumed to be tenable for all scenarios 
when the ventilation system is working as intended. It could be argued that the 
performance of the system was overestimated, but even if the performance is 
overestimated the model cannot be argued to rely too much on the ventilation system. 
The system fails to operate in one out of ten fires and the model therefore generates a 
number of scenarios where consequences occur also in those buildings where 
mechanical ventilation is provided. 
10.2.2 Comparison example 
The result of the compared solutions was unexpected and should be interpreted with 
caution. The DtS Solution 2 has an increased number of apartments compared to DtS 
Solution 1 which caused the large increase in risk. The movement time is similar in 
both solutions and the ASETs are increased in DtS Solution 2 because of the longer 
corridor. The only way the model considers that occupants in DtS Solution 2 have two 
options when evacuating is by the reduced travel distance and therefore reduced travel 
time. In reality there are other benefits with two stairs such as less people in each 
stair, if one exit is blocked (for example by a fire or a burning apartment with an open 
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door) there is an alternative available egress route. These benefits were not considered 
in the risk model which could be regarded as a weakness. However when analysing 
the ASET/RSET analyses generated by the model there seems to be a pattern showing 
that during an evacuation the corridor is either tenable or untenable. And for 
occupants located in their apartments it does then not matter how many exits the 
corridor is connected to. If the corridor is untenable the occupants cannot reach any of 
the exits, and if it is tenable one exit is enough to evacuate all occupants. 
The Alternative Solution was shown to be safer and generated a relative risk value 
85 % lower than DtS Solution 1. The model increases the risk approximately six times 
because of the increased number of apartments, but then decrease the risk to the 
generated value because smoke detection, sprinkler system and smoke seals are 
provided. The accuracy in that estimation is further discussed in section 10.3. 
What is interesting with the results generated by the risk model is that even if the risk 
values varies significantly, both DtS Solution 1 and 2 provide by definition acceptable 
levels of safety in Australia, because they comply with the prescriptive requirements 
of the current building code. The Alternative Solution could be argued to be 
acceptable because it provides a higher level of safety to occupants in the building 
than the DtS Solutions. However it is only the Authority Having Jurisdiction that can 
make the judgement assuring that that the Alternative Solution is acceptable and 
satisfies the relevant Performance Requirements. 
10.3 Uncertainty 
The uncertainty analysis showed that by applying the probability distributions to the 
most important variables in the model the result is affected. The standard deviation of 
the result increases with the number of safety systems included because more 
uncertainty and more different outcomes are introduced for each system included. The 
risk estimation for DtS Solution 1 had a 95 % CI that varied 0.6 % from its mean 
value while the same number for the Alternative Solution was approximately 73 %. 
When comparing the Alternative Solution risk value to the DtS Solution 1 and 
calculating the risk ratio a largely varying value is divided with a less varying value 
creating an even larger spread in result. As shown in Figure 9.7 the Alternative 
Solution is in 95 % of the iterations between 68 % and 100 % safer than DtS Solution 
1. This represents a large amount of uncertainty in the model which means the result 
must be interpreted with cautiousness.  
One way of treating the uncertainty when comparing an alternative solution to a 
prescriptive compliant solution is to choose a particular percentile value of the risk 
ratio as determining value. Figure 9.7 is an example of that and shows that in 95 % of 
the iterations in the model the resulting risk in the Alternative Solution is at the most a 
factor of 0.318 of the risk in DtS Solution 1 and is therefore significantly safer. When 
evaluating a building solution by using mean values the risk ratio should therefore be 
multiplied with a safety factor to reduce the level of uncertainty in the result. How 
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large the uncertainty factor should be is up to the model user to investigate, but for the 
compared example a safety factor of 2.17 results in the 95 % CI shown in Figure 9.7. 
10.4 Evaluating fire safety in residential buildings 
As anticipated, evaluating fire safety probabilistically in residential buildings was a 
difficult exercise. The complexity was due to the large number of variables affecting 
the risk and the large number of credible scenarios, but also the large uncertainty in 
regards to a number of factors and the outcomes of the different possible scenarios. 
For example determining whether an occupant will evacuate is dependent on the 
conditions in the apartment and the corridor, the physical ability and awareness of the 
occupant just to mention a few factors.  
One way of decreasing the level of uncertainty is to conduct comparative assessments 
which means that assumptions and limitations, even if they may be wrong, applies to 
the both compared solutions and would therefore not affect the result in any direction. 
However a comparative assessment does not assure its validity. The developed model 
showed that the scenario chosen of evaluation is unquestionably essential to the result. 
But even more importantly, the development of the model revealed that deterministic 
ASET/RSET analyses often not are appropriate for evaluating fire safety in extended 
corridors. 
Whether risk is an appropriate measure for evaluating fire safety and considering both 
probability and consequence can be questioned. It could be argued that if the 
consequences of fires are eliminated, it does not matter how likely it is for that fire to 
occur. In principle that is true, but in reality the consequences of fires cannot be 
totally eliminated. There will always be unknown branches and scenarios in the event 
tree, and there will also always be a probability for all safety systems failing. The only 
way of eliminating all consequences of a fire when all safety systems are failing is to 
prohibit any occupants from occupying the building (which is an unreasonable 
requirement). 
When evaluating fire safety from a risk perspective, the probability/frequency of fires 
that does not cause any consequences is irrelevant. The risk is calculated by 
multiplying the probability with the consequence, and therefore it does not matter 
how many fires that cause zero consequences. Those fires will never affect the risk 
level in the building. 
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11 Conclusions and further work 
From the development of the risk model and investigating the risk to occupants in 
residential buildings the following conclusions can be made. 
11.1 Development of the risk model 
The model was developed using an event tree approach together with ASET/RSET 
analysis for 240 scenarios. Probabilities were determined from data, fault tree 
analyses and engineering judgements. Consequences were determined through 
modified ASET/RSET analyses using fire modelling in FDS, previous studies and 
engineering judgements. The model was configured in an Excel spread sheet by using 
the add-in software PrecisionTree and @Risk from Palisade Tools. For each evaluated 
building solution the model generated an average risk value estimating the expected 
number of fatalities per year at one typical level of the apartment building and a curve 
in an F/N diagram. The values generated by the risk model should not be interpreted 
as accurate estimations of the absolute risk, but as comparative values of the risk to 
occupants based on detailed analyses for several scenarios including both fires in the 
corridor and the apartments with safety systems both working and failing. 
There are large uncertainties in the result generated by the model, and it was also 
shown to be sensitive to a number of variables. These fixed values variables were 
therefore replaced by probability distributions in the uncertainty analysis. By iterating 
the result of the model using MonteCarlo simulation with values from the applied 
distributions it was shown that the generated risk value can be characterised as a 
triangular distribution for less complex buildings, and as natural distributions for more 
complex buildings.  
The model can be used for comparing building solutions and for quantifying the 
change in risk level when different fire safety measures are provided or removed. This 
is done by dividing one generated risk value with the other and calculating a risk ratio.  
The model cannot determine whether the risk level in the evaluated building solution 
is acceptable or not. If the model is used to compare an alternative building solution 
with a prescriptive compliant building solution it was suggested that a safety factor be 
applied. Alternatively the probability distributions from the uncertainty analysis can 
be used which can give the risk ratio at different percentiles. 
11.2 Effects of increasing the travel distances 
The main contribution to the risk to occupants when travel distances are increased in 
residential buildings can be attributed to the increased number of apartments. By 
adding apartments in the corridor both the probability of a fire on that level, and the 
consequence for all scenarios when smoke leaks into the corridor are increased. This 
means that the relative risk increases nearly as the square of the factor of apartment 
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increase. The risk does not follow that exact correlation because the consequences in 
the apartment of fire origin have a different proportional contribution to the total risk 
depending on the number of apartments. In a corridor with a low number of 
apartments the risk to occupants in the AOF has a larger proportional contribution to 
the total risk than in a corridor with a high number of apartments. 
The difference in travel time due to the extended travel distance was shown to not 
have any measurable impact on the risk level for corridor lengths between 7 m and 
25 m. If corridors were increased to significantly longer than that the travel time could 
have an impact on the risk level, but it is very likely factors such as number of 
apartments, provisions for fire brigade intervention and risk for queue in the stair 
would have a larger impact on the risk level than the actual travel time. 
11.3 Effects by other fire safety measures 
The model can show how the risk is changed when different fire safety measures are 
provided or removed from a building solution. The impact of adding or removing fire 
safety measures is different depending on the building solution. For example the 
effect on the relative risk when providing a sprinkler system is not the same if it is 
provided in a building that has a smoke detection system installed as in a building that 
does not have smoke detection system installed. 
The effects on the risk level in a building with a corridor length of 9 m, a maximum 
travel distance of 6 m and smoke alarms installed in each apartment is shown in Table 
11.1. 
Table 11.1 Effects of different fire safety measures 
Change of fire safety measure Impact on the risk level 
18 m additional travel distance for all 
apartments 
no impact 
Doubling the number of apartments in 
the corridor 
+ 328 % 
Providing a heat detection system - 77 % 
Providing a smoke detection system - 77 % 
Providing a sprinkler system - 89 % 
Removing fire ratings between the 
apartments and the corridor 
+ 29 % (presuming smoke seals are 
provided to the apartment doors) 
Removing self-closers from apartment 
doors 
+ 7 % (presuming smoke seals are 
provided to the apartment doors) 
Providing smoke seals to apartment 
doors 
- 22 % 
Removing smoke alarms from 
apartments 
+ 14 % 
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Change of fire safety measure Impact on the risk level 
Providing a mechanical corridor 
ventilation system (including smoke 
detection to activate system) 
- 88 % 
11.4 Evaluating fire safety in residential apartment buildings 
The thesis showed that deterministic analyses are very depending on what scenario is 
evaluated, and even if the consequences have been lowered in the Alternative 
Solution, the increased probability for a fire to occur could generate a higher average 
risk. If the analysis only is regarding the consequences of fires the result of it would 
show that the safety level has been improved. But in reality the risk to occupants 
within the building would be higher than that of a comparable building.  
Therefore evaluating fire safety in residential buildings should always be a 
probabilistic risk process considering both the likelihood and consequences of several 
credible scenarios when safety systems are both working and failing. 
To conduct a quantitative risk analysis for every residential apartment building project 
including deviation from the prescriptive requirements of the building code is not 
feasible in the economic environment they are developed in. The model in this thesis 
was therefore developed to show how the process can be standardised and made more 
efficient. However, the model can still be improved to achieve more accurate results. 
The model was also shown to be largely depending on choices of tenability criteria, 
evaluated fire scenarios etc. which means the results generated by the model must 
always be interpreted by the user and cannot be relied on solely without engineering 
judgement evaluating the reasonableness of the findings. 
11.5 Further work 
Evaluating safety by using a probabilistic approach is always going to be time 
consuming. Therefore it is desirable that risk models like the one within this report are 
developed in the industry so that the efficiency can be increased through the benefits 
provided by that the structure of the analysis is pre-determined in detail. 
The accuracy of the risk model within this report can be improved by doing more fire 
modelling for scenarios where simplifications have been made such as fire scenarios 
when smoke leaks through a door provided with smoke seals or scenarios when the 
corridor is well ventilated. As discussed in section 10.1.5 it is also recommended to 
adjust the model to be based on either visibility or temperature in the corridor instead 
of FED. 
Another way of improving the model is to calibrate it to more recent fire statistics in 
Australia as well as more accurate data for failure probabilities. With more accurate 
data it may be possible to develop the model into a probabilistic absolute risk model 
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which could evaluate the absolute risk level at a storey in a residential building. 
However, to know whether a result of such a model would be acceptable, the building 
code including its verification method would have to be developed to include absolute 
risk criteria, for example a benchmark for what is acceptable ERL. Even if the BCA 
currently not include any quantified risk criteria there is a chance that it may will in 
the future as the principles in regards to performance based designs are further 
investigated and developed. If that happens, risk models like the one within this report 
are expected to be more common in the industry which the author believes also would 
increase the understanding of how the risk is affected when travel distances are 
extended in residential apartment buildings. 
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Appendix A Prescriptive fire safety requirements in 
residential buildings 
UK – BS9991 
The code of practice for residential buildings in the UK is BS 9991 which includes the 
following requirements. 
Passive protection 
Fire resistance should generally not be less than 30 minutes, however increased 
periods of fire resistance may be necessary to allow a fire in a dwelling to burn out 
while occupants of other remain in place and also to provide adequate safety for fire-
fighting. Residential buildings are required to have fire isolated stairs regardless of 
building height to all levels including basement. Basement stairs shall be approached 
by protected (30 mins) fire lobby and lobby fitted with permanent smoke vent to 
outside (0.4 m2). Other requirements are: 
 All public corridors are fire isolated; 
 All apartments are fire separated from each other; 
 All apartments have internal entry halls that are 30 mins fire rated with self-
closing doors with intumescent strips. That corridor cannot exceed 9 m. 
 All other doors (in basement, lobby, stairs, corridors, etc.) have self-closers 
and intumescent strips 
 Kitchens are not permitted near exits. 
Distribution of exits 
Travel distance in the public corridor shall be up to 4.5 m for buildings not higher 
than 11 m or 7.5 m max where an Automatic Opening Vent (1.5 m2, located at ceiling 
level having a min dimension of 1 m) is provided and connected to the smoke 
detectors in the corridor. These travel distances apply to all levels including ground 
floor. 
Active protection 
Firefighting equipment 
Fire mains should be designed and installed where any floor is higher than 18 m 
above ground level. 
Sprinkler system 
All residential buildings with a floor higher than 30 m above ground should be fitted 
with sprinklers.  
Smoke control and ventilation 
All stairs provided with ventilation (either automatically on the roof, or manual at 
each and every level, for use by the fire service) 
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Fire detection and alarm system 
All apartments shall have a domestic smoke alarm system with heat detectors installed 
in the kitchen and smoke detectors in the living/dining and the entry hallway with 75 
dB required at each bedhead when all doors are closed. 
Heat detection shall be provided inside each SOU entry. 
All stairs, public corridors and lobbies shall have smoke detection as part of landlord 
system. 
USA – NFPA 5000 
NFPA 5000 – Building Construction and Safety Code is a commonly used building 
code in USA and internationally. 
Passive protection 
Exit access corridor walls shall consist of fire that have not less than a 1-hour fire 
resistance rating, or, in buildings protected throughout by an approved, supervised 
automatic sprinkler system, corridor walls shall have not less than a 30 minutes fire 
resistance rating. 
Doors that open onto exit access corridors shall have a minimum 20-minute fire 
protection rating. 
Doors that open onto exit access corridors shall be self-closing and positive-latching. 
Exit enclosures shall have one hour fire rating. 
Distribution of exits 
In accordance with chapter 11 and chapter 25 
Every dwelling unit shall have access to at least two separate exits remotely located 
from each other. 
Dwelling units shall be permitted to have access to a single exit, provided that one of 
the following conditions is met: 
(1) The dwelling unit has an exit door opening directly to the street or yard at the 
finished ground level 
(2) The dwelling unit has a direct access to an outside stair that serves a maximum 
of two units, both of which are located on the same floor 
(3) The dwelling unit has direct access to an interior stair serving only that unit 
and separated from all other portions of the building by fire barriers having a 
minimum 1-hour fire resistance rating with no opening therein. 
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A single exit shall be permitted in buildings where the total number of stories does not 
exceed four provided all of the following conditions are met: 
(1) There are four or less dwelling units per story. 
(2) The building is protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic 
sprinkler system 
(3) The exit stairway does not serve more than one-half story below the level of 
exit discharge. 
(4) The travel distance from the entrance door of any dwelling unit to an exit does 
not exceed 35 ft (10.7 m). 
(5) The exit stairway is completely enclosed or separated from the rest of the 
building by barriers having a minimum 1-hour fire resistance rating. 
(6) All openings between the exit stairway enclosure and the building are 
protected with self-closing door assemblies having a minimum 1-hour fire 
protection rating 
(7) All corridors serving as access to exits have a minimum 1-hour fire resistance 
rating. 
(8) Horizontal and vertical separation having a minimum 1⁄2-hour fire resistance 
rating is provided between dwelling units. 
Travel distance within a dwelling unit (apartment) to a corridor door shall not exceed 
23 m in buildings not protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic 
sprinkler system. 
The travel distance within a dwelling unit (apartment) to a corridor door shall not 
exceed 38 m in buildings protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic 
sprinkler system. 
The travel distance from a dwelling unit (apartment) entrance door to the nearest exit 
shall not exceed 30 m.  
In buildings protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler 
system installed, the travel distance from a dwelling unit (apartment) entrance door to 
the nearest exit should not exceed 61 m. 
Active protection 
Fire detection and alarm system 
Apartment buildings with four or more stories in height or with more than 11 dwelling 
units shall be provided with a fire alarm system. 
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A fire alarm system shall not be required where each dwelling unit is separated from 
other contiguous dwelling units by fire barriers having a fire resistance rating of not 
less than 1 hour, and where each dwelling unit has either its own independent exit or 
its own independent stairway or ramp discharging at the finished ground level. 
A fire alarm system shall not be required in buildings four or fewer stories in height 
that are protected throughout by an approved automatic sprinkler system installed and 
that do not contain more than 16 dwelling units. 
Smoke alarms shall be installed in every steeping area, outside every sleeping area in 
the immediate vicinity of the bedrooms and on all levels of the dwelling unit, 
including basements. 
Sprinkler system 
All buildings shall be protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic 
sprinkler system. 
Listed quick-response or listed residential sprinklers shall be used throughout all 
dwelling units. 
Sweden - BBR 
Passive protection 
In Sweden residential apartments when designed in accordance with the prescriptive 
requirements (simplified dimensioning) should be fire separated with a construction 
achieving a Fire Resistance Level of at least 60 minutes. If the building includes three 
or more than eight storeys the staircase should be fire isolated achieving a Fire 
Resistance Level of at least 60 minutes. 
Distribution of exits 
Dwellings shall be provided with at least two independent egress paths. If the 
dwelling includes more than one storey, at least one egress path shall be provided 
from each storey. The travel distance within an egress path to a stair or an exit shall 
not extend 30 m. In egress paths where there is only one direction available for egress 
the travel distance to an exit should not exceed 10 m. 
Active fire protection 
Dwellings shall be provided with smoke alarms or an automatically activated 
occupant warning system. The alarm shall be noticeable in those rooms where 
occupants generally are located. Buildings higher than 16 storeys shall be provided 
with smoke ventilation in the staircase either with a through smoke hatches (natural 
ventilation) or mechanical ventilation. 
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Figure B. 1 Event tree overview 
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Corridor fire (P = 5.3 %) 
Smoke detection activates (P = 90 %) or fails (P = 10 %) 
 
 
  
48.0% 1.7107% 1
0 0
90.0% Sprinkler system
0 0
75.0% 1.0104% 2
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.3368% 3
0 0
42.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.1123% 4
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0374% 5
0 0
75.0% 0.2406% 6
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0802% 7
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0267% 8
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0089% 9
0 0
Heat detection
0
48.0% 0.1901% 10
0 0
10.0% Sprinkler system
0 0
75.0% 0.1123% 11
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0374% 12
0 0
42.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0125% 13
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0042% 14
0 0
75.0% 0.0267% 15
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0089% 16
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.003% 17
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 9.90E-06 18
0 0
Activates
Extinguish fire
Fails
Extinguish fire
Controls fire
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Fails
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Controls fire
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Fails
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
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Apartment fire (P = 94.7 %) 
Smoke alarm activates (P = 79 %) or fails (21 %) 
Heat detection activates (P = 90 %) or fails (P = 10 %) 
 
48.0% 32.6264% 37
0 0
Sprinkler system
0
95.0% 15.1876% 38
0 0
56.0% Smoke seals
0 0
75.0% 0.4856% 39
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.1619% 40
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.054% 41
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.018% 42
0 0
5.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.054% 43
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.018% 44
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.006% 45
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.002% 46
0 0
42.0% Apartment door
0 0
75.0% 7.6309% 47
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 2.5436% 48
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.8479% 49
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.2826% 50
0 0
44.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.8479% 51
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.2826% 52
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0942% 53
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0314% 54
Extinguish fire
Controls fire
Closed
Efficient
Fails
Activates
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Open
Activates
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
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95.0% 1.7719% 55
0 0
70.0% Smoke seals
0 0
75.0% 0.0567% 56
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0189% 57
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0063% 58
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0021% 59
0 0
5.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.0063% 60
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0021% 61
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 6.99E-06 62
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 2.33E-06 63
0 0
56.0% Door FRL
0 0
75.0% 0.4856% 64
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.1619% 65
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.054% 66
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.018% 67
0 0
30.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.054% 68
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.018% 69
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.006% 70
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.002% 71
0 0
70.0% Apartment door
0 0
75.0% 1.2718% 72
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.4239% 73
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.1413% 74
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0471% 75
0 0
44.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.1413% 76
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0471% 77
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0157% 78
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0052% 79
0 0
10.0% Fire rated construction
0 0
75.0% 1.2388% 80
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.4129% 81
0 0
90.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.1376% 82
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0459% 83
0 0
30.0% Smoke detection
0 0
75.0% 0.1376% 84
0 0
90.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0459% 85
0 0
10.0% Smoke ventilation
0 0
75.0% 0.0153% 86
0 0
10.0% Occupant awareness
0 0
25.0% 0.0051% 87
0 0
Fails
Achieves required FRL
Open
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Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Closed
Achieves required FRL
Efficient
Fails
Activates
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Fails
Activates
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Fails
Activates
Efficient
Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
Failure
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Awake
Asleep
Failure
Awake
Asleep
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Appendix C Risk model summary 
The 240 scenarios in the event tree are presented in Table C. 1. 
Table C. 1 Event tree scenarios 
Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
1 0 1 1 
2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 3 
4 2 1 1 
5 2 1 3 
6 3 1 1 
7 3 1 3 
8 4 1 1 
9 4 1 3 
10 0 1 1 
11 1 1 1 
12 1 1 3 
13 2 1 1 
14 2 1 3 
15 3 1 1 
16 3 1 3 
17 4 1 1 
18 4 1 3 
19 0 2 1 
20 1 2 1 
21 1 2 3 
22 2 2 1 
23 2 2 3 
24 3 2 1 
25 3 2 3 
26 4 2 1 
27 4 2 3 
28 0 3 1 
29 1 3 1 
30 1 3 3 
Appendix C - Risk model summary 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
31 2 3 1 
32 2 3 3 
33 3 4 2 
34 3 4 3 
35 4 4 2 
36 4 4 3 
37 0 5 1 
38 13 5 1 
39 5 8 1 
40 5 8 3 
41 6 8 1 
42 6 8 3 
43 5 9 1 
44 5 9 3 
45 6 9 1 
46 6 9 3 
47 7 8 1 
48 7 8 3 
49 8 8 1 
50 8 8 3 
51 7 9 1 
52 7 9 3 
53 8 9 1 
54 8 9 3 
55 13 5 1 
56 9 8 1 
57 9 8 3 
58 10 8 1 
59 10 8 3 
60 9 9 1 
61 9 9 3 
62 10 9 1 
63 10 9 3 
64 9 8 1 
65 9 8 3 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
66 10 8 1 
67 10 8 3 
68 9 9 1 
69 9 9 3 
70 10 9 1 
71 10 9 3 
72 11 8 1 
73 11 8 3 
74 12 8 1 
75 12 8 3 
76 11 9 1 
77 11 9 3 
78 12 9 1 
79 12 9 3 
80 9 8 1 
81 9 8 3 
82 10 8 1 
83 10 8 3 
84 9 9 1 
85 9 9 3 
86 10 9 1 
87 10 9 3 
88 0 6 1 
89 13 6 1 
90 5 8 1 
91 5 8 3 
92 6 8 1 
93 6 8 3 
94 5 10 1 
95 5 10 3 
96 6 10 1 
97 6 10 3 
98 7 8 1 
99 7 8 3 
100 8 8 1 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
101 8 8 3 
102 7 10 1 
103 7 10 3 
104 8 10 1 
105 8 10 3 
106 0 11 1 
107 9 8 1 
108 9 8 3 
109 10 8 1 
110 10 8 3 
111 9 11 2 
112 9 11 3 
113 10 11 2 
114 10 11 3 
115 9 8 1 
116 9 8 3 
117 10 8 1 
118 10 8 3 
119 9 11 1 
120 9 11 3 
121 10 11 1 
122 10 11 3 
123 11 8 1 
124 11 8 3 
125 12 8 1 
126 12 8 3 
127 11 11 2 
128 11 11 3 
129 12 11 2 
130 12 11 3 
131 9 8 1 
132 9 8 3 
133 10 8 1 
134 10 8 3 
135 9 11 2 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
136 9 11 3 
137 10 11 2 
138 10 11 3 
139 0 5 1 
140 13 5 1 
141 5 8 1 
142 5 8 3 
143 6 8 1 
144 6 8 3 
145 5 9 1 
146 5 9 3 
147 6 9 1 
148 6 9 3 
149 7 8 1 
150 7 8 3 
151 8 8 1 
152 8 8 3 
153 7 9 1 
154 7 9 3 
155 8 9 1 
156 8 9 3 
157 0 5 1 
158 9 8 1 
159 9 8 3 
160 10 8 1 
161 10 8 3 
162 9 9 1 
163 9 9 3 
164 10 9 1 
165 10 9 3 
166 9 8 1 
167 9 8 3 
168 10 8 1 
169 10 8 3 
170 9 9 1 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
171 9 9 3 
172 10 9 1 
173 10 9 3 
174 11 8 1 
175 11 8 3 
176 12 8 1 
177 12 8 3 
178 11 9 1 
179 11 9 3 
180 12 9 1 
181 12 9 3 
182 9 8 1 
183 9 8 3 
184 10 8 1 
185 10 8 3 
186 9 9 1 
187 9 9 3 
188 10 9 1 
189 10 9 3 
190 0 6 1 
191 13 6 1 
192 5 8 1 
193 5 8 3 
194 6 8 1 
195 6 8 3 
196 5 10 1 
197 5 10 3 
198 6 10 1 
199 6 10 3 
200 7 8 1 
201 7 8 3 
202 8 8 1 
203 8 8 3 
204 7 10 1 
205 7 10 3 
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Scenario Fire scenario Detection scenario Response scenario 
206 8 10 1 
207 8 10 3 
208 0 11 1 
209 9 8 1 
210 9 8 3 
211 10 8 1 
212 10 8 3 
213 9 11 2 
214 9 11 3 
215 10 11 2 
216 10 11 3 
217 9 8 1 
218 9 8 3 
219 10 8 1 
220 10 8 3 
221 9 11 2 
222 9 11 3 
223 10 11 2 
224 10 11 3 
225 11 8 1 
226 11 8 3 
227 12 8 1 
228 12 8 3 
229 11 11 2 
230 11 11 3 
231 12 11 2 
232 12 11 3 
233 9 8 1 
234 9 8 3 
235 10 8 1 
236 10 8 3 
237 9 11 2 
238 9 11 3 
239 10 11 2 
240 10 11 3 
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The ASETs for the fire scenarios are shown in Table C. 2 to Table C. 5. 
Table C. 2 ASETs for different corridor lengths between 7 m and 10 m 
Fire 
scenario 
nr 
Fire scenario 
description 
ASET for 
7 m corridor 
ASET for 
8 m corridor 
ASET for 
9 m corridor 
ASET for 
10 m 
corridor 
0 NF Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
1 CF-SC-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
2 CF-SC-VF 207 193 198 249 
3 CF-SF-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
4 CF-SF-VF 205 225 234 250 
5 AF-SC-SS-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
6 AF-SC-SS-VF Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
7 AF-SC-DO-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
8 AF-SC-DO-VF Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
9 AF-SF-SS-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
10 AF-SF-SS-VF 497 495 498 501 
11 AF-SF-DO-VE Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
12 AF-SF-DO-VF 497 495 498 501 
13 - Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
 
Table C. 3 ASETs for different corridor lengths between 10 m and 15 m 
Fire 
scenario 
nr 
ASET for 11 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
12 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
13 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
14 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
15 m 
corridor 
0 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
1 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
2 270 307 349 394 432 
3 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
4 262 276 288 303 316 
5 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
6 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
7 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
8 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
9 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
10 504 507 509 512 512 
11 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
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Fire 
scenario 
nr 
ASET for 11 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
12 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
13 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
14 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
15 m 
corridor 
12 504 507 509 512 512 
13 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
 
Table C. 4 ASETs for different corridor lengths between 16 m and 20 m 
Fire 
scenario 
nr 
ASET for 16 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
17 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
18 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
19 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
20 m 
corridor 
0 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
1 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
2 475 511 555 588 630 
3 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
4 331 343 358 369 385 
5 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
6 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
7 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
8 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
9 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
10 518 519 518 521 522 
11 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
12 518 519 518 521 522 
13 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
 
Table C. 5 ASETs for different corridor lengths between 21 m and 25 m 
Fire 
scenario 
nr 
ASET for 21 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
22 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
23 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
24 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
25 m 
corridor 
0 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
1 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
2 663 705 735 776 765 
3 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
4 399 414 423 437 451 
5 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
6 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
7 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
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Fire 
scenario 
nr 
ASET for 21 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
22 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
23 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
24 m 
corridor 
ASET for 
25 m 
corridor 
8 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
9 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
10 527 527 528 530 530 
11 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
12 527 527 528 530 530 
13 Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
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Appendix D Fire modelling 
The fire scenarios were modelled using Pyrosim in combination with FDS for all 
corridor lengths between 7 and 25 m. 
General modelling settings 
Compartment dimensions 
The compartment dimensions were chosen after reviewing a number of recent 
residential building projects in Australia and were set as “standard compartments” in 
the model. Floor and roof were assumed to be concrete and all walls were assumed to 
be gypsum. 
Apartment 
The standard compartment size for apartments was determined to be: 
 Width: 4 m 
 Length 8 m 
 Ceiling height: 2.4 m 
Corridor 
The available time for egress was modelled for all corridor lengths (1 m increments) 
between 7 m and 30 m. The other dimensions of the corridor were determined to be 
(compliant with the BCA): 
 Width: 1.2 m 
 Ceiling height: 2.4 m 
Doors 
The dimensions of the doors were determined to be as follows: 
 Width: 0.92 m 
 Height: 2.1 m 
Windows 
The apartment was determined to have one window with the following dimensions: 
 Width: 1.3 m 
 Height: 1.3 m 
The window was expected to break during because of the radiating heat and flame 
impingements from the fire. The window was therefore determined to be fully open 
during the entire fire scenario.  
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Smoke leakage 
Air leakage through small gaps in CFD is difficult. CFD can only calculate effects 
when the applied computational grid correctly resolves the geometry. To resolve gaps 
of a few millimetres the grid resolution would have to be increased to level which 
would quickly consume available computer resources and not be able to finish in 
time. Therefore a sub-model within FDS was used to predict the smoke leakage into 
the corridor based on the pressure distance. 
?̇?𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌 = 𝑨𝑳(∆𝒑)√𝟐
|∆𝒑|
𝝆∞
 
 
Equation D. 1 
Where, 
?̇?𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘  = Air leakage flow [m
3/s] 
AL = Leak area [m
2] 
∆𝑝 = Pressure difference between the areas [Pa] 
𝜌∞ = Ambient density of air [kg/m
3] 
Smoke leakage from a failing smoke seal would be through small slots along the 
perimeter of the door. And the total smoke area was therefore assumed to be 600 m2. 
Fire scenarios with the door open were represented as a hole between the apartment 
and the corridor with the same dimensions as a door, representing the door being fully 
wedged open. 
Sprinkler system effects 
The sprinkler system was assumed to either extinguish or control the fire. The 
scenarios when the sprinkler system extinguished the fire were assumed to not cause 
any consequences and the ASETs for these scenarios were therefore determined to be 
indefinite. Fatalities in sprinklered fires are very rare, hence the assumption that there 
are not fatalities when the sprinkler system controls the fire is reasonable. 
For the sprinkler controlled fires the following method presented by Staffansson 
(2010) was applied. 
If ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 < 5. MW: 
 After the sprinkler activation, the heat release rate is kept constant for the 
duration of one minute, equal to ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡, 
 After one minute, the heat release rate is reduced by a third of the heat 
release rate at the time of sprinkler activation. This reduction occurs over 
the next subsequent minute. 
 The heat release rate can then be assumed to be a third of ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 for the rest 
of the fire progress. 
If ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡 > 5. MW: 
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 After sprinkler activation, the heat release rate can be assumed constant, 
equal to ?̇?𝑎𝑐𝑡  for the rest of the fire progress. 
The sprinkler activation time and heat release rate was obtained from the fire 
modellings. 
Devices 
The conditions in the corridor was measured by providing smoke layer measuring 
devices, thermocouples and FED measurement points throughout the corridor with a 
spacing of two meters between each measurement point. The devices were determined 
to evaluate the conditions at a height of 2 m above the floor. 
Heat detectors and smoke detectors were also provided each 5.1 m in the corridor to 
measure the activation times for those devices. 
Slice files were provided to evaluate the temperature and the visibility throughout the 
corridor and the apartment. 
Corridor fire 
The input values for the corridor fire modellings are presented in Table D. 1. 
Table D. 1 Input values for corridor fire modellings 
Fire 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Fire size 300 kW 
 
Comparable to three burning 
wastepaper baskets. 
Location In the middle of the corridor. This will result in the greatest 
height of rise and maximum 
volume of smoke production. 
Fire growth A t2 growth rate (α = 0.0117 
kW/s2)  
Growth rate (α) adopted from 
Karlsson & Quintiere (2000) 
 
Burner The burner area was 
assumed to be 0.4 m x 0.4 m. 
 
Reaction 
properties 
Release per unit mass 
oxygen = 13.1 MJ/kg  
SOOT_YIELD = 0.1 g/g  
CO_YIELD = 0.0 g/g 
FDS is only capable of modelling 
one fuel type. The values are taken 
as the default values for 
Polyurethane in Pyrosim, which 
are based on NFPA Babrauskas. 
Visibility factor A visibility factor of 3 was 
adopted. 
Default value in FDS. 
Ambient conditions 
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Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Temperature Ambient Temperature of 
20°C was adopted 
 
Wind  No external wind was 
modelled. 
 
Geometry 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Material 
Properties 
Floor and roof were 
modelled as concrete. 
Apartment and corridor 
walls were modelled as 
gypsum. 
Common construction in 
Australian apartment buildings. 
Dimensions The corridors were built up 
with the dimensions shown 
in section 6.1.3. 
 
Openings A 0.01 m2 hole was included 
at each end of the corridor 
to represent leakage in the 
construction. The holes were 
located adjoining the floor. 
 
Computational 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Mesh size A uniform cell size of 0.1 m 
was adopted for the corridor 
fires. 
 
Apartment fire 
Table D. 2 Input for apartment fire modellings 
Fire 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Fire size 4.3 MW Maximum heat release rate set to 
a value higher than calculated ?̇?𝐹𝑂  
Location In the middle of the 
apartment 
 
Fire growth A t2 growth rate (α = 0.0117 
kW/s2)  
Growth rate (α) adopted from 
Karlsson & Quintiere (2000) 
 
Burner The burner area was 
assumed to be 3 m x 2 m. 
Assumed size of a burning 
furniture 
Reaction Release per unit mass FDS is only capable of modelling 
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properties oxygen = 13.1 MJ/kg  
SOOT_YIELD = 0.1 g/g  
CO_YIELD = 0.0 g/g 
 
one fuel type. The values are taken 
as the default values for 
Polyurethane in Pyrosim, which 
are based on NFPA Babrauskas. 
Visibility factor A visibility factor of 3 was 
adopted. 
Default value in FDS. 
Ambient conditions 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Temperature Ambient Temperature of 
20°C was adopted 
 
Wind  No external wind was 
modelled. 
 
Geometry 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Material 
Properties 
Floor and roof were 
modelled as concrete. 
Apartment and corridor 
walls were modelled as 
gypsum. 
Common construction in 
Australian apartment buildings. 
Dimensions The corridors were built up 
with the dimensions shown 
in section 6.1.3. 
 
Openings A 0.01 m2 hole was included 
at each end of the corridor 
to represent leakage in the 
construction. The holes were 
located adjoining the floor. 
 
Computational 
Parameter Data Input or Assumptions Comments 
Mesh size A uniform cell size of 0.1 m 
was adopted for the 
apartment fires. 
 
Fire modelling snapshots 
Below are snapshots from the fire modelling of fire scenario 12 for a 25 m corridor. 
The geometry in Figure D. 1 shows the apartment of fire origin located near the end 
of the corridor and an opening with the size of a door to the corridor representing a 
fully wedged open door. 
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Figure D. 1 Geometry setup 
After approximately 140 s the smoke layer had filled up the entire corridor as shown 
in Figure D. 2. 
 
Figure D. 2 Smoke layer filling up the entire corridor 
At that time the visibility in the hot gas layer was nearly zero, however were the 
visibility under the smoke layer (at the height of approximately one meter) at least 
thirty meters as shown in Figure D. 3 
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Figure D. 3 Visibility in the corridor after 140 s 
After 400 s the visibility was nearly zero in the entire corridor and the temperature 
varied between 20 °C and 300 °C as shown in Figure D. 4. 
 
Figure D. 4 Temperatures in the corridor after 400 s 
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Fire modelling results 
The ASETs generated by the fire modellings are presented in Table C. 2 to Table C. 
5. For fire scenarios where untenable conditions did not occur an ASET of 2000 s was 
assumed. 
The fire modellings for scenarios including smoke leakage through smoke seal failure 
(Fire scenario 6 and 10) generated results showing that untenable conditions never 
occur. This was deemed unrealistic for sprinkler failure scenarios (Fire Scenario 10), 
and for these fire scenarios the ASET was determined to be the same as smoke 
leakage with the door wedged open. 
Validation of results 
To validate the results of the fire modelling a quality assurance manual developed by 
Frantzich and Nystedt (2011) was reviewed. The manual includes a checklist for 
assure that the simulation considers some crucial aspects in regards to the quality of 
the result. Since the parameters were roughly the same in all simulations the 
validation was only conducted for one corridor fire and one apartment fire. The 
validation is shown in Table D. 3. 
Table D. 3 Fire modelling validation 
Validation moment Corridor fire Apartment fire Comment 
Control that Q* is in 
the order of 0.3 to 
2.5. 
Q* = 0.89 Q* = 1.38 Results for both fires are 
acceptable. 
Control that the 
resolution D*/dx is 
in the order of 10 to 
20. 
D*/dx = 4 D*/dx = 20 Result acceptable for 
Apartment fire. Corridor 
fire was further analysed 
and the impact when 
using D*/dx = 10 was not 
more than 10 % and 
therefore deemed 
acceptable. 
Control that 
domains are 
correctly interlinked 
and are visible. 
Control that there 
are no domain 
borders where 
stream of gases is 
expected to be high. 
Done. Done. Both simulations are 
acceptable. 
Control combustion 
and material 
Done.  Done. Both simulations are 
acceptable. 
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Validation moment Corridor fire Apartment fire Comment 
properties 
Control that the 
radiation model is 
used. 
Done. Done. Radiation not of interest 
when developing the 
model therefore the 
accuracy of the radiation 
model is not relevant. 
Control that the 
flame temperature 
is in the order of 
700 °C to 1200 °C 
Flame 
temperature is 
700 °C. 
Flame 
temperature 
varies from 
770 °C to 
820 °C. 
Result is acceptable.  
Compare the flame 
height of the 
simulation with that 
of hand calculations. 
Flame height 
in fire 
modelling: 
0.3 m 
 
Hand 
calculated 
flame height: 
1.84 m  
Flame height in 
fire modelling: 
2.1 m 
 
Hand calculated 
flame height: 
4.6 m 
Calculated flame height is 
significantly higher than 
the flame height in the 
simulation. The hand 
calculation estimates the 
flame height of a free 
burning flame. The flame 
in the fire modelling is 
limited by the ventilation 
conditions and the ceiling 
height. Therefore the 
result is deemed to be 
acceptable. 
Check that the 
adiabatic flame 
temperature does 
not exceed 1300 °C. 
Done Done Adiabatic flame 
temperature did not 
exceed 1300 °C. 
Check if calculated 
HRR is equivalent 
with HRR given by 
the simulation. Note 
if fire is under 
ventilated. 
Ventilation 
controlled. 
Fuel controlled.  As shown in Figure D.5 
and Figure D.6 was the 
corridor fire ventilation 
limited and the 
apartment fire fuel 
controlled.  
Grid size reduced 
from 0.1 m to 
0.05 m 
Impact on 
result is less 
than 10 % 
Impact on result 
is less than 10 % 
The grid size of 0.1 m 
which was used in the 
fire modellings was 
shown to be sufficient.  
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Figure D. 5 Heat Release Rate (HRR) for Corridor fire (ventilation controlled) 
 
Figure D. 6 Heat Release Rate (HRR) for Apartment fire (fuel controlled) 
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Script file 
Since there are several modellings conducted with small changes only one example of 
a script file is shown. Presented below is the script file for the fire modelling of fire 
scenario 12 for a 9 m corridor. As explained in Table 8.1 scenario 12 represents 
Apartment Fire – Sprinkler Failure – Door Open – Ventilation system Failure. 
AF-SF-DO-VF_9m.fds 
Generated by PyroSim - Version 2012.1.1221 
04/11/2013 5:45:38 PM 
 
&HEAD CHID='AF-SF-DO-VF_9m'/ 
&TIME T_END=1500.0/ 
&DUMP RENDER_FILE='AF-SF-DO-VF_9m.ge1', DT_RESTART=300.0/ 
 
&MESH ID='MESH', IJK=123,18,30, XB=-3.1,9.2,-0.2,1.6,-0.3,2.7/ 
&MESH ID='MESH02', IJK=43,80,30, XB=-3.1,1.2,1.6,9.6,-0.3,2.7/ 
 
&PART ID='Water', 
      WATER=.TRUE., 
      AGE=60.0, 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=4.184, 
      MELTING_TEMPERATURE=0.0, 
      VAPORIZATION_TEMPERATURE=100.0, 
      HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION=2259.0/ 
 
&REAC ID='POLYURETHANE', 
      FYI='NFPA Babrauskas', 
      C=6.3, 
      H=7.1, 
      O=2.1, 
      N=1.0, 
      SOOT_YIELD=0.1/ 
 
&PROP ID='Default', QUANTITY='LINK TEMPERATURE', 
ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=68.0/ 
&PROP ID='Cleary Ionization I1', 
      QUANTITY='CHAMBER OBSCURATION', 
      ALPHA_E=2.5, 
      BETA_E=-0.7, 
      ALPHA_C=0.8, 
      BETA_C=-0.9/ 
&PROP ID='Default_Water Spray', 
      QUANTITY='SPRINKLER LINK TEMPERATURE', 
      ACTIVATION_TEMPERATURE=68.0, 
      PART_ID='Water', 
      FLOW_RATE=0.0, 
      DROPLET_VELOCITY=5.0/ 
&DEVC ID='LAYER', QUANTITY='LAYER HEIGHT', XB=0.5,0.5,0.7,0.7,0.0,2.4/ 
&DEVC ID='LAYER02', QUANTITY='LAYER HEIGHT', XB=2.5,2.5,0.7,0.7,0.0,2.4/ 
&DEVC ID='LAYER03', QUANTITY='LAYER HEIGHT', XB=4.5,4.5,0.7,0.7,0.0,2.4/ 
&DEVC ID='LAYER04', QUANTITY='LAYER HEIGHT', XB=6.5,6.5,0.7,0.7,0.0,2.4/ 
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&DEVC ID='LAYER0402', QUANTITY='LAYER HEIGHT', XB=8.5,8.5,0.7,0.7,0.0,2.4/ 
&DEVC ID='THCPApt', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=-1.1,9.3,2.3/ 
&DEVC ID='THCP', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=0.5,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='THCP02', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=2.5,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='THCP03', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=4.5,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='THCP04', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=6.5,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='THCP0402', QUANTITY='THERMOCOUPLE', XYZ=8.5,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED2m', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=0.7,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED1m', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=0.7,0.7,1.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED0.5m', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=0.7,0.7,0.5/ 
&DEVC ID='FED2m02', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=2.7,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED2m03', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=4.7,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED2m04', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=6.7,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='FED2m0402', QUANTITY='FED', XYZ=8.7,0.7,2.0/ 
&DEVC ID='HD', PROP_ID='Default', XYZ=3.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='HD02', PROP_ID='Default', XYZ=8.2,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='HD06', PROP_ID='Default', XYZ=1.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SD', PROP_ID='Cleary Ionization I1', XYZ=3.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SD02', PROP_ID='Cleary Ionization I1', XYZ=8.2,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SPRK', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray', XYZ=3.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SPRK02', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray', XYZ=8.2,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SD06', PROP_ID='Cleary Ionization I1', XYZ=1.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SPRK06', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray', XYZ=1.1,0.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='HDapt', PROP_ID='Default', XYZ=-0.9,3.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SDapt', PROP_ID='Cleary Ionization I1', XYZ=-0.9,3.7,2.35/ 
&DEVC ID='SPRKapt', PROP_ID='Default_Water Spray', XYZ=-0.9,3.7,2.35/ 
 
&MATL ID='GYPSUM', 
      FYI='NBSIR 88-3752 - ATF NIST Multi-Floor Validation', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.09, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=0.17, 
      DENSITY=930.0/ 
&MATL ID='CONCRETE', 
      FYI='NBSIR 88-3752 - ATF NIST Multi-Floor Validation', 
      SPECIFIC_HEAT=1.04, 
      CONDUCTIVITY=1.8, 
      DENSITY=2280.0/ 
 
&SURF ID='Gypsum', 
      COLOR='GRAY 80', 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='GYPSUM', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.1/ 
&SURF ID='Concrete', 
      COLOR='GRAY 40', 
      MATL_ID(1,1)='CONCRETE', 
      MATL_MASS_FRACTION(1,1)=1.0, 
      THICKNESS(1)=0.1/ 
&SURF ID='Burner', 
      COLOR='RED', 
      HRRPUA=717.0, 
      RAMP_Q='Burner_RAMP_Q'/ 
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&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=0.0, F=0.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=5.0, F=6.81525E-5/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=10.0, F=2.7261E-4/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=15.0, F=6.13372E-4/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=20.0, F=0.00109044/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=25.0, F=0.00170381/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=30.0, F=0.00245349/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=35.0, F=0.00333947/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=40.0, F=0.00436176/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=45.0, F=0.00552035/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=50.0, F=0.00681524/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=55.0, F=0.00824645/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=60.0, F=0.00981395/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=65.0, F=0.0115178/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=70.0, F=0.0133579/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=75.0, F=0.0153343/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=80.0, F=0.017447/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=85.0, F=0.0196961/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=90.0, F=0.0220814/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=95.0, F=0.024603/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=100.0, F=0.027261/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=105.0, F=0.0300552/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=110.0, F=0.0329858/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=115.0, F=0.0360526/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=120.0, F=0.0392558/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=125.0, F=0.0425953/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=130.0, F=0.0460711/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=135.0, F=0.0496831/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=140.0, F=0.0534315/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=145.0, F=0.0573162/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=150.0, F=0.0613372/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=155.0, F=0.0654945/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=160.0, F=0.0697881/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=165.0, F=0.074218/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=170.0, F=0.0787842/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=175.0, F=0.0834868/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=180.0, F=0.0883256/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=185.0, F=0.0933007/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=190.0, F=0.0984121/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=195.0, F=0.10366/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=200.0, F=0.109044/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=205.0, F=0.114564/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=210.0, F=0.120221/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=215.0, F=0.126014/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=220.0, F=0.131943/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=225.0, F=0.138009/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=230.0, F=0.144211/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=235.0, F=0.150549/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=240.0, F=0.157023/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=245.0, F=0.163634/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=250.0, F=0.170381/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=255.0, F=0.177265/ 
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&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=260.0, F=0.184284/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=265.0, F=0.19144/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=270.0, F=0.198733/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=275.0, F=0.206161/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=280.0, F=0.213726/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=285.0, F=0.221427/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=290.0, F=0.229265/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=295.0, F=0.237239/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=300.0, F=0.245349/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=305.0, F=0.253595/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=310.0, F=0.261978/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=315.0, F=0.270497/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=320.0, F=0.279152/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=325.0, F=0.287944/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=330.0, F=0.296872/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=335.0, F=0.305936/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=340.0, F=0.315137/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=345.0, F=0.324474/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=350.0, F=0.333947/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=355.0, F=0.343557/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=360.0, F=0.353302/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=365.0, F=0.363184/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=370.0, F=0.373203/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=375.0, F=0.383358/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=380.0, F=0.393649/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=385.0, F=0.404076/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=390.0, F=0.41464/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=395.0, F=0.425339/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=400.0, F=0.436176/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=405.0, F=0.447148/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=410.0, F=0.458257/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=415.0, F=0.469502/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=420.0, F=0.480884/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=425.0, F=0.492401/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=430.0, F=0.504056/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=435.0, F=0.515846/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=440.0, F=0.527773/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=445.0, F=0.539836/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=450.0, F=0.552035/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=455.0, F=0.56437/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=460.0, F=0.576842/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=465.0, F=0.589451/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=470.0, F=0.602195/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=475.0, F=0.615076/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=480.0, F=0.628093/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=485.0, F=0.641246/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=490.0, F=0.654536/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=495.0, F=0.667962/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=500.0, F=0.681525/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=505.0, F=0.695223/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=510.0, F=0.709058/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=515.0, F=0.723029/ 
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&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=520.0, F=0.737137/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=525.0, F=0.751381/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=530.0, F=0.765761/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=535.0, F=0.780277/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=540.0, F=0.79493/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=545.0, F=0.809719/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=550.0, F=0.824645/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=555.0, F=0.839706/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=560.0, F=0.854904/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=565.0, F=0.870239/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=570.0, F=0.885709/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=575.0, F=0.901316/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=580.0, F=0.917059/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=585.0, F=0.932939/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=590.0, F=0.948955/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=595.0, F=0.965107/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=600.0, F=0.981395/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=605.0, F=0.99782/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=610.0, F=1.0/ 
&RAMP ID='Burner_RAMP_Q', T=1500.0, F=1.0/ 
 
&OBST XB=-1.23358E-18,9.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,2.4, COLOR='INVISIBLE', SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Wall S 
&OBST XB=-1.11022E-16,9.0,1.3,1.4,0.0,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Wall N 
&OBST XB=-0.1,4.44089E-16,1.11022E-16,1.4,0.0,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Wall W 
&OBST XB=9.0,9.1,1.11022E-16,1.4,0.0,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Wall E 
&OBST XB=-0.1,9.1,0.0,1.4,-0.1,2.77556E-17, SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Floor 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,1.6,9.4,-0.1,2.77556E-17, SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Apt floor 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,1.3,1.6,-0.1,2.77556E-17, SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Apt floor 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,1.6,9.4,2.4,2.5, COLOR='INVISIBLE', SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Apt roof 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,1.3,1.6,2.4,2.5, COLOR='INVISIBLE', SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Apt roof 
&OBST XB=-0.1,9.1,0.0,1.4,2.4,2.5, COLOR='INVISIBLE', SURF_ID='Concrete'/ Roof 
&OBST XB=-3.0,-2.9,1.6,9.3,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,9.3,9.4,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
&OBST XB=1.0,1.1,1.6,9.3,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
&OBST XB=-3.0,-2.9,1.4,1.6,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
&OBST XB=-3.0,1.1,1.3,1.4,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
&OBST XB=1.0,1.1,1.4,1.6,2.77556E-17,2.4, SURF_ID='Gypsum'/ Apt walls 
 
&HOLE XB=8.95,9.21,0.6,0.7,0.0,0.1/ Hole 
&HOLE XB=0.0,0.92,1.25,1.45,0.0,2.1/ Hole 
&HOLE XB=-1.8,-0.1,9.25,9.45,1.0,2.3/ Window 
&HOLE XB=-0.15,0.05,0.6,0.7,0.0,0.1/ Hole 
 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=9.2,9.2,-0.2,1.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH [XMAX] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,-3.1,-0.2,1.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH [XMIN] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=1.2,9.2,1.6,1.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH [YMAX] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,9.2,-0.2,-0.2,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH [YMIN] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,9.2,-0.2,1.6,2.7,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH [ZMAX] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,9.2,-0.2,1.6,-0.3,-0.3/ Mesh Vent: MESH [ZMIN] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=1.2,1.2,1.6,9.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH02 [XMAX] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,-3.1,1.6,9.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH02 [XMIN] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,1.2,9.6,9.6,-0.3,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH02 [YMAX] 
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&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,1.2,1.6,9.6,2.7,2.7/ Mesh Vent: MESH02 [ZMAX] 
&VENT SURF_ID='OPEN', XB=-3.1,1.2,1.6,9.6,-0.3,-0.3/ Mesh Vent: MESH02 [ZMIN] 
&VENT SURF_ID='Burner', XB=-2.5,0.5,5.0,7.0,0.01,0.01/ Fire 
 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBY=0.7/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='TEMPERATURE', PBX=-1.1/ 
&SLCF QUANTITY='VISIBILITY', PBY=0.7/ 
 
 
&TAIL / 
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Ref
"These calculation sheets need the macro to be enabled to work"
Sprinkler Response
Ref 1
Where r/H > 0.18, and
Where r/H ≤ 0.18, and
Where r/H > 0.15
Where r/H ≤ 0.15
Symbols
Tg is the maximum, near ceiling, fire-gas temperature (°C)
Ta is the ambient temperature (°C)
         is the total heat release rate of the fire (kW)
r is the radial distance from the axis of the fire plume (m)
H is the height above the origin of the fire (m)
u is the maximum, near ceiling, fire-gas velocity (m)
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Corridor sprinkler 
 
Ref
Ref 1
Where
Td is the temperature of the detector link (°C)
RTI is the Response Time Index for the link (m1/2s1/2)
Design Fire
Dt = 5 s
Option = 1
a  0.0117 kW/s2 for a t2 fire
Max HRR = 300 kW
Compartment Data
Ta = 20 °C
r = 2.55 m
H = 2 m
r/H 1.275
Sprinkler Input Parameters
RTI = 50 m1/2s1/2
Tact = 68 °C
Td = 68.1 °C
Error = 0.08%
tact = 183.0 s
                  = 300.0 kW
Ref 2 Sprinkler Suppression
= 300.0 kW
Spray density, = 0 mm/min
t2-Fire
Calculations
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Q
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Ref
Version 1.1
t Tg - Ta Tg u Td,n - Td,n-1 Td
s kW °C °C m/s °C °C kW kW
0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.00 0.00 20.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.3 0.6 20.6 0.09 0.02 20.0 0.3 0.3
10 1.2 1.6 21.6 0.14 0.06 20.1 1.2 1.2
15 2.6 2.8 22.8 0.18 0.11 20.2 2.6 2.6
20 4.7 4.0 24.0 0.22 0.18 20.4 4.7 4.7
25 7.3 5.4 25.4 0.25 0.25 20.6 7.3 7.3
30 10.6 6.9 26.9 0.28 0.34 21.0 10.6 10.6
35 14.4 8.5 28.5 0.32 0.42 21.4 14.4 14.4
40 18.8 10.2 30.2 0.34 0.52 21.9 18.8 18.8
45 23.7 11.9 31.9 0.37 0.61 22.5 23.7 23.7
50 29.3 13.7 33.7 0.40 0.71 23.2 29.3 29.3
55 35.5 15.6 35.6 0.43 0.81 24.0 35.5 35.5
60 42.2 17.5 37.5 0.45 0.90 24.9 42.2 42.2
65 49.5 19.4 39.4 0.48 1.00 25.9 49.5 49.5
70 57.4 21.5 41.5 0.50 1.10 27.0 57.4 57.4
75 65.9 23.5 43.5 0.52 1.19 28.2 65.9 65.9
80 75.0 25.6 45.6 0.55 1.29 29.5 75.0 75.0
85 84.7 27.8 47.8 0.57 1.38 30.9 84.7 84.7
90 95.0 30.0 50.0 0.59 1.47 32.4 95.0 95.0
95 105.8 32.2 52.2 0.61 1.56 33.9 105.8 105.8
100 117.2 34.5 54.5 0.63 1.64 35.6 117.2 117.2
105 129.2 36.8 56.8 0.66 1.72 37.3 129.2 129.2
110 141.8 39.2 59.2 0.68 1.80 39.1 141.8 141.8
115 155.0 41.6 61.6 0.70 1.88 41.0 155.0 155.0
120 168.8 44.0 64.0 0.72 1.95 42.9 168.8 168.8
125 183.2 46.5 66.5 0.74 2.02 44.9 183.2 183.2
130 198.1 49.0 69.0 0.76 2.09 47.0 198.1 198.1
135 213.6 51.5 71.5 0.78 2.16 49.2 213.6 213.6
140 229.8 54.1 74.1 0.79 2.22 51.4 229.8 229.8
145 246.5 56.7 76.7 0.81 2.28 53.7 246.5 246.5
150 263.8 59.3 79.3 0.83 2.33 56.0 263.8 263.8
155 281.6 61.9 81.9 0.85 2.39 58.4 281.6 281.6
160 300.0 64.6 84.6 0.87 2.44 60.8 300.0 300.0
165 300.0 64.6 84.6 0.87 2.21 63.0 300.0 300.0
170 300.0 64.6 84.6 0.87 2.01 65.1 300.0 300.0
175 300.0 64.6 84.6 0.87 1.82 66.9 300.0 300.0
Table 1: Sprinkler Response and Suppression Calculations
Calculations Comments

Q controlQ

 actttQ 

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Ref
Version 1.1
Reference
CommentsCalculations
2. Fleming, R. P., Automatic Sprinkler System Calculations, Section
4/Chapter 3, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (4th
Edition), Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 2008.
Figure 1: Link Temperature (Unsprinklered)
Figure 2: Design Fires
1. Custer R. L. P., Meacham. B. J., Schifiliti, R. P., Design of Detection
Systems - Heat Detection , Section 4/Chapter 1, SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering (4th Edition), Society of Fire Protection
Engineers, 2008.
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Apartment sprinkler 
 
Ref
Version 1.1
Ref 1
Where
Td is the temperature of the detector link (°C)
RTI is the Response Time Index for the link (m1/2s1/2)
Design Fire
Dt = 5 s For plotting only
Option = 1
a  0.0117 kW/s2 for a t2 fire
Max HRR = 4300 kW
Compartment Data
Ta = 20 °C
r = 2.55 m
H = 2 m
r/H 1.275
Sprinkler Input Parameters
RTI = 50 m1/2s1/2 Fast response
Tact = 68 °C
Td = 68.2 °C
Error = 0.16%
tact = 178.0 s
                  = 371.4 kW
Ref 2 Sprinkler Suppression
= 371.4 kW Refer to 
Spray density, = 0 mm/min
t2-Fire
Calculations Comments
control
Q


w
 
1,
1,,
2
1
. 

D











 nd
ndng
nd Tt
RTI
TTu
T
 acttQ

   
 



































85.1
''
60
0.3
exp
w
tt
tQttQ actactact
control
Q

Appendix E - Sprinkler activation time 
142 
 
 
Ref
Version 1.1
t Tg - Ta Tg u Td,n - Td,n-1 Td
s kW °C °C m/s °C °C kW kW
0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.00 0.00 20.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.3 0.6 20.6 0.09 0.02 20.0 0.3 0.3
10 1.2 1.6 21.6 0.14 0.06 20.1 1.2 1.2
15 2.6 2.8 22.8 0.18 0.11 20.2 2.6 2.6
20 4.7 4.0 24.0 0.22 0.18 20.4 4.7 4.7
25 7.3 5.4 25.4 0.25 0.25 20.6 7.3 7.3
30 10.6 6.9 26.9 0.28 0.34 21.0 10.6 10.6
35 14.4 8.5 28.5 0.32 0.42 21.4 14.4 14.4
40 18.8 10.2 30.2 0.34 0.52 21.9 18.8 18.8
45 23.7 11.9 31.9 0.37 0.61 22.5 23.7 23.7
50 29.3 13.7 33.7 0.40 0.71 23.2 29.3 29.3
55 35.5 15.6 35.6 0.43 0.81 24.0 35.5 35.5
60 42.2 17.5 37.5 0.45 0.90 24.9 42.2 42.2
65 49.5 19.4 39.4 0.48 1.00 25.9 49.5 49.5
70 57.4 21.5 41.5 0.50 1.10 27.0 57.4 57.4
75 65.9 23.5 43.5 0.52 1.19 28.2 65.9 65.9
80 75.0 25.6 45.6 0.55 1.29 29.5 75.0 75.0
85 84.7 27.8 47.8 0.57 1.38 30.9 84.7 84.7
90 95.0 30.0 50.0 0.59 1.47 32.4 95.0 95.0
95 105.8 32.2 52.2 0.61 1.56 33.9 105.8 105.8
100 117.2 34.5 54.5 0.63 1.64 35.6 117.2 117.2
105 129.2 36.8 56.8 0.66 1.72 37.3 129.2 129.2
110 141.8 39.2 59.2 0.68 1.80 39.1 141.8 141.8
115 155.0 41.6 61.6 0.70 1.88 41.0 155.0 155.0
120 168.8 44.0 64.0 0.72 1.95 42.9 168.8 168.8
125 183.2 46.5 66.5 0.74 2.02 44.9 183.2 183.2
130 198.1 49.0 69.0 0.76 2.09 47.0 198.1 198.1
135 213.6 51.5 71.5 0.78 2.16 49.2 213.6 213.6
140 229.8 54.1 74.1 0.79 2.22 51.4 229.8 229.8
145 246.5 56.7 76.7 0.81 2.28 53.7 246.5 246.5
150 263.8 59.3 79.3 0.83 2.33 56.0 263.8 263.8
155 281.6 61.9 81.9 0.85 2.39 58.4 281.6 281.6
160 300.1 64.6 84.6 0.87 2.44 60.8 300.1 300.1
165 319.1 67.3 87.3 0.89 2.49 63.3 319.1 319.1
170 338.8 70.0 90.0 0.90 2.54 65.9 338.8 338.8
175 359.0 72.8 92.8 0.92 2.58 68.5 359.0 359.0
Table 1: Sprinkler Response and Suppression Calculations
Calculations Comments

Q controlQ

 actttQ 

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Ref
Version 1.1
Reference
2. Fleming, R. P., Automatic Sprinkler System Calculations, Section
4/Chapter 3, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (4th
Edition), Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 2008.
Figure 1: Link Temperature (Unsprinklered)
Figure 2: Design Fires
1. Custer R. L. P., Meacham. B. J., Schifiliti, R. P., Design of Detection
Systems - Heat Detection , Section 4/Chapter 1, SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering (4th Edition), Society of Fire Protection
Engineers, 2008.
CommentsCalculations
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Appendix F Maximum Heat Release Rate 
Apartment fire 
The maximum heat release rate was calculated by using Equation F. 1 which is 
presented in Enclosure Fire Dynamics (Karlsson & Quintiere, 2000) 
?̇?𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏. 𝟓𝟏𝟖 ∙  𝑨𝟎√𝑯𝟎 Equation F. 1 
 
where, 
?̇?𝑚𝑎𝑥 = the maximum energy release rate [MW] 
𝐴0 = the area of openings [m
2] 
𝐻0 = height of openings [m] 
Parameter Value Unit 
𝑨𝟎 2.47 m
2 
𝑯𝟎 1.3 m 
?̇?𝒎𝒂𝒙 4.24 MW 
 
